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This dissertation recovers several stories from earlier times about law’s relationship to 
embodiment, materiality, and nature. These stories range chronologically from 
Sophocles’ Antigone in the fifth-century BCE to Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s Venus in 
Furs in the second half of the nineteenth-century, to contemporary inquiries into legal 
materialisms. Included are texts in the Western tradition of jurisprudence that deal with 
sometimes wide-ranging and diverse topics from modern social contract theory and the 
concept of political obligation to the phenomenon of animal trials, the classical Greek 
nomos—phusis debate, the medieval Scholastic concept of analogia entis, and 
contemporary discussions about law’s spatial dimension. An effort to illuminate how 
these stories collectively compose an important—if today often overlooked—strand of 
the natural law tradition connects all the chapters. This strand of natural law thinking 
engaged law as a material embodied practice. It offers another way of doing and thinking 
about law that emphasizes material bodies and their interests rather than some abstract 
subject of law and right. The dissertation argues that these stories from the natural law 
tradition—from regions and thinkers intimate with and integral to the West’s 
contemporary constellation—can still critically illuminate the matter of law in our world. 
Chapters One, Two, and Three recover and disclose an understanding of law and 
nature that I show is obscured today and yet has been effectively articulated in the past in 
a tradition of natural law. My interest in these “story” chapters is with what possibilities 
for law and nature we obscure when we tell ourselves stories about the loss of the natural 
law or the disintegration of natural law theory. Each of these chapters turns to a specific 
historical moment and text in the Western natural law tradition to reconsider its 
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possibilities and ultimately pursue a “path not taken,” or a “minor literature” of natural 
law thought so to speak.  
 The first chapter reveals three visions of law circulating in Sophocles’ Antigone: 
legal positivist, conventional natural law, and one that focuses on the rapport between 
Polynices’ corpse and the other characters of the play. This third vision of law offers an 
alternative reading of natural law as a material call rather than the unwritten imperatives 
or higher laws of the gods. The second chapter argues that for Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
natural law theory was never a moral theory, but a task of boundary drawing, care, and 
multiplication. Aquinas’s interest was with the historical and ongoing production of 
boundaries and limits between the natural and its others. Aquinas did not reduce nature 
and its other to a stable binary, but constantly explored its limits along a proliferating 
spectrum of natural, supernatural, artificial, and preternatural. The third chapter shows 
how Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s famous sex and bondage novella Venus in Furs 
rethinks the concepts of contract and bond(age) at the very heart of legal positivism’s 
attempt to define itself in the terms of social contract theory. The novella tells an 
alternative story of what it means to contract, one that is not oriented toward securing the 
future and establishing “islands of predictability,” but towards being mindful—
sometimes painfully mindful—of the present, of flesh contracting in the cold and under 
the whip, of hands literally con-tracted (or, drawn tight) to the bedpost with rope. The 
final chapter examines historical cases of nonhuman animal legal trials to show that they 
reveal a model of law that places human communities within nature rather than apart or 
outside it. I conclude by bringing the themes of law, nature, and materiality these stories 
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from the natural law tradition disclose into conversation with contemporary new 
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Introduction: Law and Care 
“Natural rights is simple nonsense…nonsense upon stilts.” 
 Jeremey Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, 501 
 
 
“After all, can we come to so great evil if we keep a little fire on our hearths and in 
our souls, and welcome with open hand whatever of excellent come to warm 
itself, whether it be man or phantom, and do not say too fiercely, even to the 
ghouls themselves, 'Be ye gone'? When all is said and done, how do we not know 
but that our own unreason may be better than another's truth? For it has been 
warmed on our hearths and in our souls, and is ready for the wild bees of truth to 
hive in it, and make their sweet honey.”  




Passing into Maryland driving north on US route 13 through the Virginia Tidewater 
region, one encounters a welcome sign. Below the greeting, one is met with what appears 
to be a command in the form of an imperative that is backed up with a conjunctive 
statement: “Buckle Up! We care—and it’s our law.” Signs notifying passersby of local 
laws requiring the use of seat belts while operating motorized vehicles are common sights 
in all fifty US states and beyond today. Yet the Maryland signs (signs with the same text 
can be found throughout Maryland’s roadways) are interesting for a number of reasons.  
Like other seat belt signs, the Maryland signs inform drivers and their passengers 
that state law requires the use of seat belts. The State of New York’s welcome sign for 
example includes the text: “Buckle Up! New York Law. Seat Belt Use Required.” And 
South Carolina’s welcome sign has appended to it the text: “State Law: Fasten Seat 
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Belts.” In both of these cases, as with the Maryland sign, drivers and their passengers are 
issued a command that the signs backup in some assertion about law to put on their seat 
belts—literally to bind themselves to a petroleum-fueled combustible machine or find 
themselves in non-compliance with the law. 
Yet the Maryland sign does more. Besides issuing a command and abutting it with 
the claim of law, the Maryland sign also puts “law” into a relationship with “care.” It 
does this not just using the conjunction “and,” but a full stop dash, italics, and font 
change. The sign thus both conjoins and renders separate “law” and “care” in interesting 
ways. I want to spend a few minutes reflecting on what this sign might illuminate about 
how we in the late modern West experience, use, and think about law.1  
In brief, my argument is that one important thing the sign reveals is our 
contemporary discomfort when law and care are brought together in the same breath. 
Both care and law constantly remind us of and return us to our embodiment, 
vulnerability, and common muddled material-semiotic existence where bodies and words 
shuffle together. These bodily reminders are permitted, even sometimes lustfully 
welcomed, in the private sphere where care is at home and intimate, but come as 
intrusions in the public realm. The sign then testifies not to the difficulty in experiencing 
law and care together, but the great effort and work that has been put into maintaining 
their separation.  
                                                 
1 See Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey, The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life (1998) for a 
similar approach to the study of law and legality that focuses on “stories of everyday life to discover the 
different ways in which people use and think about law” (xi). This dissertation follows a similar method, 
yet attempts to include in its analysis what Jane Bennett has called the “traces of independence or 
aliveness constituting the outside of our own experience” (2010, xvi).   
  
 3 
This dissertation is ultimately an attempt to recover stories from earlier times 
about law’s relationship to embodiment, materiality, and nature; the specter of which still 
haunts the Maryland signs. I argue that collectively, these stories can be seen as 
composing an important thread of the natural law tradition.2 Yet if Jeremey Bentham’s 
eighteenth-century assessment of the natural law tradition as “nonsense upon stilts” rings 
just as true today,3 I suggest that this is because something similar to the discomfort the 
conjoining of law and care evokes today has worked to occlude and sanitize these stories 
from our contemporary legal imagination. Returning to these stories of natural law—of 
how law matters and the matter of law—and “welcom[ing them] with open hand,” as 
Yeats put it in contrast to Bentham, is the goal of this dissertation. 
 
Law’s Impersonalism 
The Maryland sign’s conjunctive statement literally conjoins or brings together “law” and 
“care” in the same sentence. At the same time though, the sign emphatically renders 
“law” and “care” separate. What do these terms mean? 
On one side of the emphasized dash and “and” is placed “law.” What is this 
“law”? And why the need to mark its difference from “care”? As a diverse range of 
scholars have shown, one crucial way modern legal theory organizes its thinking about 
law is in contrast to terms like “care,” “love,” and the “personal.” As Linda Ross Meyer 
                                                 
2 See Ernst Bloch Natural Law and Human Dignity (1987) and Douzinas and Gearey Critical Jurisprudence 
(2005) for similar attempts to, as Douzinas and Gearey put it, “present an alternative history of natural 
law” (80). 
 
3 Of course, there are numerous scholars today who advance natural law theories, see Finnis 1969. 
Moreover, a simple survey of political rhetoric will uncover the continued relevance of natural law 
concepts in the public realm. Part of my interest in telling alternative stories about natural law then is to 
explain its continued attraction despite its theoretical rejection. 
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and Martha Umphrey point out, “law, as legal theory usually understands it, belongs 
either in the realm of impersonal violence, as, for example, law as biopower, social 
control, or commands backed by threats; or law belongs in the realm of impersonal 
reason, as, for example, law as a system of conventional, generally applicable rules that 
treat like cases alike, or law as what reason would dictate behind a veil of ignorance or in 
a kingdom of ends or in a state of nature” (587). In both cases, whether law is understood 
as “impersonal violence” or “impersonal reason”4 law is marked as “impersonal.” Law 
addresses communities in the abstract, not persons. Law, in other words, explicitly 
eschews the familiarity and boundary-crossings between private and public that care 
seems to require. Law is public. Law strives for universality and objectivity in its 
application.5  
This eschewal of the familiar in legal theory crosses jurisprudential schools. Both 
natural law theory and legal positivism—the two dominant choices in modern legal 
theory—approach law as an impersonal and theoretical object of concern.6 Although 
often presented as two competing or opposed theories of law, thinking about law in terms 
of the impersonal reveals their similarity. Both attempt to clarify what law is by straining 
from it the familiar, the personal, the intimate. This is important to realize because one of 
my key arguments in this dissertation is that by pulling back on this drive to clarify, in 
                                                 
4 On the difference compare Cover “Violence and Word” and Hart The Concept of Law. In Anglo-American 
legal theory this distinction is roughly tracked by the divide between scholars like Hart, Finnis, Raz on the 
one hand and Critical Legal Scholars on the other like Cover, Kennedy, and Tushnet who seek to expose 
law as the imposition of violence. 
 
5 Nothing about this impersonality makes law necessarily just, as critics of the liberal rule of law have been 
careful to point out. 
 




allowing law to disclose itself a bit muddled, other stories about law and its relationship 
to the familiar, the personal, the intimate rise up that modern legal theory makes it hard to 
appreciate.7  
Anyone who has travelled along America’s roadways is well acquainted with the 
experience of law’s impersonalism. The New York and South Carolina seat belt signs I 
mentioned above are good examples.8 Like the Maryland sign, the New York sign 
commands passersby to “Buckle Up!” yet the force of this command stands alone, 
abutted only by the apparent inexorability of “New York Law.” You are commanded to 
“Buckle Up!” when entering New York State and left alone to imagine the alternatives of 
non-compliance with the law. The sign does not address you personally or appeal to any 
familiar relationship to support its command. The South Carolina sign is even more blunt 
and impersonal in its formulation: “State Law: Fasten Seat Belts.” You are presented with 
the law and with what it commands in objective, terse statements of fact. 
The Virginia sign is more complicated, but also attests to the contemporary 
experience of law’s impersonalism. It reads: “Buckle Up Virginia! It’s A Law We Can 
Live With.” Unlike the New York and South Carolina signs, the Virginia sign not only 
addresses the passersby with a proper name, “Virginia,”9 but it also appears to make a 
                                                 
7 Donna Haraway makes a similar point about resisting the urge to clarify and clean up the muddle in 
Staying with the Trouble (2016).  
 
8 There are numerous more critical examples of the experience of law as impersonal reason and 
particularly impersonal violence than the rather benign and privileged example of driving a car and being 
legally required to wear a seat belt. One only has to think of split immigrant families navigating the 
rationalities of immigration and visa law, or the bloodied impersonal body stilled after a legal arrest in the 
back of a police vehicle distinguishable only for its blackness.  
 
9 Louis Althusser has argued that this “hailing” ought to be read as an impersonal movement of law in its 
attempt to create legal subjects. Once situated as subject of Virginian law, you have objective reasons to 
obey the law rather than subjective motives. See following footnote for more in-depth discussion. 
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claim for why the individual should personally fasten his or her seat belt: “It’s A Law We 
Can Live With.” Yet upon closer reflection, it seems this sign is just as impersonal as the 
New York and South Carolina signs. While the latter may be more blunt or violent in 
their impersonalism—perhaps more an example of what Meyer and Umphrey call law’s 
“impersonal violence”—saying something like “Fasten Your Seat Belt. Or Else You Will 
Feel the Impersonal Violence of the Law in the Form of Monetary Fines, Arrest, Etc.,” 
the Virginia sign appeals to a rational-utility calculation that is ultimately just as 
impersonal. You should “Buckle Up!” not just because the Virginia law has the violence 
behind it to force you to do so, and certainly not because Virginia personally cares about 
you, but because upon rational calculation you will see that compliance with the law can 




But let me return to the Maryland sign because it complicates and muddles all this in 
illuminating ways. On the one side of the conjunctive statement sits “law.” Modern legal 
theory—and here legal positivism and natural law theory are in agreement—generally 
                                                 
10 This would be a weak version of law as impersonal reason. It is law as rational utility. And as the 
Utilitarian legal theorists like Jeremy Bentham and John Austin and their modern-day followers like H.L.A. 
Hart have argued, just because a law does not contribute to utility does not make it any less forceful, it just 
opens it to social criticism. Yet the Virginia sign also suggests a stronger reading of law as “impersonal 
reason.” At first glance, the sign’s command is no different than the command issued on the Maryland and 
New York signs, although qualified by “Virginia” as if perchance the passersby did not know where they 
were. Yet maybe something more is meant with the inclusion of “Virginia.” Maybe as Louis Althusser has 
argued in his theory of interpellation, the Virginia sign is not simply issuing a command, but also calling a 
subject into being. “Buckle Up!” not just all you diverse forces and winds and animals and collections of 
cells and narratives who pass this sign, but “Buckle Up Virginia!” The hailed passerby in passing would 
thus become by virtue of the hail a Virginian subject of law. The passerby now has a reason or logos to 
buckle up: she is Virginian (even if just passing through) and she has been called by name.  
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understand law as an “impersonal” force. This is validated by our experience of the New 
York, South Carolina, and Virginia seat belt signs. Yet the Maryland sign seems to 
problematize—or rather muddle—these understandings of law in its conjunction of “law” 
and “care.” In contrast to law’s “impersonalism,” care is often thought of as eminently 
personal although not necessarily anthropocentric. 
Care is generally thought of as something soft and warm, the way a parent may 
care for a newborn or hatchling through diaper changes, swaddling, and feeding—this is 
true whether the food is heated in a microwave, regurgitated from a gullet, or produced in 
mammary glands it seems—and a grown human might care for an elderly parent through 
acts of grooming that enfeebled hands can no longer perform.11 Yet care also, and this 
point is crucial, readily crosses traditional species boundaries: in the way pet-owners may 
care for their cats or dogs or birds with feeding and exercise and shepherds may care for 
their sheep by bringing them to fresh pasture and chasing away predators. Care even 
readily extends to the non-animal, think here of the gardener, and inorganic. A marble 
statue may require relatively little care compared to a newborn baby or dog or even 
organic art installment—whether it be a live performance or a sketching on vellum—but 
the marble statue nonetheless requires certain care that amounts to more than routine 
                                                 
11 The care relationship is never easy to solidify in any unidirectional way. The care a parent may bestow 
in diaper changes or late night rockings upon a newborn child frequently has a way of rebounding upon 
the parent in gestures as simple as an arm reach or midnight smile after a trying day apart. Those who 
care for pets and other nonhuman animals probably know this even better than the human parent who is 
quick to describe this phenomenon with a rhetoric of filial attachment rather than care. Yet the 
ambivalence or rather muddled directionality of the care-relationship also crucially distinguishes it from 
the conventional understandings of law. Conceived as either “impersonal violence” or “impersonal 
reason” law moves unidirectionally beginning with the state and imposing itself downwards. Of course, 
there have been important critiques of this understanding of law coming particularly from the 
anthropology of law. See Sally Falk Moore, Law as Social Process (1977). 
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upkeep if the statue is to endure. The statue, just like the newborn babe, has its own 
vulnerabilities, that require the attentiveness of a care-giver.12  
In minute ways, acts of caring constantly defy the many boundaries that seem 
pertinent to the maintenance of social and political life. Care, then, belongs at home, in 
the homeless shelter, in church, the art gallery, or in the barroom toilet. Care happens 
among good friends, between physician and patient, man and domesticated animal, 
teacher and student. Care requires us to get up, close and personal, sometimes with very 
impersonal things. Care is hard to place as it constantly blurs, or rather crosses and 
recrosses boundaries.13 
Care engages our entire body. Even when the care is directed toward the cared-
for’s mind or soul we generally speak in bodily metaphors. The teacher thus “nurtures” 
the mind or is “midwife” to thought, as Arendt in her lectures on Kant puts it. And the 
                                                 
12 The statue is an interesting example and it will resurface in Chapter Three. Severin, the main character 
in Venus in Furs passionately loves a stone statue. One of the reasons he gives for preferring the love of a 
statue to the love of an organic body is the lack of vulnerability. Yet this is not so clear. Stone is certainly 
vulnerable to the decay of the elements even if this usually happens on a timescale much longer than 
humans can recognize. Interestingly, this points to another vulnerability of stone statues that is more 
pertinent although it takes Severin the entirety of the novella to realize it: stone statues are vulnerable to 
being forgotten unless attentively cared-for. Sacher-Masoch does not explore whether this caring-for 
must be done by humans or not. It seems likely that a family of birds nesting in the crook of the statue’s 
arm also develops a care-relationship with the statue that tends the statue’s wounds of forgettability. 
Perhaps lichen does too. 
 
13 Reflecting on love, but in a way that seems pertinent to care too, the philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy gives 
us a reason why care may be so hard to place. Nancy writes, love and care are “impossible to confuse and 
yet ineluctably entangled: charity and pleasure, emotion and pornography, the neighbor and the infant, 
the love of lovers and the love of God, fraternal love and the love of art, the kiss, passion, friendship... . 
Love is not their substance or their common concept, is not something one can extricate and contemplate 
at a distance. Love in its singularity, when it is grasped absolutely, is itself perhaps nothing but the 
indefinite abundance of all possible loves, and an abandonment to their dissemination, indeed to the 
disorder of these explosions. The thinking of love should learn to yield to this abandon: to receive the 
prodigality, the collisions, and the contradictions of love, without submitting them to an order that they 
essentially defy” (1991, 82-83). Nancy’s point helps explain why care is so hard to place. Care, like Nancy’s 
love, cannot be explained with any simple stock account. Caring is in care’s “prodigality,” in the overflow 
or superabundance. Care gives freely. 
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pastor is literally s/he who shepherds souls.14 Care breaches the boundary between the 
noble senses of sight and hearing we typically claim we use to interact with other, often 
eliciting the “less” noble senses of touch, smell, and taste.15 One rarely, after all, first sees 
a dirty diaper or tumor. Care is an eminently embodied activity: sniffing, palpitating, 
licking.16 In fact, the only place care seems emphatically not to belong is in the public 
realm—behind the veil of ignorance where the senses and body are blocked and veiled—
which Meyer and Umphrey remind us is conventionally the placed reserved for law.  
 
—and: Wound-ability 
Yet it seems to me that it precisely care’s attentiveness to embodiment and the material-
semiotic boundary crossings embodiment enables and depends upon that returns us to the 
experience of law. This is what makes the Maryland sign so interesting. The Maryland 
sign conjoins “care” and “law,” bringing them together in the same breath using the 
conjunctive “and,” yet it also emphatically signals that there is something strange or 
unusual about doing so that requires a full stop dash, a change in font, and italics. The 
emphasis of the sign after all is neither on “care” nor “law,” but on the “and” and the 
dash. What does the dash and this emphasis signify or illuminate about our experience of 
                                                 
14 This does not mean that the teacher may not develop a genuine interest in caring for the bodily aspects 
of the student or that this interest may not in some cases precede the desire to nurture the mind. It 
would be ridiculous to assume that just because we speak of the teacher-student or pastor-soul 
relationship using bodily metaphors of care these relationships are barred from expressing themselves in 
bodily ways too. I have received too many meals from the beneficence of my teachers to think they have 
cared only for my mind.  
 
15 See Aristotle on this distinction, De Anima II.5. 
 
16 We all have the experience—usually with some older man in our life—licking the fluid he finds on the 




law? At an obvious level, it may simply signify the necessity of keeping “law” and “care” 
separate even as we acknowledge some similarities between them for the purposes of 
convincing people to “Buckle Up!”. Indeed, as I have just suggested, today the distinction 
between law and care is often formulated as one necessary and good to maintain lest 
paternalistic visions of law and state take root as others like Robin West have been 
particularly apt in demonstrating (1999). West deftly points out that not all care 
relationships establish good connections. The Maryland sign’s dash and italics certainly 
seems to illuminate this tension between care and law, with the emphasis standing guard 
as both an acknowledgment and warning of the dangers of the violence inherent and 
possible in all care relationships.  
Yet the dash and italics illuminate more. The dash and “and” is uncomfortable. 
The sign reads: “We care,” full stop dash, change of fonts, emphasis, “—and,” remove 
emphasis, return to text, “it’s our law.” This discomforting formulation I want to suggest, 
betrays our own bodily and material as well as semiotic discomfort when law and care 
are brought into relationship or asked to cross one another.17 The sign makes us 
uncomfortable because it brings together in one breath two things that we experience 
today as uncomfortably similar.18 In other words, it is not that we never think about or 
experience “law” and “care” together because they are so different, but that the 
experience of their similarity makes us uncomfortable.  
                                                 
17 On material-semiotic connection see Donna Haraway. 
 
18 See Kaja Silverman Flesh of My Flesh (2009) for a brilliant discussion of the uncomfortability modernity 
has in thinking about “similarity.” Silverman explores “similarity” through the trope of the analogy which 
is central to my reading of Aquians.   
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When we start thinking about “law” and “care” together everything gets muddled. 
Not only does the once-exorcized specter of paternalism come back to haunt us with a 
vengeance, but legal theory as a clarificatory endeavor gets turned on its head. The body, 
the personal, the intimate navigation of a material world come rushing back to the surface 
of our experience of law. Law, like care, we uncomfortably realize, begins and ends with 
a body, more so than other traditional disciplines like theology and philosophy which can 
more thoroughly escape the body in their claims. Law, like care too, may have other 
aspects, like a linguistic one. However, what the care-relationship demonstrates and 
uncomfortably reveals for the law-relationship is that to be enmeshed in these relations 
one is required to have a body which means that one is wound-able. Ultimately, what this 
italicized dash and conjunction illuminates are co-dependent relations of vulnerability, or 
literally wound-ability, that facilitate as well as limit the care and operation of law.19  
Care and law, the Maryland sign illuminates, are thus way too co-contaminant for 
our modern sensibilities of sanitation. Pull out the full stop dash, raise the italics, care is 
breaching our law and we are getting uncomfortable. Everything grows dim, murky, 
viscous, swampy, muddled when we look in that direction.  Yet earlier times did not have 
such weak stomachs for studying law, embodiment, materiality, and nature. This 
dissertation is an attempt to recover some of these occluded stories of law, nature, 
embodiment, and materiality that earlier times told, but which are barred from our 
modern accounts of law due to sanitation regulations.   
 
 
                                                 
19 Think here of medical staff caring for patients during epidemics like the recent Ebola virus outbreak in 
western Africa. The care the medics could provide was certainly limited by their vulnerability.  
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A Brief Roadmap 
Chapters One, Two, and Three compose the heart of the dissertation. They are presented 
as a series or cycle of stories about natural law. The goal of these chapters is to begin the 
work of recovering and disclosing an understanding of law and nature that I argue is 
obscured today, yet has been effectively articulated in the past in a tradition of natural 
law. I am not interested in telling the story of why or how or even when this 
understanding of law and nature became obscured or lost. This is the story of the rise of 
modernity and the Western world’s progressive disenchantment and it has many tellers 
and versions.20 Rather, my interest in these “story” chapters is to attempt to tell the story 
of what is occluded by these conventional narratives of disenchantment particularly in 
our thinking of law. Specifically, my interest is with what possibilities for law and nature 
we close ourselves off from when we tell ourselves stories about the loss of the natural 
law today or the “disintegration of natural law theory,” as one scholar of natural law puts 
it (Westerman 1997). 
 Each of these chapters thus turns to a specific historical moment and text in the 
Western natural law tradition to reconsider its possibilities and ultimately pursue a “path 
not taken,” or a minor tradition of natural law thought so to speak. Chapter One 
                                                 
20 Max Weber is perhaps most famous for his account of disenchantment, but many Western thinkers tell 
stories about what makes the modern distinctly different. A tale could be told using Thomas Hobbes and 
the breakdown of ecclesiastical authority and morality in the early modern period that required the 
institution of the social contract. Martin Heidegger tells a much older tale stretching back to ancient 
Greece and the birth of Western metaphysical thinking. See Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern 
and Jane Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life for a critical analysis that are both much closer to my 
approach here. My goal is not to avoid the questions of why or how or when natural law thought was 
hijacked, but rather to suggest that this type of storytelling is part of the problem to seeing alternative 
visions of law. Mark Antaki begins to pursue a similar line of inquiry in “The Turn to Imagination in Legal 
Theory: The Re-Enchantment of the World?” (2012), although his interests are exclusively with 
contemporary legal thinkers and he does not explore the possibility of natural law as one of these 




“Antigone’s Misstep?, or, How Natural Law Became Higher Law” turns to Sophocles’ 
tragedy Antigone. Antigone has often been read as an early, perhaps foundational, 
expression of the view that natural law is a “higher law” which takes precedence over 
man-made or positive law, a view that has come to dominate most interpretations of 
natural law. Composed by Sophocles during the height of the nomos-phusis debate that 
occupied Greek intellectual discussion in the fifth century BCE, interpreters from 
Aristotle to Hegel to Judith Butler read the play according to an “oppositional logic” that 
pits the two main characters against one another. I tell a different story. I argue that this 
oppositional logic enables the “natural law as higher law” interpretation of natural law by 
framing natural law and positive law as opposite or competing sides of the same coin 
contending for supporters. However, this oppositional logic occludes an alternative 
interpretation of natural law. We can discern this interpretation when we read the play 
with a compositional logic.  
Sophocles does not bury this alternative deep in the play or make it hard to find. 
Indeed, I show that he makes it as evident as possible—literally refusing to bury it. This 
alternative interpretation of natural law is underscored in the play I argue as the rapport 
that emerges between Ploynices’ actively (de)composing corpse and the other characters 
of the play. Drawing on other recent interpretations of Antigone that have focused on 
minor characters of the play—rather than the major oppositional struggle between Creon 
and Antigone—I tell the story of this alternative natural law.  
 Chapter Two, “Aquinas’s Eco/Analogical Vision of Law,” focuses on the 
medieval Scholastic thinker widely considered to be the capstone of natural law thought: 
Saint Thomas Aquinas. This chapter reaffirms Aquinas’s preeminence in the natural law 
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tradition, yet in a non-conventional way. I show that what makes Aquinas such a 
profound natural law thinker is his approach to natural law as a way of approaching 
questions of relationality and embodiment, not morality. One of the major modern 
critiques leveled against Thomistic natural law is that it derives normative-legal 
statements from factual statements. I argue that this modern framing at best misses and at 
worst occludes the task of natural law thinking for Aquinas. This task was never an 
“epistemological-normative” one; Aquinas did not prescribe the derivation of ought-
statements from is-statements. Instead, it was a jurisprudential task. Aquinas’s project 
was to attend to the boundaries between the natural and its others, and to consider how 
these boundaries are produced and multiplied across time and space.  
In Aquinas’s time, Aquinas framed this project in terms of an analogical account 
of being, meaning that he attended both to the relations and interconnections between 
things as well as their fundamental differences and the boundaries-between. This 
analogical account contrasted sharply with a univocal vision of being that saw all of 
reality as fundamentally interconnected. Ultimately, for Aquinas natural law was about 
caring for and maintaining boundaries without which Aquinas did not think “friendship” 
and “justice” between human beings, between man and God, and between human 
communities and the more-than-human realm were possible. I argue in the conclusion 
that this Thomistic story of natural law is crucial to reanimate today when univocal 




 Chapter Three “Sacher-Masoch and the Character of the Contract” turns to a 
modern, but less well-known natural law thinker, Leopold von Sacher-Masoch.21 Sacher-
Masoch is primarily known as the nineteenth-century author of the lurid Venus in Furs, 
yet he was also a historian of political thought and a lawyer. Moreover, although he wrote 
after the heyday of classical social contract theory, Sacher-Masoch was deeply interested 
in the idea of the contract and articulating a natural law version of contracting. In Chapter 
Three, I read Venus in Furs as a story about what we miss when we think of the contract 
primarily in legal positivist terms. In such terms, contracts are preoccupied with securing 
an indefinite future. When the contracts in Venus in Furs are read this way, the story is 
one of failure; the contract between Wanda and Severin is eventually broken and 
Severin’s attempt to secure Wanda as a possession through his own subjugation is futile. 
But Venus in Furs repeatedly criticizes this notion of contract. Early on in the novella, 
Wanda likens the legal positivist type of contract to the traditional marriage contract and 
heaps scorn upon it for its vain attempts to “bury woman like a treasure” (19). 
Throughout the novella Severin lists between a desire to secure the future and a 
commitment to the moment. I show how Venus in Furs tells an alternative story of what 
it means to contract that is not oriented toward the future, but towards being mindful—
sometimes painfully mindful—of the present and embodiment: of flesh contracting in the 
cold, under the lash of the whip, and in arousal, of hands literally con-tracted (drawn 
tight) to the bedpost with rope.  
Both types of contract are present in Venus in Furs and Sacher-Masoch shows us 
that both types of contracting are ways of navigating uncertainty. Yet the latter, although 
                                                 




rarely acknowledged, is more radical according to Sacher-Masoch. It reasserts the always 
fleshy and always vulnerable relationality of law at the epicenter of modern social 
contract theory’s attempt to make law artificial and the product of a fleshless body 
(Hobbes, Leviathan).  
Chapter Four concludes the dissertation. It is titled “Animals on Trials: 
Reconsidering the Natural Law Tradition for Troubling Times.” It begins with a 
description of the once commonplace phenomenon of animal trials and takes them as an 
opportunity to explore the “pay-off” of the stories I tell about natural law in this 
dissertation.22 Most scholars dismiss the animal trials as superstitious mumbo-jumbo or 
childish pre-rationality. Those few who do take the trials seriously read them through a 
utilitarian-legal positivist lens as part of the West’s progressive drive to control and 
regulate nature. The stories I have told about natural law suggest an alternative reading. I 
argue that the animal trials need to be appreciated as the serious, thoughtful, and 
communal work that these earlier Western communities put into giving themselves a 
place within the wider more-than-human world (Serres 1995).23 Like Antigone’s care for 
Polynices’s corpse and Severin’s emphasis on the embodied present, the trials display an 
attentive, observant awareness of material particularity and embodied life. I argue that the 
institutional work that went into these animal trials needs to be read as an example of the 
ligaments or “connective tissue” Aquinas talks about which holds together the sublunary 
realm. The Chapter turns then to explore the “pay-off” of the stories I tell about natural 
law for the broader fields of legal theory and environmental studies.  
                                                 
22 Walter Benjamin notes that in contrast to the novel, all stories are practically-oriented. Stories provide 
counsel or advice about continuation. See, “Nikolai Leskov: The Storyteller” in Illuminations. 
 










Composed in Athens during what classicist W.K.C. Guthrie has dubbed “the fifth century 
enlightenment”—when Greek thinkers first began to distinguish between nomos, or 
roughly what is done by convention, and phusis, or what happens by nature—Sophocles’ 
Antigone was written and performed in the same milieu that gave rise to the occidental 
natural law tradition (1977). The play thus provides a point of access for me in my 
attempt to uncover aspects of a natural law tradition that I argue have been occluded in 
modernity. Where can natural law be found in the play? Can it be found in the play at all? 
Readers of Antigone are hotly divided on this question; largely, I hope to show, because 
they are looking in all the wrong places.  
Since at least Aristotle’s time, the play has been popularly associated with an 
influential interpretation of the natural law tradition that equates natural law with 
“higher” law: universal, position-less standards of non-human origin capable of 
superseding, even nullifying, posited laws and social conventions of immanent human 
origin (Rhetoric 1373b-10). On this reading, the law Antigone is said to appeal to and the 
positive law Creon promulgates are mutually opposed as competing theories of law, or 
“epistemological claims” about law—an “irresolvable conflict between natural (or 
ancient or divine) and positive (or modern or state) law” locked in a millennial stalemate 
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that has come to characterize Western legal philosophy as diverse scholars have argued 
(Lavi 2011, 811-813; Culbert 2010,766). 
I argue that this conventional interpretation of Antigone—Carol Jacobs has called 
it the “oppositional” interpretation because it sets in opposition or conflict the two main 
characters and their claims—actually occludes more than it reveals particularly when it 
comes to thinking about law (1996, 910). In particular, what is occluded by this 
oppositional interpretation is the chance to make sense of another story about law and 
nature circulating in the play that takes its cues from the compositional logic that emerges 
between Antigone and Polynices’ corpse.24 According to this story, law is not a 
regulatory force that manages or controls the things of the world, bringing order to a 
world in flux, but a compositional force co-making a world that is constantly becoming 
with vast and diverse material and semiotic vitalities.  
In Section One I briefly review the conventional oppositional interpretation of 
Antigone and document how it is has organized readings of the play and our conceptions 
of natural law and positive law from Aristotle to Hegel, Luce Irigaray, and beyond. 
Recently, disheartened by the millennial stalemate Creon’s and Antigone’s opposition 
bequeaths us, some scholars have been looking to the “minor characters” of the play for 
more promising advice. These turns to minor characters introduces my “compositional 
reading” of the play in Section Two. Here I ask what happens when we read Polynices’ 
corpse not only as a prop or part of the background scenery, but as an active minor 
                                                 
24 On the importance of seeing law’s compositional logic see James Boyd White, “The Judicial Opinion and 
the Poem: Ways of Reading, Ways of life” (1984). In my reading of Antigone, I use Bruno Latour insights 
about composition to expand White’s understanding of the compositional logic of law to include 
nonhuman materialities and forces, like Polynices’s corpse, Tiresias’s birds of augury, and the dust storm 
that accompanies Antigone’s appearance alongside the corpse. See Bruno Latour, “A Compositionist 
Manifesto” (2010).  
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character that enters into interactions not only with Antigone but also with dust, birds, 
pollution, hearths, and seers. Unlike other readers of Antigone who turn to minor 
characters though, I do so not to move my reading of the play away from a conventional 
focus on natural law and positive law, but to disclose another story about natural law, 
positive law, and their relationship.  
In Section Three, therefore, I turn to the visions of law circulating in the play. 
There are at least three: Creon’s edict (7), Antigone’s appeal to the “unchanging and 
unwritten law” (455), and Antigone’s invocation of her unique material-semiotic 
relationship with the corpse of Polynices (900ff). Most interpretations set the first two of 
these visions of law in opposition and reject the third. Some have tried to reconcile all 
three. Others have exploited the tension between them to teach a lesson about law. Yet all 
agree that the third vision is problematic and needs explanation (Butler 2001). I argue 
that the play can be read as dramatizing the seductiveness of the first two visions which 
Sophocles shows us share a common image of law. Sophocles dramatizes this 
seductiveness by suggesting that the second vision is a misstep Antigone is lured into by 
her uncle. Yet while Antigone recovers from this misstep in articulating the third vision, 
the critical lesson of the play seems to remain that many of us have not. My reading of 
Polynices’s corpse as a minor character attempts, however, to recover this third vision of 
law. 
 
I Oppositional Readings of Antigone  
As I mentioned above, Sophocles’ Antigone was composed in Athens in the 
formative years of what would become the occidental natural law tradition when Greek 
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thinkers began first distinguishing between phusis and nomos or roughly what happens by 
nature versus what is done by convention (Segal 1964,63; Voegelin 379; Hayek 1973; 
Strauss 1950; Heinimann 1949).25 While the play never explicitly mentions the term 
                                                 
25 Prior to the fifth century BCE as numerous scholars have demonstrated, Greek thought, from which 
both Sophocles’ Antigone and the occidental natural law tradition emerge, did not distinguish between 
nature on the one hand (phusis), and law and custom on the other (nomos) (Strauss 1950; Bloch 1991; 
Heidegger; Bernard Knox; Paul Sigmund; Nussbaum; Douzinas). Consequently, understanding how fifth 
century Athenian thinkers began to differentiate between nature and law is crucial to understanding the 
shared milieu in which Sophocles wrote Antigone and natural law thought developed.  
As classicist Victor Ehrenberg puts it, for the archaic Greeks, “nature was divine, physis [sic] was 
nomos” (35). Intimately bound up the divine unfolding of the cosmos (phusis) and what Martin Heidegger 
has called “the overpowering structure of Being,” custom, law, and traditional authority (nomos) were not 
conceived in archaic Greece as human-made social conventions. Unlike what we might today call artificial 
constructs and which because of this artificial constructedness might be otherwise and so are open to 
criticism and questioning, the nomoi of archaic Greece were an unquestionable part of the physico-cosmic 
order (see Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics; Bloch 6-13; Hayek 20; Laroche). Or, put slightly 
differently, nature and law were not conceptually differentiated in the archaic Greek mind, but combined 
in a divine cosmography rooted in ancestral authority, the traces of which one can still find in the works of 
archaic Greek poets like Homer and Hesiod (Laroche 1949). Yet contemporaneous with Sophocles’ writing 
of Antigone, several thinkers and writers in Athens were beginning to question this archaic Greek view of 
the cosmos.  
These thinkers, generally referred to as Sophists but also associated with the nascent Hippocratic 
medical tradition as both Heinniman and Hadot point out, began to develop and deploy a new concept of 
nature (phusis) that was universal, rationally knowable, and, most importantly, could be set against law 
and custom (nomos)—now conceived as purely human-social constructs—as a critical standard by which 
law and custom could be evaluated and criticized (Hadot 19). Often associated with a discontent younger 
generation ill-at-ease with traditional authority and opinion, these Sophists sought means by which they 
could expose traditional beliefs and customs (nomoi) to rational criticism (Douzinas 27; Hadot 17-28). 
Nomoi, they argued contra the archaic view, were not part of nature and the divine unfolding of the 
cosmos (phusis), but conventions grounded only in human authority. 
As something separate, nature (phusis), these fifth century thinkers reasoned, might be appealed 
to in order to evaluate these socially constructed customs, laws, and conventions (nomos). But to make 
this move, not only did nature and law have to be unthreaded from the archaic Greek cosmology and 
from each other, but more importantly nature had to be reconceived as an abstract standard, or what 
Pierre Hadot has called an “absolute” in the etymological sense of something set apart from, that was 
both universal and knowable through rational inquiry (19). Absent this transformation, phusis as nature 
would have remained ill-fit to serve as a standard from which rational criticism might be mounted against 
traditional customs. This was a momentous development in Greek thought that, as Leo Strauss has 
shown, paved the way not only for classical Greek philosophy (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and their heirs) 
as self-conscious rational inquiry distinct from traditional opinion, but also for a natural law tradition that 
appealed to a higher standard discernable in the structure of nature which was both universal and 
knowable and could be used to evaluate the positive laws of a community (1965). 
Euripides, also a playwright and a contemporary of Sophocles, gives us some insight into how this 
new concept of nature was being employed. In his play Hecuba, Euripides suggests that slavery is a purely 
conventional matter, and that the distinctions between slave and master, foreigner and Greek—so crucial 
to Greek thought—have no grounding in the natural order, but are the result of human conventions. 
Through our use of reason, Euripides argued, we can come to appreciate the order set forth by nature. On 
Euripides’ account then, the practice of slavery itself can be questioned precisely because nature 
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“natural law” as Tony Burns points out (2002), it nonetheless occupies a pivotal moment 
at the genesis of occidental natural law thinking and dwells upon many of same themes 
that would become central to the natural law tradition—e.g, law versus convention; 
divine authority versus state authority; nature versus man; Homeric virtue versus 
democratic legality, etc—as numerous interpreters have pointed out (Aristotle; Hegel; 
Steiner 1991; Connolly 2010; Honig 2013). What unites these accounts is the “clear 
oppositional struggle” that frames all these debates and has influenced the vast majority 
of subsequent interpretations of the play regardless of which side of the struggle the 
interpretation favors, as Jacobs has pointed out (1996, 910). 
The play dramatizes the confrontation between Antigone (the heroine) and her 
maternal uncle Creon, the regent king of Thebes. Prior to the play’s beginning, Creon 
issues an edict (kerugma) forbidding the burial of Polynices, Antigone’s recently slain 
brother, as punishment for his part in rallying a foreign force against Thebes. Antigone, 
nevertheless, proceeds—or so she later claims—to bury Polynices.26 When caught and 
                                                 
constitutes an independent (Hadot’s absolute) and universal standard that we have access to through 
rational inquiry and which we can use to evaluate and judge inherited conventions. Other contemporaries 
like Antiphon the Sophist in his fragment On Truth and Alcidamas—who Aristotle cites as having argued 
“nature has made no one a slave”—make similar arguments distinguishing what is by nature and what is 
merely conventional and so open to criticism and reform (Rhetoric 1373b 5-20; Burns 2002; Waterfield 
59; see Heinniman for a detailed overview).  
What is evident is how far this concept of nature departed from the archaic Greek view. Not only 
are nature and law now opposable in a way that they were not for pre-fifth century thought, but nature is 
ordered in such a way that its order can be known by human-rational inquiry. Thus nature in its 
universality provides a blueprint or standard upon which human laws and customs might pattern 
themselves (Segal; Douzinas), even if, importantly, this natural standard is not yet conceived as law, i.e., a 
natural law theory, something which would have to wait for Aristotle (Douzinas 26). The crucial point is, 
however, we see here for the first time in occidental thought the beginnings of a concept of nature as 
critical standard opposed to law as human-social construct, a higher or universal standard, which would 
give birth to the dominant reading of natural law as higher law as well as legal positivism’s corollary 
reduction of law to human-social construct.   
 
26 There is vigorous scholarly debate on how Polynices’ corpse actually gets “buried.” As I discuss in detail 
below, the burial is a little more than a light dusting. When confronted, Antigone owns up to having done 
it, but no one actually witnesses her in the act. Antigone’s sister Ismene claims to have taken part but 
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confronted by Creon, Antigone confesses both to knowing that Creon had prohibited the 
burial of Polynices and to burying Polynices. Asked by Creon how she “dared to 
transgress these laws,” Antigone responds: “for it was not Zeus Who proclaimed these 
things to me / Nor was it She, Justice, Who dwells with the gods below / Who defined 
these laws for human beings; / Nor did I think that such strength was in your / 
Proclamations, you being mortal, as to be able to / Prevail over the unwritten and 
steadfast lawful conventions of the gods” (449-455). 
These lines, which I refer to as Antigone’s first formulation of her law since they 
come “first” in the text of the play (the second formulation comes at lines 905ff), are well 
known. They are arguably the most repeated lines ever written by Sophocles (Steiner 
1984). Taken with Creon’s justification of his edict for leaving Polynices unburied, they 
stage a conflict or opposition between a temporally- and geographically-specific posited 
law—what I call a positioned law—enacted by a sovereign’s will or a community’s 
recognized legislative procedures (Hart 1961) and a higher, unwritten positionless law. 
This higher law is capable of nullifying posited law and may justify actions that the 
posited law forbids or deems illegal.27 Creon brandishes his edict and demands a 
response: “You, however, tell me—not at length, but briefly—did you know that an edict 
                                                 
Antigone explicitly denies her sister played a role. (Most interpreters accept Antigone’s denial, as Bonnie 
Honig has recently pointed out.) Carol Jacobs suggests the corpse could have gotten covered in dust by a 
windstorm either brought about by the gods or bad weather, but the play effectively dramatizes the 
seductiveness of our desire to read the burial as pitting Antigone and Creon against one another. 
 
27 See George Steiner, Antigones: How the Antigone Legend has Endured in Western Literature, Art, and 
Thought, Yale UP (1984) for an impressive account of Antigone’s popular and intellectual reception. Also 
see Bertolt Brecht’s 1948 adaption of the play and Ron Jenkins’ 30 March 2003 article in the New York 
Times, “Theatre; ‘Antigone’ as a Protest Tactic,” for some of the more radical ways Antigone has been 
deployed. Bonnie Honig’s recent Antigone, Interrupted (2013) draws on reception theory to argue for 
Antigone’s continuing importance. 
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had forbidden this” (450). Antigone counters, opposing Creon’s edict with the unwritten 
laws of the gods.  
Even competing interpretations of the play concur in reading this oppositional 
struggle between Creon and Antigone as the motor of the play. Aristotle and Hegel 
provide good examples of this agreement over the oppositional structure of the play. 
Aristotle develops his reading of Antigone in his Rhetoric. Here briefly Aristotle parses 
Antigone’s appeal to the “unwritten laws” as an appeal to “the general law of nature…a 
certain natural and universal right and wrong” (1373b-10).28 Aristotle compares Creon’s 
edict forbidding the burial of Polynices to the Sophist Euripides’ account of the 
institution of slavery: a matter of convention that needs to be judged according to 
universal standards discernable in nature.  
Others—notably Hegel—have contested this “natural law” or “higher law” 
reading of Antigone. They argue that nowhere in the text does Antigone associate her law 
with nature (phusis), claiming it simply to be the “laws of the gods” (450ff; Burns 2002). 
These commentators maintain that it is not until much later, around the first century BCE, 
that a natural law as higher law theory emerges in the writings of Stoic philosophers like 
Cicero and Seneca (see Burns 2002 for an overview). What we see in Antigone, they 
maintain, is not the synthesis of a radical fifth century BCE Sophist conception of nature 
as critical standard into an account of natural law, but rather the exact opposite: an 
explicit rejection of the emerging Sophist concept of nature. “Far from pointing forward” 
to a radical account of nature as a critical standard that may be used to upend traditional 
authority, these commentators maintain that Antigone actually “points back—to the age-
                                                 




old reverence for the dead and their protecting gods,” or what Hegel calls the warm 
maternal “law of shadows” in contrast to the emerging paternal law of the state or “law of 
the day” (Knox 97-8; Hegel 266-290; Bloch 120-130). These interpretations of Antigone 
thus read the play as a negation of the Sophist phusis-nomos dichotomy. 
Hegel is, of course, an influential member of this second camp. Hegel reads 
Sophocles’ Antigone not as a conflict between a forward-looking and anti-traditional 
authority and customary conventions or traditional authority, but as the first instance of 
the “ethical world divided,” a division that allows for the first unmediated appearance of 
Geist in his Phenomenology of Spirt. Yet just as in Aristotle’s natural law reading of the 
play, opposition is central to Hegel’s reading of Antigone. Hegel subscribes to the view 
that the play concerns an opposition between the divine and the human. However, 
according to Hegel, the laws of the gods govern the family and chthonic elements in a 
matriarchal order represented by the girl Antigone and the laws of the government or 
state in an emerging patriarchal order represented by Uncle Creon and brother Polynices 
(Phenomenology #451). In a Hegelian vein, Luce Irigaray writes of Antigone, “[s]he 
reminds us that the earthly order is not a pure social power, that it must be founded upon 
the economy of the cosmic order, upon respect for the procreation of living beings, on 
attention to maternal ancestry, to its gods, its rights, its organization” (Difference 69-
70E). Hegel and those of his ilk thus read the play as something like the last stand of an 
archaic, matriarchical, family-based Greek cosmology against a growing Sophist-
Hippocratic assault (Sigmund 1972) that draws strength from the highly local and organic 
(thus “unwritten,” as Sophocles puts its) “religious and ceremonial law” of each polis 
(Sigmund 10).  
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A diverse range of scholars have noted that these readings of Antigone lead to a 
stalemate (Jacobs 1996; Weber 2004; Honig 2013). In recent years some have thus begun 
to look to the “minor characters” of the play to offer alternatives to the “oppositional 
struggle” of the two main characters, arguing we can still find in the play a “prudent 
perspective” that is politically relevant for contemporary life (Jacobs 910; Kirkpatrick 
2011). The minor characters turned to are various. William E. Connolly turns to Tiresias 
in his invocation of a seer’s relevance for contemporary politics (2011).29 Derek Barker 
and James Tully both turn to Haemon whose impassioned plea to his father to heed the 
plurality of reasonable positions is particularly suited, they argue, for our contemporary 
plural society (Tully 1995; Barker 2009).30 Jill Frank, Jennet Kirkpatrick, and Bonnie 
Honig all turn to Ismene whose “unmanly” nonviolent resistance and desire for solidarity 
offer a nice counterweight to her sister’s individualistic and rash actions (Frank 2006; 
Kirkpatrick 2011; Hongi 2013).31 Margaret Kitzinger, Rebecca McCarthy, and Larissa 
Atkison turn to the Chorus whose plural composition mirrors well, they suggest, our 
political condition, one in which we always find ourselves with others (Kitzinger 2008; 
Atkison 2016).32  
 
                                                 
29 See William E. Connolly, “The Theorist and the Seer” in A World of Becoming (2011). 
 
30 See Derek W.M. Barker, Tragedy and Citizenship (2009) and James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: 
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (1995). 
 
31 See Jill Frank, “The Antigone’s Law” in Law, Culture, and the Humanities 2 (2006); Jennet Kirkpatrick, 
“The Prudent Dissident: Unheroic Resistance in Sophocles’ Antigone” in The Review of Politics 73 (2011); 
Bonnie Honig, Antigone Interrupted (2013). 
 
32 See Margaret Rachel Kitzinger, The Choruses of Sophokles’ Antigone and Philoktetes: A Dance of Words 
(2008) and Larissa Atkison “Antigone’s Remainders: Choral Ruminations and Common Sense” Political 
Theory 44:2 (2016).  
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II  A (De)compositional Reading of Antigone: Polynices’s Corpse as Minor 
Character 
I now turn to offer what I call a compositional reading of the play that looks to Polynices’ 
corpse as a minor character. Acknowledging Polynices’ corpse as a minor character has 
consequences for how we understand the place of law in the play which I discuss in the 
following section. In brief, to preview, when Polynices’ corpse is acknowledged as an 
active minor character, law begins to look much more like a compositional force co-
making a world that is constantly becoming with vast and diverse material and semiotic 
vitalities. 
When the play begins, Polynices is already dead.33 Throughout the whole play we 
never see the corpse, but only hear it being talked about. Antigone references the corpse 
in the opening scene in her exchange with her sister Ismene. The corpse is referred to by 
the Chorus in its first ode where it recounts both Polynices’ and Etoycles’ death. Yet it is 
only around line 250ff that we get a description of the corpse and this description is more 
of a non-description as it details what was not seen. One of Creon’s men who had been 
tasked with guarding the corpse comes to report to Creon. However, as none of the 
guards saw anyone approach the corpse and there is no evidence of digging in the earth, 
the conclusion that Creon’s edict has indeed been violated is not self-evident.  
Listen to how the guard puts it when Creon asks “who” violated his edict: 
I do not know. For there was there no mark/of axe’s stroke nor casting up of 
earth of any mattock; the ground was hard and dry/unbroken; there were no 
signs of wagon wheels./The doer of the deed had left no trace./But when the 
first sentry of the day pointed it out/there was for all of us a disagreeable/ 
wonder. For the body had disappeared/not in a grave, of course; but there lay 
                                                 
33 As Samuel Weber (2004) points out, in Greek tragedy the action always occurs before the opening of 
the curtains. Greek tragedies focus on effects rather than causes. According to Weber, this is one of the 
things that makes them so enduring and timeless. 
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upon him/a little dust as of a hand avoiding/the curse of violating the dead 
body’s sanctity. There were no signs of an beast nor dog/that came there; he 
had clearly not been torn./There was a tide of bad words at one another/guard 
taunting guard, and it might well have ended/in blows, for there was no one 
there to stop it./Each one of us was the criminal but no one/manifestly so; all 
denied knowledge of it (248-63) 
 
The guard’s report is brimming with intrigue and loose-ends, one of which is a point that 
is almost universally overlooked: Polynices’ body has not been buried, but “there lay 
upon him a little dust” (256).  
Toward the end of the play, the blind seer Tiresias locates the crux of Creon’s 
failing and the crisis of the play in Creon’s arrogant inversion of earth and underworld. 
Tiresias says to Creon, “you have thrust one that belongs above below the earth, and 
bitterly dishonored a living soul by lodging her in the grave; while one that belonged 
indeed to the underworld gods you kept on this earth” (1068ff).  In burying Antigone 
alive and at the same time refusing Polynices, who is dead, burial or a spot below the 
earth, Tiresias claims that Creon’s edict and punishment of Antigone violates the 
ordering of earth and underworld. Yet if Creon’s intention is to keep Polynices from 
burial, from being placed below the earth, then the guard informs him that his edict has 
not been violated. Again, the guard only reports that “the body had disappeared,” not that 
it had been put below the earth (255). And even this is not quite true, for the body still 
appears to the guards, but it is just now covered in “a little dust” (256). How might 
recognizing Polynices’ non-burial affect our telling of the story?  
Carol Jacobs in her reading of Antigone is one of the few commentators who 
acknowledges the non-burial of Polynices. In the essay, “Dusting Antigone,” Jacobs 
argues the dusting “tells the story of another economy,” one that does not conform to 
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Creon’s, the guard’s, and Tiresias’s economy of buried or unburied. Consequently, 
dusting is misunderstood when read as a burial (1996, 900). In her reading of the play, 
Jacobs compares the strangeness of the guard’s report of the “traceless” dusting with the 
Chorus’s famous “Ode to Man.” In the “Ode to Man,” which follows on the heels of the 
guard’s report, the Chorus praises man’s capacities to chart courses across the sea and 
make marks on the earth. “Wonders are many, and none more wonderful than man. This 
being goes with the storm-wind across the foamy sea, moving deep amid cavernous 
waves. And the oldest of the gods, Earth the immortal, the untiring, he wears away, 
turning the soil with the brood of horses, as year after year the ploughs move to and fro” 
(332ff). According to the Chorus, man’s wonderfulness comes from his ability to plow 
the earth, to literally “wear [it] away” (335).  
For Jacobs, the Ode is a sharp foil for the traceless non-marks of the scene the 
guard reports. “When Antigone works the earth, or fails to,” Jacobs says, “she does so 
differently from this universal man turned male [of the chorale Ode to Man], plowing 
neither for possession of the earth nor of the other. She leaves the ground unmarked, 
unbroken” (1996, 900). Thus, the dusting scene “tell[s] the story of another economy” 
(1996, 900). 
Jacobs’ reading of the dusting scene is important to help us see what happens 
when we start to focus more on the corpse of Polynices. When we do so, we must admit 
that we cannot be certain that Polynices was ever buried, for instance. But Jacobs does 
not go far enough as she is certain that it was Antigone who performed the traceless 
dusting. How can Jacobs be so certain? If we return to the description of the corpse,  
there is no sign of the doer of the deed, or even of a “doer” at all. Again, “The doer of the 
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deed had left no trace…there was there no mark of axe’s stroke nor casting up of earth of 
any mattock” as Jacobs points out (249-252).  
Interestingly, Sophocles provides a second dusting scene and this time Antigone 
is sighted by the guards near the corpse. Yet even in this second scene, it is impossible to 
say Antigone did it. Who or what or what assemblage might be responsible? I think it is 
important to dwell on this question because the effort to answer it leads us to broaden the 
field of possible suspects.  
 After a berating by Creon, the guard returns to his post and with the other guards 
brushes the dust off the corpse and resumes watchful guard. This time the corpse is 
physically described: It is “moist” and the guards leave it “naked” (410). The guards also 
take up their watch “on the brow of the hill, to windward, that we might shun the smell of 
the corpse” (411-12). In other words, the corpse is damp and stinky. These are important 
observations if we are going to appreciate the corpse as an actor. For the dampness 
suggests that the corpse is in what forensic scientists call the third stage of decomposition 
or “purge.” Depending on factors like temperature, cause of death, and exposure to the 
elements, this stage usually begins a couple days after death (Costandi 2015). As its 
internal tissues are liquified and seep out, the corpse becomes moist.  
As forensic scientists now know, decomposition is a process that corpses both 
actively participate in and undergo. In fact, the first stage of decomposition is even 
known as “autolysis” or literally “self-digestion.” Only minutes after death enzymes in 
cells build up to toxic levels (Costandi 2015). In normal human functioning and cellular 
life these enzymes are a routine product of cell metabolism. However, when they are 
deprived of oxygen, cells can no longer remove the enzymes and at a certain point, 
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usually after only a few minutes, the enzymes begin to devour the cell membranes, 
leaking out into the flesh in a process of self-cannibalism (Costandi 2015).  
The breakdown of cell walls allows the vast number of bacteria that inhabit our 
bodies—something both us and not us—to begin spreading through the body. Trillions of 
bacteria make their home on the typical human body—on average roughly one for every 
human cell—from our eyelashes and tongues to skin, gut, and genitals. All of them begin 
to consume what they find. Eating their way out of the intestines and systematically 
through the rest of the internal organs, anaerobic gut bacteria play a leading role in 
decomposition. Once the white blood cells of the immune system become defunct in the 
process of autolysis, nothing keeps this gut bacteria in check. Gut bacteria are so 
foracious and systematic in their eating practices, that forensic scientists can actually use 
their presence or absence on certain organs to help determine time of death (Costandi 
2015).    
When thinking about the disappearance of Polynices’ corpse, the question of who 
or what is acting is clearly important to the unfolding of Antigone. However, most 
answers to this question fail to consider the active role Polynices’ corpse might be 
imagined to have played in its disappearance.  Forensic scientists agree that when 
enzymes build up to toxic levels they eat through cell membranes in what they describe 
as an “in-house activity” (Costandi 2015). It is described this way because the cells are 
auto-destructing. The enzymes carry the same DNA as the cells they destroy; they are of 
the same stuff. Gut bacteria are different. Collectively these critters are made up of 
thousands of different species that inhabit the human gut in varying and diverse 
compositions throughout an individual’s life. Still, it is hard to say that these bacteria are 
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“outsiders” without literally turning the stomach inside out. Without them, digestion and 
life as we know it would be impossible. The self depends on them for its vital functioning 
just as much as it depends on its human cells (Mol 2008).  
If we are not quite willing to see these bacteria as wholly “other” in life, why 
should we in death? If we say, “I digest my food” or “I eat an apple” as Annemaria Mol 
(2008) has pointed out and mean something by it—all the while having to recognize it is 
never the self who digests food but a complicated network of human organs and 
bacteria—should we not also say “I decompose”? “I partake in the process of turning 
internal organs into liquid that then seeps out into the soil making my flesh moist.” And 
as I am active in the process of putrefaction, should we not also say that “I help make the 
stench that draws the flies and maggots and that sends the guards windward”? Do I not 
help make the tacky fluid that perhaps dust might stick to?  
My suggestion is not that Sophocles had a modern theory of bodily 
decomposition, but that he was surely not ignorant of the process of bodily 
decomposition.34 Polynices’ corpse was a stinky, oozing, bloating and deflating active 
mess. And it seems more our modern sensibilities that want to strip the corpse of any 
agency. Yet Polynices’s corpse was active, and in collaboration with diverse gut bacteria,  
producing the tacky fluid Sophocles describes. Then, in the hot noonday sun—imagine 
the stench of the baking corpse emitting its liquids— 
                                                 
34 For the recognition of the material agency of corpses in premodern times, see Margaret Schwartz, “An 
Iconography of the Flesh: How Corpses Mean as Matter” (2013), Ingrid Fernandez, “Necrolife” (2012), and 
Reza Negarestani “The Corpse Bride: Thinking with Nigredo” (2008) which through a reading of the nupta 
cadavera emblem argues for the prevalence throughout antiquity and early modernity of a lively 





a squall lifted out of the earth a storm of dust/a trouble in the sky. It filled the 
plain/ruining all the foliage of the wood/that was around it. The great empty 
air/was filled with it. We closed our eyes, enduring/this plague sent by the 
gods. When at long last/we were quit of it, why, then we saw the girl (417-
423) 
 
This second dusting scene is no less problematic than the first, despite the fact that the 
guards are paying attention this time and the corpse is not shrouded in the darkness of 
night. However, on this occasion the guards close their eyes! It is not fatigue that causes 
them to close their eyes though. It is a dust storm. According to the guard who recounts 
this second scene to Creon, the dust fills the entire sky. And when the dust settles 
Antigone is espied standing over the corpse. The guard continues his account: 
She was crying out with the shrill cry/of an embittered bird/that sees its nest 
robbed of its nestlings/and the bed empty. So, too, when she saw/the body 
stripped of its cover, she burst out in groans/calling terrible curses on those 
that had done the deed/and with her hands immediately/brought thirsty dust 
to the body; from a shapely brazen/urn, held high over it. (424-431) 
 
As the dust settles, Antigone wails unintelligibly like a bird bereft of its chicks. It is 
tempting to read this as the response Antigone has to her brother’s stinky, naked, oozing 
corpse. The guards, of course, have already responded to the corpse in what might be 
considered a more reasonable fashion, “moving windward” to escape the stench. By 
contrast, Antigone seems to be driven towards the corpse, drawn by it. Polynices is her 
brother, and although dead and stinky, Antigone’s drawing to Polynices might be 
understood in terms of the social norms of her society’s customary treatment of corpses 
(Allen 2000). Yet Antigone is not the only sister of Polynices who is socially situated. 
Why does Ismene not respond like Antigone?35 And who does? Who else besides 
                                                 
35 As Bonnie Honig has recently pointed out, Ismene does claim to have acted with Antigone. We just all 
ignore her claims. 
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Antigone responds to Polynices’ corpse as one being drawn by the corpse? Attuning 
ourselves to the seemingly minor detail that the corpse also elicited unintelligible bird 
noises from Antigone I think can help answer this question.  
Recall that Tiresias’ birds of augury also fall into “shrieking and unintelligible 
frenzy” when they encounter the corpse of Polynices. Tiresias ominously recounts “our 
altars and hearths have been defiled, every one, by birds and dogs, with carrion from the 
son of Oedipus who lies in miserable death [Polynices]. And hence the gods no longer 
accept sacrificial prayers from us, nor blazing thigh-bones, nor does any bird scream out 
intelligible cries, for they have consumed a stream of dead man’s blood” (997ff). In 
Tiresias’ recounting, the birds of Thebes, like Antigone, find themselves drawn to 
Polynices’ corpse and their response is eerily akin to Antigone’s. 
This correspondence suggests we acknowledge Polynices’ corpse as acting in this 
scene (Edwards 2009).36 As I have pointed out, Polynices’ corpse is constantly acting: it 
stinks, it becomes moist, it disappears, it draws people to it, it induces madness. Focusing 
on Polynices’ putrid, disintegrating body as a minor character in the play—as a character 
whose affects can be just as dramatic and influential as those of living bodies in the 
play—has significant consequences for how the place of law in understood in the play as 




                                                 
36 Erin Edwards has recently drawn similar attention to corpses as characters in her analysis of 20th 
century American literature and film. See “Extremities of the Body” in Modern Fiction Studies 55.4 (winter 




III  Three Visions of Law Circulating in Antigone 
At least three visions of law circulate in the text of Antigone. Two are readily recognized 
by nearly all readers even though they are often read as diametrically opposed. I argue 
that this is because they both share and operate under what Alexandre Lefebvre has called 
“the dogmatic image of law” (2008, 3). Not only does this sharing in the dogmatic image 
of law make the two visions easy to recognize as “law” for most people, but it also allows 
us to see them as opposed or opposites. Like the two sides of a coin, opposites must 
always share some common ground otherwise the oppositional relation would never take 
hold. 
In this section, I lay out the three visions of law circulating in Antigone. That 
there are three and not a nice round two, has been a troublesome point for centuries, 
especially for oppositional readings of the play. Goethe, for example, pled with any “apt 
philologist” of his day to prove that the passage which contained the third vision was 
spurious. He thought it was too great a “blemish” to coexist with the artistic genius of the 
likes of Sophocles. Others try to write the third vision off, not as a vision of law, but as a 
womanly outburst. More recently, Judith Butler, surprisingly taking a somewhat similar 
tack, has attempted to ignore the third vision too, claiming its irrationality and singularity  
deny it the status law (2001).37 By contrast, Julen Extabe does not attempt to cross out   
or ignore this vision of law, but he does suggests we can read it as expounding on and 
claiming legitimacy for the second vision.  
                                                 
37 Butler’s interpretation is worse than Goethe’s it seems to me. Goethe just wants the passage out, like a 
painful splinter. Butler does not criticize the manuscript but the character, Antigone, for her irrationality. 
Women may speak about law but they should only speak about law in the terms given to them by men 
and once a man has initiated the conversation, as, for example, Creon initiates the conversation here. 
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Seeing Polynices’s corpse as an actor allows us to appreciate the third vision of 
law as a robust account of law in its own right: a compositional force co-making a world 
that is constantly becoming with vast and diverse material and semiotic vitalities. This 
point differentiates my reading from Extabe’s then too. The second and third visions of 
law cannot be read together as supporting one another, but are in disaccord. The play, I 
thus suggest, tells the story of how Antigone was lured into the “misstep” of the second 
vision and the difficulties in recovering the third vision. 
 
 A. First Vision of Law: Creon’s Positioned Law 
The first vision of law is advanced by Creon. Antigone alludes to it in an early 
dialogue with Ismene: “And now what is the proclamation [kerygma] that they tell of 
made lately by the commander [Creon], publicly, to all people” (8-9). In simple terms, 
this is a vision of law as “proclamation” or command. It issues “publicly” from a 
“commander.” And it has a time and place; it is “made lately” to “all the people [of 
Thebes].”  
Creon fleshes out this vision in his inaugural speech as the king of Thebes. 
Addressing the leaders of the city, Creon outlines the elements of good governance and 
rule of law he hold as essential:  
Anyone thinking another man more a friend than his own country/I rate him 
nowhere. For my part, God is my witness/who sees all, always, I would not 
be silent/if I saw ruin, not safety, on the way/towards my fellow citizens. I 
would not count/any enemy of my country as a friend—/because of what I 
know, that she it is/which gives us our security. If she sails upright/and we 
sail on her, friends will be ours for the making/In the light of rules like these, 





In this passage, Creon places the good of the state above all particular goods, relations, 
and institutions—especially friendship.38 In this context, law has a very specific function 
or purpose: “In light of rules like these, I will make her greater still.” In other words, 
Creon is clear about the utilitarian purpose of law. Law is not made for personal gain, nor 
for emotional reasons. Law is made for the strengthening and making “greater still” the 
state.39  
The purpose of law is to secure the state. By securing the state, law makes the 
state’s citizens secure as well. Samuel Weber calls this element of Creon’s vision 
“containment.” In his reading of Antigone, Samuel Weber focuses on the ship of state 
metaphor that is recurrent in Creon’s speech. This metaphor surfaces when Creon 
describes for his audience the conditions of their city: “Gentleman: as for our city’s 
fortune, the gods have shaken her, when the great waves broke, but the gods have brought 
her through again to safety” (163-5). The “great waves” Creon mentions include, of 
course, the rise and fall of Oedipus, as well as the conflict between Oedipus’ sons, and 
Polynices’ attack on Thebes. Weber’s term “containment” is helpful because it has been 
used before and has rich critical capacity.40 It also emphasizes how a ship not only 
contains its cargo—the diverse cohort of seaman, passengers, livestock, and freeloaders, 
from rats and viruses and plague to human stowaways on board—but how the hull that 
                                                 
38 Creon’s explicit antinomy between the state or rule of law [note that “the state” and “the rule of law” 
are not synonyms] and friendship may not seem that provocative today in the liberal West. In Chapter 
Three on Aquinas I will argue that friendship is the root of law for the natural law tradition I am disclosing 
here. 
 
39 I do not think it is much of a stretch to read Creon here in line with H.L.A. Hart’s own interest in 
rehabilitating utilitarian legal philosophy (1958, 593). 
 
40 See, for example, William Connolly’s criticisms of Martha Nussbaum’s “concentric image” container 
theory of culture in favor of an “ec-centric image” in Neuropolitics, 190-191. Also see Derrick Denman, 
Scales of Political Life (2015). 
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holds this motley collection of human and nonhuman passengers is all that stands 
between them and dissolution at sea. Indeed, because the ship contains a multitude, the 
captain’s priority is to keep the ship intact. In other words, the captain is less concerned 
with what the ship contains than the integrity of the container. As Weber writes, a well-
ruled state, “provides a vessel capable of containing the various elements that make up a 
polis and, by so containing them, imparts a certain unity and duration to them” (2004, 
130). 
A third and final element discernable in Creon’s speech is even more intimately 
bound to the ship metaphor and has to do with good navigation. “If she sails upright and 
we sail on her, friends will be ours for the making,” Creon says. Not only must good laws 
protect the container but they must also help the ship “sail upright.” The state must not 
just hold its citizens secure, but it must do so over time and in different, sometimes 
dangerous, conditions. In his reading of Antigone, Weber parses this as “continuity” 
(2004, 130). As Weber puts it, “as a vessel, [the state] navigates the obstacles that time 
places in the path of any entity seeking to maintain its identity” (2004, 130).  
Creon’s vision of law is marked, first, as a positioned vision of law. It is both 
geographically and temporally locatable. “I here proclaim to the citizens…,” Creon says. 
It is this positioned-ness that makes law, second, directable to a certain use-value—the 
making “greater still” the city of Thebes. Third, using the ship of state metaphor, Creon 
argues that the viability of the state depends on good governance. 
I turn now to the second vision of law offered in Antigone. This vision is 
presented by Antigone. I show that while it differs on some points from Creon’s vision, it 




B. Second Vision of Law: Antigone’s Misstep and Position-less Law    
 The second vision of law comes at lines 450ff. It is this vision of law that I want 
to suggest we consider as a misstep. It is a misstep Antigone corrects in the third vision of 
law, but not before dramatizing how seductive the misstep is and how wide its path. It is 
a misstep that I believe modern legal theory continues to take to this day which is one of 
the reasons the third vision of law is so hard to see.  
At the beginning of this second vision, Antigone has literally been dragged before 
Creon by the guards who were charged with preventing the burial of Polynices a second 
time. Creon confronts Antigone: “You there, that turn your eyes upon the ground/do you 
confess or deny what you have done?” (441-2). Creon does not ask Antigone for her 
version of events, but demands a confession or denial. “I do not deny a thing” Antigone 
responds, at first neither confessing anything nor denying anything. For Antigone’s self-
proclaimed nature, we must remember, is “not to join in hate, but in love” (524). So far, 
so good. Antigone seems to hold up an option Creon does not offer her and one I believe 
she finally finds a formulation in the third vision of law.  
But Creon keeps pressing. Creon then demands to know if Antigone acted with 
knowledge of the law: “tell me shortly and to the point, did you know the edict against 
your action?” (446-7). Creon assumes Antigone acted but he does not want to know 
anything about the circumstances. He is confrontational and insists that Antigone respond 
in kind. To this question, Antigone responds directly and indignantly: “I knew it; of 
course I did. For it was public” (448). Yet Creon’s interrogation is not over. Perhaps he 
can smell the weakness in his prey because now he has her on his ground, on the terms of 
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his edict and his vision of law which she openly (“publicly”) acknowledges. “And did 
you dare to disobey that law?,” Creon says, going for the kill. Weak, weary, on enemy 
ground, Antigone missteps, her foot faltering she flees to the bosoms of her gods: 
Yes, it was not Zeus that made the proclamation/nor did Justice, which lives 
with those below, enact/such laws as that, for mankind. I did not believe/your 
proclamation had such power to enable/one who will someday die to 
override/God’s ordinances, unwritten and secure/They are not of today and 
yesterday/they live forever; none knows when first they were/These are the 
laws whose penalties I would not/incur from the gods, through fear of any 
man’s temper (450-459) 
 
In this passage, Antigone articulates the play’s second vision of law, a vision which I 
have attempted to describe as a misstep. This vision has often been read as opposed to the 
first one articulated by Creon.43 One reason for this is that Antigone describes here a law 
that is “unwritten.” Thus, it is not located in any particular place. Nor is it located in any 
particular time, for the “none know when first they [God’s ordinances] were.” Indeed, 
these laws “are not of today and yesterday, they live forever.” In brief, these laws are 
positionless. This is in marked opposition to law that is geographically and temporally 
delimited, as law is in Creon’s vision discussed above. 
 Nevertheless, this vision of law is remarkably similar to Creon’s vision in several 
ways. After all, as I showed above, Antigone has been cornered on Creon’s ground, and 
this second vision is thus forced into the same framing as the first in many crucial 
aspects. First, like Creon, Antigone envisions law as something that is dangerous to 
                                                 
43 This is a very abstract theoretical account of opposition. I really doubt anything like it exists in the world 
outside theory. Things might get close to opposing one another, but there is always a little space, or 
rather a little hiccup of matter or grit in the machine that prevents the “maximal facial exposure” 
necessary for opposition. Skewed ever so slightly off-kilter any opposition we encounter is probably 
better described as “composition” even if the destructive forces of this “composition” are so absolute and 
totalizing for some species and ways of life that we can rightly say things like, for example, capitalism is 
opposed to human existence on earth. Of course, another way to say this is that capitalism is composing a 
world where humans no longer exist.  
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ignore.  For Creon, law helps us traverse turbulent times in relative safety. Antigone does 
not fear turbulent times as much as the displeasure of those who make times turbulent: 
“these are the laws whose penalties I would not incur from the gods” (458).  
Second and more significantly, both of these visions of law seem to suggest law 
serves as something like a yardstick for determining the legality of actions. Law is 
something that is imposed or “placed upon” something else (OED). Law is “placed upon” 
an independent reality to measure and evaluate it. Law (nomos) and the things of the 
world (phusis) that law evaluates or measures exist independently just as the yardstick 
and object measured exist independently of each other. Law comes ready-made to be 
placed upon things—a world of bodies, affects, and actions. Law is imposed as a ready-
made tool to evaluate the “legality” of certain actions in the world. It is not an active 
component in the building or composition of the common world (Arendt 2006; Cover 
1983; Latour 2010; Tully 2013).  
Concern with legality may be identified with what Robert Cover calls 
“jurispathic” law (Cover 1983).45 According to Cover, the jurispathic judge asks: to what 
extent does a certain matrix of past actions approximate the established legal standard 
which I must only “assert” in this particular instance (53)? Like yardage, legality is a 
                                                 
45 Linda Ross Meyer has also recently drawn a similar distinction in her address to the Eastern Law, 
Culture, and the Humanities section. Meyer asks: “What if injustice and law-as-insidious-power sticks out 
for us, precisely because the background in which we live is so full of lawfulness as care for each other, so 
full of pointfulness and trajectory?” (my emphasis, 2013: 11-12). I think Meyer’s provocative question 
helps us see through the mist of the commonplace to some of the ways law functions in our everyday 
lives in underappreciated ways. Both Meyer and Cover, however, associate lawfulness and jurisgenesis 
with the human capacity for narrative and language. This I suggest still remains too bound by the Sophist 
opposition between the human and normative and the non-human and physical, and so obscures the 
possibility of thinking law (nomos) not only in terms of a human “hermeneutic impulse—the human need 
to create and interpret texts” as Cover puts it (40), but also in terms of matter, bodies, affects, and the 
more-than-human, or that which has often been theorized on the phusis side of the dichotomy. 
  
 41 
specification added to an activity or object within the world rather than a quality inherent 
to it.  
Cover contrasts jurispathic law with jurisgeneratie law. Jurisgenerative law is, in 
Cover’s words, “’paedic’…[or] world-creating” (12). It “proliferates…legal meaning,” 
rather than standardizes it. Consequently, its “discourse is initiatory, celebratory, 
expressive, and performative, rather than critical and analytic” (12-13, 40). Stemming 
from what Cover calls “the hermeneutic impulse” or “the human need to create and 
interpret texts,” jurisgenesis is a “creative…social process” that results in the fecund 
multiplication of legal meanings or normative worlds.  
In this light, I find it useful to draw a distinction between legality and lawfulness. 
The first two visions of law are framed in terms of legality. Legality is a matter of 
measure, some imposed standard. The modern jurispathic state, as Cover notes, seeks a 
clear unitary standard and characterizes the judge as the person who applies this standard 
(42). Lawfulness pushes against legality’s standardization of actions, focusing instead on 
whether actions have the quality of composition or world-building. But lawfulness can be 
very hard to see in a world of legality. Lawfulness is most closely related to the third 
vision of law.  
 
C. Third Vision of Law: Entering into Rapport with Corpses 
Polynices’ corpse adds a layer to Cover’s jurisgenerative law that Cover and his 
compatriots do not consider. Despite his expansive account of law, Cover nonetheless 
operates on an account of law that restricts law to the human, the normative qua 
narrative, and cultural. For Cover, law remains a “hermeneutic impulse—the human need 
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to create and interpret texts,” as he puts it (40).47  But acknowledging Polynices’ corpse’s 
vitality, seems to suggest something more—a third vision of law, a correction in step, and 
an alternative path for natural law. It is a vision of law as a compositional force co-
making a world that is constantly becoming with vast and diverse material and semiotic 
vitalities.  
According to Bruno Latour, “composition takes up the task of searching for 
universality,” that is, “the task of building a common world but…without believing that 
this universality is already there, waiting to be unveiled and discovered” (Manifesto 474). 
For Latour, unlike Cover, this composition includes nonhuman actors. This is an 
important point when considering corpses. 
This vision is again Antigone’s but it is not the vision she invokes when she 
speaks of the “laws of the gods” (450) or some higher standard. Instead, it is a vision of 
the social and affective obligations that bond her to the corpse of her brother Polynices 
(980ff). “For a husband who had died there would be another for me / And a child from 
another man, if I had been deprived of this one / But with mother and father covered 
over, in Hades / There is no brother who could ever grow up / By such a law [nomos] 
indeed have I given you [Polynices] preeminence in honor” (904-920). On this occasion 
Antigone is not confronted by Creon or opposed by Creon into giving an account of her 
law, but freely gives one of her own accord. This is crucial I believe because it is here we 
                                                 
47 Cover and Latour disagree over the role of the material world in this compositional process. Cover (and 
Meyer as well as other ‘world-building’ theorists like Arendt) tend to think of the composition or building 
of a common world in humancentric terms. Latour chastens this humancentrism with his own account of 
compositionism, and consequently is more in line with the goal of this chapter which is to disavow the 
dichotomy that makes Cover’s humancentrism possible (Latour 2010). For a formerly humancentric 




can see Antigone regain sureness of foot. If the second vision was framed by Creon’s first 
vision, literally drawn out of Antigone on enemy ground, here Antigone unfoots Creon 
and walks an alternative path.  
For centuries scholars have either ignored or dismissed this third vision of law, 
focusing instead on Antigone’s more popular and standard first formulation (second 
vision).49 Judith Butler’s recent dismissal of the third vision as an account of law at all is 
characteristic. Butler dismisses the third vision as “a law of the instance and, hence, a law 
with no generality and transposability, one more mired in the very circumstances to 
which it is applied, a law formulated precisely through the singular instance of its 
application and, therefore, no law at all” (2000: 10). This critique attests to the 
dominance of what Alexandre Lefebvre has called the “dogmatic image of law” (2008). 
For Lefebvre, a “dogmatic image” is “dogmatic” because it is drawn from opinion and 
common sense, and it is an “image” because “it is rarely, if ever, directly thematized” 
(2008, 3). Creon’s vision and the ship of state metaphor is a “dogmatic image of law” I 
believe. And in a tit for tat way, under the pressure of opposition, Antigone adopts this 
“dogmatic image” at line 450ff it seems.  
The dogmatic image is an image of law that brings standardization, regularization, 
knowability, and order to an otherwise anarchic and unknowable flux of bodies, affects, 
and actions. It is an image of legality as I described above in contrast to lawfulness. But 
this assumes a very particular account of the world, one that is essentially lawless and to 
which law must be added as a corrective, “subsuming” as Lefebvre puts it, the things of 
the world (3). There is thus a deep connection between the dogmatic image of law I am 
                                                 
49 See Martin Cropp, “Antigone’s Final Speech” (1997) for a nice overview. 
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criticizing and a dualist image of reality characterized by a division between a fecund and 
recalcitrant but dumb physical world and an active, intelligent world of culture and law.50  
First, phusis or matter is conceived as the dumb background upon which the physicist 
must impose laws (or discern the laws imposed by the Creator God) in order to make the 
physical world a regular and knowable object of scientific inquiry. In a similar fashion, 
the legislator must impose laws upon the equally dumb movements of the social-human 
world whose original condition is lawlessness and disorder.  
Consequently, law assumes the active role: the fatherly role of reason and 
language, ordering and regulating only after passivizing an unruly but dumb material 
world, the world of mater, affect, and bodies, as psychoanalytic theory might put it. Law 
comes from without or above to correct a problem: the anarchic flux of the material, 
bodily world of desire. Law is not an aboriginal feature of our belonging to one another 
and the world, but prescribes boundaries, external limits. These prescriptions are given by 
a correcting father or Pater Noster. The dogmatic image thus makes it hard to see both 
how law itself is composed52 and how law might be conceived as an interactive material 
process (i.e., lawfulness) working with and as bodies, affects, and actions, both human 
and more-than-human, to compose and disclose the contours of a common world—the 
lineaments of our material belonging.53 
                                                 
50 See Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolles’s excellent edited volume on the connection between law and 
conceptions of physical reality, Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe (2008). Also see 
Jane Bennett’s influential critique of this conception of reality in Vibrant Matter (2010). 
 
52 There have been many, especially in anthropology, who have plumbed the question of law’s 
composition. See Sally Falk Moore, Law as Social Process (1977), for a start. Also see Bruno Latour’s more 
recent The Making of Law (2010). 
 
53 There have been attempts in recent years to theoretically explore the way law builds our common 
material world. See Material Worlds: Intersections of Law, Science, Technology, and Society the March 
2012 special edition of the Journal of Law and Society. Such attempts have frequently focused on 
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Conclusion—Footsteps of a Compositional Account of Natural Law 
As I have suggested, the dogmatic image of law underwrites both Creon’s 
positive law (first vision) and Antigone’s higher law (second vision). I believe Antigone 
tells the story of why this dogmatic image is so seductive. What accounts for the hold this 
dogmatic image has had on Western legal philosophy? I suggest it is an attitude toward 
matter. Matter frames the opposition between natural law and positive law. This is 
apparent in so far as natural law and positive law are distinguished from one another by 
their source, reducing legal phenomena to this theoretical disjunctive (Lavi 2011). 
One “theory” or “school,” represented by Creon, is what we often identify today 
as legal positivism: law is simply what the sovereign says it is. On this theory, law’s 
matter is immanent and positive, not only in the sense that it is posited by a sovereign but 
also in the sense that it is content-specific. We can find it promulgated in the law-books, 
we can trace its movement through the legislative houses, and we can study its effects on 
the bodies and things it governs. To paraphrase H.L.A. Hart’s influential account of legal 
positivism: law is the geographically- and temporally-specific outcome of community’s 
recognized legislative procedures. Law is a human-social construct (1961).  
The other theory, represented by Antigone’s appeal to the gods, holds that law is 
otherworldly and universal; it is not created or posited here on earth, but discovered and 
employed as a negative concept to assess the validity of specific posited law (Blackstone; 
Boorstin 1996). On this theory law is not what a sovereign says it is, but what ought to be 
no matter who says so (Hart 1958). The positive laws that govern human communities 
                                                 
regulatory law and zoning law that material practices such as architecture must adhere to. The problem 
with these attempts is that law retains the crucial active feature it has on the standard model, relegating 
bodies, materials, and affects to the passive background. 
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are only law in so far as they reflect this higher law. On this reading, Antigone rejects 
Creon’s edict because it is not truly law.  
These two theories are presented as at odds with one another; one is either a legal 
positivist who thinks law is just what it is (although this does not mean we should not be 
critical of it and seek to change it), or a natural law theorist who thinks that law is only 
that which can be grounded or found to accord with some higher law or natural law. Of 
course, this is a rough sketch and over the centuries legal theorists in both camps have 
nuanced their accounts with insights from the other.55 Yet Sophocles offers an alternative, 
a “third vision” rooted in a natural law tradition. 
Early modern legal positivists like Jeremy Bentham criticized natural law as 
“nonsense upon stilts,” an utterly content-less and airy-fairy concept akin to belief in 
“witches and unicorns” that can be pulled out of some metaphysical bag of tricks to avoid 
real argument (Bentham 1843; MacIntyre 1981). Rather than focus energy on the 
criticism and improvement of posited laws, these early modern legal positivists worried 
that natural law theory blurred an important distinction between law and morality, 
between what law is (an analytic inquiry) and what law ought to be (a normative 
question), and so detracted from the necessary work of advancing careful analytic 
arguments against unfair posited law in an attempt to get them repealed. Natural law 
theory, they argued, risked both the modern anarchists who in the garb of Antigone says 
“this ought not to be law, therefore it is not and I am free not merely to censure but to 
disregard it,” (yet who stops short of the more challenging but more socially constructive 
                                                 
55 Hart’s influential version of non-command legal positivism is a good example. So are the “new natural 
law” accounts that have been articulated in response to Hart’s account of legal positivism. See Finnis 
(1980); George (1995). Neil MacCormick provides a nice overview (1996). 
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task of pursuing the bad law’s repeal), and the reactionists who retort “this is the law, 
therefore it is what it ought to be, and thus stifles criticism at its birth” (Hart 598). In 
place of this natural law as higher law, Bentham and other early legal positivists argued 
for a strict separation between what law is and what law ought to be. Only the former, 
they argued, had the critical purchase to actually change unfair posited law. While natural 
law theory concerns itself with the metaphysical, otherworldly, and phantastic, legal 
positivism turns its cool analytic eye to the realities of law and its violence in our shared 
social world.  
Yet the rejection of higher law by the early modern legal positivists as “nonsense 
upon stilts” leads to a reduction of this-worldly law to an all-too-human nihilistic process 
of social control and power relations or what Linda Ross Meyer has called “law-as-
insidious-power” that has come to dominate most late 20th and 21st academic studies of 
law (2013: 11).56 Philippe Nonet and his students have developed piercing critiques of 
modern legal positivism and its attendant “sociological law,” revealing the nihilistic and 
reductive elements of contemporary legal studies in their divorce of law (an immanent 
fact) and justice (a transcendent aspiration) (Nonet 1990; Constable 1994, 2014; Meyer 
2010; Berkowitz 2010). Yet what Nonet and his students leave unturned is the 
                                                 
56 As others like Constable have noted (1994), the legal realism of the mid-20th century and contemporary 
sociological studies of law is the natural outcome of legal positivism’s rejection of natural law as higher 
law. Roger Berkowitz, for example, has shown how rejection of higher law by legal positivism has led to 
the transformation of law into “social rules” and justice into “a knowable product of science.” Berkowitz 
writes, “it is a mistake to think positive laws are without reasons [because they are sourced in an immanent 
will rather than transcendent reason]. Rather, positive laws are precisely those most in need of reasons; in 
other words, positive law must be justified” (xiii). My claim is that we must understand this contemporary 
condition of law, i.e., “the increasingly normalized divorce of law from justice” (Berkowitz xiii), in terms 
of legal positivism’s rejection of a peculiar albeit dominant conception of natural law as higher law. The 
antidote to this “divorce” is not marriage counseling, but an annulment that disavows the very oppositional 
pairing of phusis and nomos in the first place in order to imagine an alternative account of law and nature 
ulterior to narrative that allowed law qua immanent standard to be opposed to justice qua transcendent 




assumption that natural law must be identified with a higher law, and so they leave 
unexplored what I take to be the animating question of any alternative account of law: the 
relationship between law (nomos) and nature (phusis) when nature is understood as the 
particularities of bodies, affects, and actions.57 The result of the failure to reconsider this 
assumption about natural law, as more than one commentator has noted, is that these 
accounts “present an idealist investigation into law” that turns away from the real ways 
law cuts across bodies and works in this immanent world, preferring to explore law’s 
“metaphysical underpinning” and “transcendental virtues” rather than its “power, effects, 
and consequences” (Blank 666; Frank 2006).58  
Again, Sophocles’ insights and Antigone’s rapport with Polynices’ all-too-
material yet vital corpse seems to provide help. Sophocles’ play I believe dramatizes the 
seductiveness and danger of considering  natural law theory and legal positivism as two 
sides of the same dogmatic image of law. Reduced to two competing “theories,” law is 
either a human-social product or it is universal and transcendent. One either studies law 
                                                 
57 Nonet’s senior colleague and friend Philip Selznick did explore the promise of natural law in an early 
essay “Sociology and Natural Law” (1961). 
 
58 Philippe Nonet comes close to my own argument: to return to Antigone’s law is to return to phusis and 
to turn away from dominant readings of law as command or pre-existent standard. See Nonet, 
“Antigone’s Law” in Law, Culture, and the Humanities (2006). However, whereas Nonet roots Antigone’s 
law in the Heideggerian “unsayable,” I want to root it in the call and agency of material bodies, a move 
Nonet would surely criticize as falling back into the model of rooting law in something pre-existent rather 
than the surging forth into light of phusis. Yet this criticism seems to me to miss that the material 
interactions I chart are not pre-existent, but ongoing, open, and exploratory. In fact, I see my reading as 
bridging some of the tensions between Nonet and some of his respondents such as Andrew Norris and Jill 
Frank. See once again Law, Culture, and the Humanities, vol 2.3, Oct 2006. Frank in particular criticizes 
Nonet for being too abstract and failing to see the role of law and justice in particular, immanent human-
institutional practices. Frank thus turns from Nonet’s Antigone’s law to a more “prudent” perspective on 
law and justice that she pulls out of the minor characters. My reading begins the work of 
immanentizing/materializing the “unsayable” of Nonet’s Antigone’s law along the lines Frank suggests, 
but refuses to make law and justice humancentric, seeing law’s activities not just as the practices of 




analytically or normatively, but not both. One either delves into the ins and outs of law’s 
pervasive hold on bodies (Cover 1986) or dreams an alternative and “hold[s] out the 
possibility that law might actually be—that it might actually have an existence—outside 
of its posited existence in rules, norms, and conventions” (Berkowitz xvi). It is this 
opposition, a product of a shared dogmatic image, itself that structures legal philosophy 
and organizes it into competing schools and theories that I believe we find an alternative 
to in non-oppositional or compositional reading of Antigone. For in Antigone, I claim, we 
can find the seeds of an alternative approach to law and nature unbeholden to these 
disjunctives and dichotomies and which can help us begin to appreciate many of the often 




















Aquinas’s Eco/Analogical Vision of Law 
 
There is a legend told about Thomas Aquinas. Large of stature and slow of 
tongue, his fellow students at the University of Paris called him the “Dumb Ox.” Yet, his 
teacher, Albert the Great, who at that time held the Chair of Theology at the College of St 
James, rebuked the chides, reportedly saying: “You can call him a Dumb Ox; but I tell 
you that the Dumb Ox will bellow so loud that his bellowing will one day fill the 
world.”59 Albert was apparently prophetic. Today, Aquinas’s “bellowing” literally echoes 
to all corners of the world. His name marks all six inhabitable continents, from schools 
and churches to universities and roads. He is the patron saint of students and all 
universities, and one of just a handful of named Doctors of the Roman Catholic Church. 
Revered for his classic synthesis of Greek philosophy—particularly Aristotle’s natural 
philosophy which was virtually unknown in the Latin West until Aquinas’s time—and 
the Augustinian-inspired theology of the Roman Church, Aquinas’s thought has become 
a cornerstone of Roman Catholic theology.  
Yet it is in the realm of natural law thought today that Aquinas is usually 
considered to be the most influential both inside and outside the Christian churches.60 
Widely considered to have given the definitive account of the Western natural law 
                                                 
59 For a fuller account of the legend see Chesterton (1956). 
 
60For Aquinas’s influence in developing a secular liberal account of natural law see Jacques Maritian 
(1958) and Sadry Dury (2008). 
  
 51 
tradition, Aquinas gave the topic of natural law extensive and systematic treatment in his 
Treatise on Law which forms part of his magnum opus the Summa Theologiae. This 
chapter focuses on Aquinas’s natural law thinking to argue that there is discernable in 
Aquinas’s thought an account of natural law that we do not often appreciate today. I call 
this Aquinas’s eco/analogical vision of law and distinguish it from dominant normative-
epistemological images of law that figure law as a normative system providing “reasons 
for action” (Hart 1958; 1961).  
As I show in Section One, these normative-epistemological images of law 
circulate widely today in both legal positivist and natural law theories and obscure 
Aquinas’s eco/analogical vision of law. The unwieldy phrase “eco/analogical vision of 
law” helps me stay as close as possible to Aquinas’s meaning. At root and flower, law for 
Aquinas does not give “reasons for action,” but composes the strands—Aquinas’s word is 
“ligaments” or “connective tissue”—of belonging-together in an interactive community 
that includes all those things dwelling below the moon in the “sublunar realm” (ST I-II 
90.1). Consequently, Aquinas’s account of given reality, of the “natural world,” is much 
closer to our modern usage of “ecology” than “Nature.” Yet for Aquinas it is insufficient 
to talk about this “ecology” without also talking about the requirement of “friendship.” 
As Aquinas points out, law does not merely reveal our relatedness or interconnectedness, 
but actively works towards “the establishment of friendship” (ST I-II 99.2). As such, the 
connections Aquinas draws between law and nature (ecology) are always mediated by 
analogy. Yet this does not make them any less “real” or important for Aquinas. For 
Aquinas, as I point out in the conclusion, being itself was structured analogically or what 
he called the Analogia Entis. 
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It is this alternative story of law and nature that this chapter shows Aquinas’s 
account of natural law to disclose. This alternative story is occluded by the dominant 
story told today of natural law as a normative system of moral rules that ultimately 
provide “reasons for action” rather than shape or guide our belonging to one another and 
the more-than-human world.61  For certain natural law theorists, these reasons for action 
exist within the fundamental metaphysical structures of the cosmos or human nature. 
Natural law theorists then give an account of law as providing reasons for action and give 
some account of nature as securing or undergirding those reasons. Aquinas’s own 
examinations of law and nature do not map easily on to this schema as I show in Sections 
Two and Three respectively.  
To begin with, I show in Section Two Aquinas does not approach law as a 
normative-epistemological system, but as boundary-work. A normative-epistemological 
account of law approaches law as primarily something to be known. By contrast, Aquinas 
defines law as the “ligaments” or “connective tissue” that bind and bound a community in 
belonging-together. Like the ligaments that both tie together and separate the elements of 
an organism or the connective tissue that composes an ecosystem, law joins and relates 
disparate elements in a gathering.  Even in the Garden of Eden—and this is where 
Aquinas departs quite radically from the Augustinian tradition—law is necessary because 
God alone cannot transcendentally produce belonging-together or what Aquinas calls 
“friendship.” Friendship requires give and take between one and another. It also requires 
care and concern for boundaries and connections. Such care is what Aquinas understands 
to be the work of law.  
                                                 
61 While Aquinas’s alternative may sound simply like habits or customs I will show below that he crucially 
distinguishes law from custom by its ability to bind or its “ligament” quality.  
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In his most sustained work on the nature of nature and the animal, Jacques 
Derrida calls a focus on the multiplicity and heterogeneity of structures and boundaries 
“limitrophy” (599). Limitrophy, for Derrida, is an investigation of “what sprouts or grows 
at the limit, around the limit, by maintaining the limit” (601). For Derrida, limitrophy is 
missing from the entire Western philosophical tradition. I disagree in so far as I believe 
Aquinas’s approach to law, reflected in and informed by his interest in exploring the 
boundaries and limits of nature, raises many of the same concerns and strategies as 
limitrophy but centuries before Derrida coins the term. Aquinas wrote just as Aristotle’s 
natural philosophy was being reintroduced to the Latin West via Islamic and Jewish 
sources. The reintroduction of natural philosophical enquiry, or what we might today 
liken to scientific observation and study, created a stir in a society where the dominant 
explanation for all activity in the cosmos from the most mundane sprouting of the oak 
seed to the most divine splitting of the Red Sea was attributed to God’s direct, miraculous 
activity. Working with Aristotle’s newly reintroduced and translated texts, Aquinas along 
with some of his contemporaries differentiated between the natural and the supernatural, 
and struggled to frame the relationship between the natural, the supernatural, and those 
mysterious phenomena like freak comet showers or children born with six fingers in such 
as way that “natural” was still a meaningful term.62  
Aquinas envisions the relation between nature and law as two independent 
melodies played at the same time. To theorize this relationship, I elaborate on Aquinas’s 
analogical vision of reality, what he called analogia entis. I conclude the final section of 
this chapter with a recapitulation of what I call Aquinas’s “eco/analogical” vision of law. 
                                                 




I Law as “Reason for Action” 
In this section I use H.L.A. Hart to illuminate a dominant image of law that circulates 
today in natural law theory. While Hart is a famous legal positivist, he describes natural 
law as a normative-epistemological system that provides “reasons for action” in his 
account of what is known as the “separation thesis” (1958).  
In a widely read and influential essay from 1958 titled “Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals,” Hart offered a defense of what he called legal 
positivism’s “separation thesis.” For Hart, the separation these was closely connected to 
the debate between legal positivism and natural law theory. Hart defined the separation 
thesis as “the need to distinguish, firmly and with the maximum of clarity, law as it is 
from law as it ought to be” (594). According to Hart, legal positivism affirms the 
separation thesis, while “natural-law thinkers…blur this apparently simple but vital 
distinction,” which ultimately leads to all types of confusion (594).  
Hart presents his argument “as part of the history of an idea” about law stretching 
back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. That history tells the story of how early 
legal positivist thinkers like Jeremey Bentham and John Austin developed David Hume’s 
distinction between is-statements (or positive statements typically employing the verb 
“is”) and ought-statements (or normative statements typically employing the verb 
“ought”).63 Until Bentham’s and Austin’s development of legal positivism, the distinction 
                                                 
63 In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume famously remarks: “In every system of morality, which I 
have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary 
way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; 
when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is 
not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is 
imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some 
new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time 
that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a 
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provided by the separation thesis was blurred by the dominance of natural law theory.64  
Hart argues that the separation thesis is “vital” to legal theory’s proper study of law. In 
this regard, Hart’s history is told as a salvation narrative.  
According to Hart, it is crucial to distinguish between law and morality. It is 
crucial for the study of law as well as for the life of society. First, if we fail to make the 
distinction, Hart maintains there is no defense against the reactionary conservative who 
claims: ‘X is law, X has been law, therefore X is moral.’ Hart insists that a thing’s 
legality and it morality are two separate questions and keeping the two separate is crucial 
not only for clear legal thinking, but also clear moral thinking. Second, without the 
distinction between law and morality the anarchist can argue: ‘this law Y is immoral; 
therefore it is not a proper law, and I am consequently not bound to follow it.’ The 
solution to both of these potential problems is to keep separate questions of fact (or what 
Hume famously calls is-statements) and questions of morality (Hume famously calls 
these ought-statements). A law may factually be a law, but this does not necessarily make 
it morally good. For Hart, these are two separate spheres of questioning (598).  
                                                 
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this 
precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention 
would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is 
not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason” (III.I.1). Historians of 
philosophy have called the distinction between is-statements (positive statements) and ought-statements 
(normative statements) which Hume raises Hume’s law or Hume’s guillotine.  
 
64 This of course seems to be how Bentham, Hart’s inspiration, approaches the relationship between 
natural law theory and legal positivism too. Bentham famously ridiculed natural law theory as “nonsense 
upon stilts” and advocated legal positivism for it clarity. Hart seems to realize a progressive narrative of 
salvation from superstition is too simple and perhaps too limited by the second half of the twentieth-
century. Yet the Christological framing is still in Hart. 
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Another aspect of the conventional appreciation of natural law that Hart clarifies 
is the role of commands.65 Against Bentham and Austin, Hart argues that there is much in 
legal systems that cannot be explained in terms of command. While it is true that “some 
laws require men to act in certain ways or abstain from acting whether they wish to or 
not,” Hart writes,  
other legal rules are presented to society in quite different ways and have 
quite different functions. They provide facilities more or less elaborate for 
individuals to create structures of rights and duties for the conduct of life 
within the coercive framework of the law. Such rules, unlike criminal law, 
are not factors designed to obstruct wishes and choices of an antisocial sort. 
On the contrary, these rules provide facilities for the realization of wishes and 
choices. They do not say (like commands) ‘do this whether you wish it or 
not,’ but rather ‘if you wish to do this, there is the way to do it.’ Under these 
rules we exercise powers, makes claims, and assert rights. (604) 
  
Hart elaborates here what he means when he claims law provides “reasons for action” 
(2010, 79-85). Law is about moving people to act, either as they will or against their will. 
In the case of criminal law, a person is provided with punishment, or the threat of 
punishment, as a reason to act in a particular way. In other areas of law, a person is 
provided with the opportunity to realize something they would like to have—“wishes and 
choices”—as a reason to act in a particular way.  
Hart’s success, and he was the first to note this, came not from his originality, but 
from his ability to give a certain freshness to an old narrative about law: that law is 
fundamentally a normative-epistemological project, or a legitimated system of reason-
giving and reason-receiving. What distinguishes natural law from positive law is the 
kinds of reasons given and received for action. Hart criticizes natural law theory for 
                                                 
65 “It is possible to endorse the separation between law and morals and to value analytical inquiries into 
the meaning of legal concepts and yet think it wrong to conceive of law as essentially a command” (601). 
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providing reasons for action that are themselves based on metaphysical claims about the 
world or human nature, that is in violating the is-ought distinction.  
In the past fifty years the dominant debate in natural law theory has been whether 
natural law actually does provide reasons for action that are based on metaphysical 
claims. On one side, there are those who claim Aquinas and the classical natural law 
theorists never confused is-statements (stating what is the case based on logic or 
observation) with ought-statements (stating what should be the case based on 
supernatural conjecture). This scholarship often goes by the name New Natural Law 
Theory (NNLT); the philosophers most closely identified with it are the French-
American Thomist philosopher Germain Grisez and Hart’s student John Finnis. 
According to Grisez, Finnis, and their compatriots, for the premoderns, speculative 
reason and practical reason are two completely separate spheres. In addition, law is a 
matter of practical reason. Natural law therefore did not start from propositions derived 
by speculative reason about the metaphysical structure of the world or human nature but 
was based instead on practical self-evident goods that were identified as such through a 
process of self-reflection. 
The other main camp of natural law interpretation denies that Aquinas and the 
classical natural law theorists distinguished the way modernity finds necessary between 
is- and ought-statements. For this camp of what might best be called Neo-Scholastic 
interpreters, Aquinas’s “failure” to distinguish between these kinds of statements is not a 
problem as the distinction is a modern one and overdrawn in any case. Neo-Scholastic 




The tension between the NNLT and the Neo-Scholastic interpreters of Thomistic 
natural law gets to the heart of why I have spent this first section elaborating Hart’s 
separation thesis. Even those who deny the validity of Hart’s separation thesis like the 
Neo-Scholastics still make the question of drawing a distinction between is- and ought- 
statements central to their accounts of natural law and to their reconstructions of Aquinas. 
For the Neo-Scholastics, as much as for the NNLT and Hart, law is a reason for action, or 
what might be called a normative-epistemological project. The only question open for 
dispute is whether these reasons for action are discovered in structures of the cosmos 
(Neo-Scholastics), is a function of practical rationality (NNLT), or is established via a set 
of secondary rules (Hart). It is this story of law that obscures another one that I believe 
Aquinas offers. I turn to that one now. 
 
II Law as Friendship and the “Ligaments” of Community 
Aquinas advances several claims about law in the Summa that when considered together 
reveal a peculiar conception of law. This conception is of law as the connective tissue— 
Aquinas’s word is “ligaments”—or stuff of our belonging-together in community (ST I-II 
90.1).66 Aquinas’s claims about law draw into question the image of law as “reason for 
action” I discussed in the previous section.  
The first claim Aquinas makes is that law was not just present, but was a necessary 
good in man’s original state of paradise (ST I 96.4). This is a crucial point for Aquinas 
                                                 
66 See Aquinas’s first definition of law, The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 1948), I-II90.1. Translations of Aquinas are drawn 
from the standard Opera Omnia Leonine edition of 1882. I relied heavily on earlier English translations, 
particularly the translation by the Dominican Fathers cited above and Alfred Freddoso, Aquinas’s Treatise 
on Law (South Bend: Augustine’s Press, 2009). 
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that differentiates him from many other Christian thinkers and their heirs who held law to 
have merely remedial functions as a consequence of sin.67 In the Summa this claim 
appears in the “Treatise on Man” when Aquinas sets out to consider the “authority” 
(dominio), “dominion,” or “mastership” proper to human beings prior to the Fall. In 
article 4 of question 96 Aquinas makes a crucial distinction between the “authority” one 
wields over a slave and political or legal authority. Aquinas writes, 
Authority has a double meaning. First, against slavery, in which sense the 
authority of the master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In 
another sense authority is referred in a proper sense to any kind of subject; 
and in this sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free 
persons, can be called a master. In the state of innocence man could have had 
authority in the latter sense only. (ST I 96.4) 
 
Two things are important to note in this passage. First, in distinguishing between 
the authority appropriate to the master-slave relation and the authority appropriate to the 
governor-free person relation, Aquinas makes a distinction between that which is 
essential to authority insofar as it is authority at all, namely “governing and directing,” 
and that which merely accrues to authority in our fallen world, “coercive domination.”68 
According to Aquinas, the master-slave relationship is a product of our fallen world. 
There were no slaves or masters in Eden. The same is not true of the governor-free 
person relation though. While both relationships contain elements of authority, only the 
                                                 
67 As others have pointed out, the claim that law attended man in his paradisiacal condition appears to be 
tightly bound up with Aquinas’s Aristotelian premises of the naturalness of politics against the 
establishment Christian views of his day, such as those espoused by Augustine, which held law to be a 
consequence of sin and therefore containing merely remedial or corrective functions. See Robert Markus, 
“Two Conceptions of Political Authority,” Journal of Theological Studies 16 (1965); Paul Weithman, 
“Augustine and Aquinas on Original Sin and the Function of Political Authority,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 30:3 (1992), pp. 353-76; Phillip Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
 
68 This penchant for making distinctions is often criticized by modern readers of Aquinas as a scholastic 
splitting of hairs. Below I will suggest that this is crucial for contemporary environmental thought. 
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master-slave relationship contains an added element, an element made possible only 
because of sin. The point is important because it allows us to appreciate the non-coercive 
essence of authority Aquinas sees, even if that kernel is often obscured in our fallen 
world.69  
 Second and perhaps even more importantly for my purposes here, Aquinas’s 
distinction between kinds of authority suggests something profound about law’s purpose 
or end and ultimately it seems to me law’s relationship to justice. Following the biblical 
tradition, Aquinas held Eden as a state of innocence and perfection. Consequently, justice 
also perfectly obtained there. In other words, for Aquinas as for nearly every Christian 
thinker, in Eden justice was not simply striven for but was obtained, it was an 
accomplished fact. But that means, however he theorized law, it had to have a function in 
excess of, or “superabundance” to the attainment of justice.70 If law was an affirmative 
primordial feature of a state of perfect justice, then law could not be said to properly 
intend or be directed towards the realization of justice or any of the other conditions that 
already obtained perfectly in Eden—peace, virtue, felicity, etc.—in any simple means-
ends way. This claim troubles the image of law as reason for action directed towards even 
the common good (ST I-II 90.3). In fact, Aquinas severely problematizes any attempts to 
think of the common good as something we might act for. Let me explain. 
                                                 
69 Moreover, the point confirms recent environmental Christian readings of God’s original grant of 
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possessions or slaves. For example, see Pope Francis’s recent encyclical Laudato Si’. 
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In the same article concerning law and authority in Eden, Aquinas raises a 
discussion of the common good. After affirming that law and authority were present in 
the state of innocence, Aquinas proceeds to tell us why: “because man is naturally a 
social animal in the state of innocence he would have lead a social life. Now a social life 
cannot exist unless the intending of the common good itself presides” (ST I 96.4).  
 When Aquinas turns to discuss the relationship between law and the common 
good in his “Treatise on Law,” Aquinas uses a peculiar, but illuminating example: the 
relationship between fire and heat. 
Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the 
others, and the others belong to that genus in subordination to that thing: thus 
fire, which is principal among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed 
bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they participate in fire. 
Consequently, since the law principally intends the common good, any other 
precept in regard to some individual work, must needs be devoid of the 
nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good. Therefore 
every law intends the common good. (ST I-II 90.2) 
  
Aquinas calls the relation between fire and heat one of “participation.” To the extent that 
something is “hot,” it “participates in”—or “has a share in”—fire. Hot things, Aquinas 
here explains, are not the means to the goal of fire or directed towards something outside 
or foreign to them—what the seventeenth-century Thomist John of St Thomas called 
“alien goods.”71 Rather hot things participate in fire or have a direct share in the doings of 
fire. It follows, Aquinas thinks, that law is not directed towards the common good as a 
goal outside itself—as one might say perhaps money is directed towards purchasing 
things—but is rather a way or mode of our participation in the common good. And this 
                                                 




means, for Aquinas at least, the common good is not a goal at all, not something to be 
obtained. It is a doing or mode of “participation,” the doing of which Aquinas calls law. 
 Law and justice for Aquinas are not so much different things or means to achieve 
one or the other, but diachronic and synchronic explanations of the same phenomenon of 
belonging-together. When Aquinas talks about justice he is taking a synchronic view. 
When he talks about law, the view is necessarily diachronic. 
 Aquinas offers a more sustained discussion of the common good and its 
relationship to law in De Caritate that helps us see how the relationship of law and 
justice. Here he explicitly rejects the idea that the common good might be something 
possessable by individuals: 
To love the good of a city in order to appropriate it and possess it for oneself 
is not what the good political man does; for thus it is that the tyrant, too, 
loves the good of the city, in order to dominate it, which is to love oneself 
more than the city; in effect it is for himself that the tyrant desires this good, 
and not for the city. But to love the good of the city in order that it be 
conserved and defended, this is truly to love the city, and it is what the good 
political man does, even so that, in order to conserve or augment the good of 
the city, he exposes himself to the danger of death and neglects his private 
good. (2.17) 
 
Aquinas makes clear here that the common good in contrast to private goods can never be 
possessed. The common good is of a different quality entirely from private goods. The 
common good is not something that can be had, but an activity that is itself “diffusive,” 
as the twentieth-cenury Thomist Charles De Koninck puts it (36). In fact, the more one 
attempts to possess or have the common good, the more elusive it becomes. If, as 
Aquinas seems to be suggesting here, the common good’s essential quality is to love 
another (figured as someone other than oneself or as the city), then there is no reason to 
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wonder it cannot be possessed. To possess the common good is to alter its essential 
nature.  
An attempt to possess the common good is exactly what Aquinas criticizes  
tyranny for. The tyrant desires the common good all for himself, but fails to see how his 
appropriation of the common good destroys the element of the common good that 
attracted him to it in the first place: its diffusive communality (De Regno c.1). This 
quality is palpable and real. Consequently, it can be “conserved,” “defended,” and 
“augmented.”72 Aquinas writes: 
Just as the principal intention of human law is to create friendship between 
human and human; so the principal intention of the divine law is to establish 
friendship between human beings and God. (ST I-II 99.2) 
 
As Paul Weithman has argued, this passage is full of insight on how Aquinas understands 
law (372). Here the name Aquinas gives law’s principal intention is “friendship” and this 
very Aristotelian choice of words is illuminating for two reasons.  
 First, in the Nicomachean Ethics—on which Aquinas wrote a lengthy 
commentary—Aristotle makes the claim that “friendship seems to hold states together, 
and lawgivers care more about it than justice” (1155a22). The pairing of law and 
friendship over justice is similar to the conclusion we drew above in point one. 
Friendship, like law as participation in the common good, is an ongoing activity, the end 
of which lies not in completion, but in its ongoing-ness. It is a give-and-take 
relationship.73 Friendship like law requires work. This is why, I believe, it is hard for 
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many to theorize an aboriginal function or non-coercive quality distinctive to law: work, 
it seems, should be absent from paradise. Yet this is not how Aquinas understands 
paradise, nature, work, and embodiment. 
 Here Aquinas takes an Aristotelian line against the more Neo-Platonist trends that 
dominated medieval Christian interpretations of the Eden narrative.74 These trends 
prioritized the role of the spirit over the body and so excluded from paradise the more 
bodily acts of existence. For Aquinas though—and he is adamant here—eating, 
defecating, sex, the work of “dressing and keeping” the Garden, and even natural death 
were all attendant aspects of our original paradisiac condition.75 “Every bodily power is 
finite,” Aquinas reminds us (ST I 97.4). The bodily work of caring for the land, for our 
bodies, and the friendships between us is not considered by Aquinas to be a curse foisted 
on us by the vengeful God spiteful of our original disobedience, but a part of paradise and 
an intimate delight. This work which includes the work of law is an aboriginal feature of 
our human existence.  
 I close this section by outlining the Thomistic picture of law that I believe 
emerges here. In affirming law’s presence in Eden, Aquinas conceives law outside any 
simple means-ends ordering. Nevertheless, law intends or participates in the common 
good. Thus, Aquinas identifies the common good not as an object or possession or goal, 
but as an ongoing activity—in De Koninck’s phrasing, “communicability.”76 The 
medium of community and belonging-together for Aquinas is law. As Aquinas says, 
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law’s “principal intention is the establishment of friendship” (ST I-II 99.2). Put less 
formulaically, law’s intention (but not purpose) is the connective tissue or “ligaments” 
that twist through our coexistence with others, transforming, with work, that coexistence 
into the being-together of friendship.77  
 
III Natura: Nature’s Rhythms and Refrains  
How Aquinas conceives nature (natura) is also problematic for contemporary 
interpretations of natural law. These interpretations, whether Neo-Scholastic or NNLT, 
conceive nature as a normative foundation: a source from which reasons for action can be 
derived. But Aquinas’s discussions of natura were of a much different sort. Listen to how 
Aquinas approaches the concept of nature in his Summa contra gentiles:  
Nature is in keeping with that which usually happens for the most part, but is 
not in keeping with what always occurs: because many natural causes 
produce their effects in the same way usually, but not always; since 
sometimes it happens otherwise, either due to a defect in the power of an 
agent, or to the unsuitable condition of the matter, or to an inferior agent with 
greater strength—as when nature gives rise to a sixth finger on a human. 
(III.99) 
 
Nature, Aquinas here suggests, is “what happens usually, but not always.” Indeed, 
Aquinas seems emphatic, repeating it three times in this short passage: nature is neither 
universal nor controlling, but shot through with contingencies. Nature is what happens 
for the most part—contextual, historical, and shot through and through with the 
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contingencies of defective agents, “as when nature gives rise to a sixth finger on a 
human.” 
 But the really interesting point is not simply that Aquinas does not use nature here 
in a typical modern fashion to denote a universal determinative realm. What is interesting 
is that for Aquinas there is nothing normative at all about nature. The child born with the 
sixth finger is “natural” but not “normal.”  
This account of nature is in stark contrast to how many of Aquinas’s modern 
readers interpret him. These readers understand Aquinas to offer a list of moral rules 
derived from a universal nature.78 For these modern interpreters, Thomistic nature 
provides a normative foundation applicable to all peoples and all times. Of course, as I 
showed in the previous section, Aquinas has his modern apologists who have attempted 
to show that Aquinas did not run afoul of modernity’s is-ought distinction and other 
modern philosophical sensibilities.79 My point is different though. I am claiming that 
Aquinas’s question was different. The question posed by nature for Aquinas did not 
discuss morality on this basis. Instead, he was concerned with boundaries, such as the 
boundaries between the natural and its others, and questions about how these boundaries 
are produced, generated, and even multiplied. What Aquinas is concerned with is not the 
normative conclusions that may be deduced from these boundaries but rather in how the 
natural divides itself and generates difference. 
 Drawing on Estonian biologist Jakob von Uexküll’s “musical laws of nature,” 
Elizabeth Grosz has recently argued for a conception of nature reminiscent of Aquinas 
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(2008). Developing Uexküll’s notion of how there is something like “law” that binds 
“together the development, or, rather, coevolution, of the spider and the fly, the tick and 
the mammal, the wasp and the orchid, the snapdragon and the bumblebee,” Grosz paints 
a picture of nature as “counterpoint with which the living being must harmonize if it is to 
survive” (2008, 40). Grosz concludes, 
If nature can be seen as the contrapuntal relation between at least two 
biologically connected musical themes, the harmonious note-by-note 
connections between at least two different melodies, then milieu or environment 
is not entirely separate from or outside the living organism: it is already mapped 
or composed in terms of the musical cadences available to the body (2008, 44) 
 
Grosz’s and Uexküll’s focus on the musical laws of nature and counterpoint is 
helpful for explaining Aquinas’s account of natura. Like Aquinas, Grosz’s and Uexküll’s 
conception of nature appears more ecological than normative. Their concern is more 
about how things co-exist harmoniously in an ecosystem, how species develop a place of 
home and co-evolve. In other words, like Aquinas, they stay close to the idea of nature as 
a set of relations structuring and composing a house or an abode (as the etymology of 
ecology suggests.)80 Importantly, the elements of the composition possess their own 
vitality and always have the capacity to change the overall structure or relationship. A 
change in the orchid may affect a change in the wasp, just as a change in the soprano 
voice of a contrapuntal fugue may elicit a change in the alto voice. These changes operate 
immanently to the system and are funded, so to speak, by immanent sources.   
Even though an ecosystem has its own vitality, there is nonetheless a certain law-
quality or “contrapuntal” character to its activity that Uexküll thinks can be observed and 
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studied. Although not governed by an external hand, nature’s activity is not radically 
contingent or reducible to blind chance, but suffused with lines of commonality or 
communication just as the voices of a contrapuntal fugue, depend on and relate to one 
another.81 
In the Summa, Aquinas describes nature similarly. Nature is a space of 
indeterminate free play that, nonetheless, contains tendencies, lures, and leanings. Listen 
to how Aquinas puts it: 
Not every power of created nature, however, is known to us. Therefore, when 
something happens outside the order of nature insofar as it is known to us, 
through a natural power unknown to us, it is a preternatural marvel with 
respect to us. Thus, when demons act by their own natural power, they are 
not properly called miracles, but they are miracles, or marvels, with respect to 
us. (ST I 110 4.2) 
 
The English translation here seems to suggest an epistemological uncertainty, a limit to 
human knowing or even just an “unknown” that with study may become a known. 
Aquinas’s language actually suggests something else. “Know” is usually a translation of 
cognosco. The Latin word Aquinas employs is noto, not cognosco. Noto indicates a 
“mark,” “sign,” or “hint.” Nature, Aquinas is arguing, marks or hints at its own 
indeterminacy. This is not a failure of human knowledge to grasp nature’s working, or 
what we would more properly call uncertainty, but a feature of the world, an 
indeterminate quality of reality, a movement of nature oblique to itself, as Aquinas 
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himself defines it.82 Aquinas and his Scholastic contemporaries called these oblique or 
tangential phenomena  “preternatural” to distinguish them from the “natural.” But by this, 
Aquinas also meant to distinguish them from the “supernatural,” “unnatural,” and 
“artificial” as well. In fact, as I began to show and claim above, the boundaries of 
Aquinas’s natura are always in question.  
 As Aquinas conceives natura then, nature is a limit concept. Derrida is useful to 
think with here because he can help us see that the idea of the limit radically changes 
when we no longer approach it as a “single indivisible limit” (601). Derrida’s concern is 
with the limit or boundary drawn between the human animal and all other animals. 
Derrida argues more attention could be paid to the differences and boundaries within as 
well as between the groups that are distinguished from one another. Indeed, the goal of 
limitrophy is to “multiply the limit’s figures, to complicate, thicken, delinearize, fold, and 
divide the line precisely by making it increase and multiple” (601). Aquinas’s own focus 
on the multiplication of limits and boundaries is similar to Derrida’s project of 
limitrophy. 
As I have already suggested, Aquinas in his day proliferated nature’s boundaries 
along the artificial, supernatural, and preternatural, each with their own distinctive 
characteristics.83 Central to Aquinas’s notion of nature is the ongoing question of how to 
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draw, complicate, and multiple the boundaries between nature and its others. Boundary-
drawing practices particularly interested Aquinas. In the Summa for example, Aquinas 
writes “human nature is changeable, thus that which is natural to a human may 
sometimes [aliquando, lit. “at any time”] fail [deficere, lit. “fall off”].84 For Aquinas the 
task was not one of categorizing the world into categories, but attending to how the 
boundaries between categories are drawn, redrawn, and multiplied. Natura is constantly 
on the move. Its boundaries are multiplicitous and heterogenous.  
We can see how this Thomistic interest in boundary-drawing plays out in a letter 
Aquinas wrote to an unnamed knight titled “On the Occult Workings of Nature.”85 Here 
Aquinas plumbs the natural/supernatural divide that was a particularly thorny issue in the 
late Middle Ages.86 The reintroduction of Aristotle’s pagan natural philosophy to the 
West via Islamic sources in the late twelfth century put Western Christianity on edge—an 
edge Aquinas was particularly attentive to. The dominant Christian view of Aquinas’s 
day held that God’s will alone held all creation in existence from moment to moment.87 
On this view, there was thus no definable difference between a supernatural miracle and a 
natural occurrence. As Augustine observed, “how can anything done by the will of God 
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be contrary to nature, when the will of so great a Creator constitutes the nature of each 
created thing.”88 
The establishment Augustinian tradition denied that any knowledge about the 
cosmos could be had except through divine revelation or illumination.89 Any regularity or 
tendency that might be observed inhered in God’s continual maintenance of it, rather than 
a “natural” relationship between created things. For example, the regular germination of 
plant-life was not attributed to a relationship between seed, soil, water, and sun, but 
directly to God’s will. If God so happened to will a seed to sprout in a vacuum, this 
occurrence would be no less natural or more miraculous than God’s willing of a seed to 
germinate in warm, moist soil. The consequences of this tradition of thought were 
extreme for natural philosophy. Any knowledge of nature had to proceed by direct 
dispensation from God.90 
By contrast, Aquinas pursued a budding natural philosophy which sought to come 
to terms with the workings of the cosmos through research into the relations between 
created things independent of God’s immediate causation.91 And in the letter to the 
unnamed knight, Aquinas probes the boundary between the supernatural and natural as it 
was being drawn by his contemporaries.  Aquinas concerns himself with scriptural texts, 
and nonhuman occurrences like meteor showers and seasonal anomalies, those “occult” 
or “secreted happenings,” the “preternatural marvels” or indeterminate free play of nature 
                                                 
88 St. Augustine, City of God, Book III. 
 





91 Daston and Park, Wonder, p. 120. 
  
 72 
we encountered in the earlier passage that proliferate along the supernatural-natural fault 
line. These proliferations complicate any simple attempt to define a natural realm in 
opposition to a divine realm.92 The establishment, of course, had an easy answer to these 
preternatural happenings: God in his omnipotent perfection willed them.93 But on the 
cusp of Aristotelian natural philosophy, this solution was hard to swallow and Aquinas 
rejected it.  
Aquinas and the natural philosophers maintained there had to be some room for 
natural enquiry. Contrasting God’s “supernatural” healing of the sick “upon contact with 
a saint’s relics” in which the occurrence “is not attributable to a form implanted in these 
bodies but only to the divine power which uses the bodies for these results,” Aquinas 
argues “it is clear that not all the workings of natural bodies manifesting indeterminate 
operations are like this.”94 If they were, Aquinas points out, it would be impossible to 
explain any unusual occurrence without an appeal to God’s supernatural activity. Even 
something as simple as a magnet’s attraction of iron despite iron’s natural tendency to 
move towards the earth—what we today usually think of in terms of gravity—appears 
problematic unless nature has some free play of its own Aquinas thinks. Aquinas 
chastises his correspondent for suggesting that unless an occurrence can be explained in a 
determinate fashion the only alternative explanation is God. No, Aquinas counters, nature 
includes marvels and preternatural occurrences. Aquinas concludes this is precisely what 
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makes a keen and ongoing consideration of the boundaries between the natural and its 
others so important.  
Aquinas’s conception of natura thus proves problematic for contemporary 
accounts of natural law that see nature as a normative source. It is not simply that nature 
was a historical and contingent concept for Aquinas, but that it was wholly wrong to 
think of it as a list of norms. Natura, for Aquinas is a mode of happening, the “material 
media” or “meshwork” out of which emerges the interactions of planetary life.95 
Aquinas’s word for this is “sublunary”—the realm under the moon—denoting both the 
earthy-mundane aspect of our creaturely existence and its temporal character bound as it 
is by earth rotations, solar revolutions, tides, and lunar cycles.96 Conceived as such, 
nature is first and foremost something we live in—the tendencies, rhythms, and refrains 
which pattern our creaturely lives—before we know it in any abstract way. Yet natura is 
also something more, as these comments about rhythms and refrains remind us and point 
us back to the contrapuntal structure of Uexküll’s musical laws of nature.  Neither a 
universal normative foundation nor chaotic maelstrom of chance interaction, nature for 
Aquinas appears to be something closer to the web or tissue from which our joint 
interactions emerge.  
 
IV  Aquinas’s Eco/Analogical Vision of Law: Befriending Nature  
 In what remains of this chapter I show how Aquinas’s accounts of law and nature 
that I sketched separately, form an eco/analogical vision of law. I use the term “ecology” 
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to suggest that Aquinas’s term natura is in many ways better captured by our 
contemporary usage of that word than “nature.” To describe the structure of reality or 
how ecology is organized—which for Aquinas is crucially more than mere chance 
interaction and development—Aquinas uses the term “analogy.” To remain close to  
Aquinas’s vision of law and nature I thus refer to an “eco/analogical” vision of law. 
 This eco/analogical vision can be observed in the way Aquinas theorizes natural 
law as well as Aquinas’s claims about friendship. When discussing natural law, Aquinas 
never parses “law” and “nature” as isolable terms—the former belonging to the domain 
of ethics or politics and the latter to natural philosophy or science—but presents them 
holistically, one might even say “ecologically” and yet also “analogically.” This is a 
crucial point. In light of this point, a Thomistic student of natural law should attend to the 
relations between and co-constitutions of terms, to the law-quality of nature and the 
nature-quality of law (this is the ecological element). Yet, nature can never be reduced to 
law nor law be reduced to nature. Nature and law each retain their own integrity (this is 
the analogical element). In how Aquinas theorizes natural law, just as in friendship, there 
is thus an emphasis on relatedness (ecology) that nonetheless remains not just respectful 
of boundaries, but also fundamentally interested in and animated by boundaries 
(analogy).  
 Aquinas refers to this method or eco/ way of thinking relationality 
eco/analogically with the technical Scholastic term synderesis. For Aquinas and his 
contemporaries, synderesis was the “characteristic disposition” of practical, as opposed to 
speculative, reason.97 In contrast to the disembodied demonstration of speculative first 
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principles (principles human beings shared with angels and spiritual beings), the 
medievals likened synderesis to the creaturely vision of eagles.98 Synderesis was 
distinguished by two features: it was a participant-perspective, but one balanced by 
critical distance or respect for boundaries (Kries 2002). In contrast to speculative reason, 
synderesis guided human beings in their practical navigation through the landscape—in 
their relations and “friendships” with one another and the more-than-human practical 
world. Aquinas’s synderesis or ecological vision is profoundly embodied. 
 In short, rather than offering a God’s (or angel’s) eye view, a view from nowhere 
and everywhere, synderesis offered what the medievals describe as an eagle’s eye view, 
an embodied view. There is thus a deep creaturely vulnerability in how Aquinas describes 
our practical dealings with the world. Our dealings occur as an ecological give-and-take 
that lacks any guarantee of symmetry. In marked contrast to the angel for the medievals, 
the eagle may miss its mark and careen into a cliff-side, or a “death spiraling” pair may 
fail to disengage their talons and crash into the bramble. Synderesis opens up to a 
material world of interactions and interrelationships—a world of “dark ecology” as 
Timothy Morton has put it—that no one or thing can master, but with which each must 
engage (2010). 
 Alongside attentiveness to connectivity and embodiment, the practice of 
eco/analogical vision also respects and takes pride in building and maintaining practical 
boundaries and conceptual distinctions. The Scholastic metaphor of the eagle is important 
                                                 
instinctual grasp of indemonstrable “first principles” (intellectus principorium), like the principle of non-
contradiction, practical thinking found its source in synderesis. 
 




here too. Aloofness and a certain “pathos of distance” are cultural features readily 
associated with eagles.99 For the medieval Scholastics, this aloofness was particularly 
appropriate because synderesis, in contrast to conscience (conscientia) was at a step 
removed from the hubbub of interaction (ST I 79). Whereas repeated wayward acts could 
dull, even extinguish, one’s conscience, they could not effect synderesis which was 
insulated and set apart even as it remained a practical capacity. While one’s conscience 
acts in the thick of interaction, synderesis operates at a distance, offering a vision or 
partial overview of the milieu in which interactions occur. Like an eagle on wing, 
synderesis offers a mezzo-level perspective—an embodied in-between position—a 
perspective from which one might discern action and contemplate practical alternatives. 
 As a mezzo-level perspective, this vision helps us to recognize the radical extent 
of our entwinement with the natural world—with a milieu that is, as Timothy Ingold has 
put it, “the ground upon which the [very] possibility of interaction is based” (Ingold 
2008, 213). Eco/analogical vision names the capacity to sense the profound relevance of 
nature as the necessary conditions of interaction, and not merely a “hybridity” of inter-
actants as Bruno Latour, Timothy Morton, and Jedidiah Purdy among others have 
recently argued. Grasped as a complex whole by eco/analogical vision, nature is not one 
inter-actant alongside others, but the “meshwork” or reticular tissue that makes life, 
agency, and belonging-together possible in the first place. What the mezzo-level 
perspective reveals to Aquinas is the possibility for friendship and belonging with 
nature—possibilities which are missed by post-nature accounts unwilling or unable to 
adopt a mezzo-level perspective.  
                                                 




 Aquinas charts a non-binary, non-universal account of nature that is certainly 
sympathetic to contemporary critiques that correctly problematize modernity’s Nature-
Culture dualisms as artificial, gendered, and imperialistic. Nevertheless, Aquinas 
decidedly retains, or rather, remembers for us, a concept of nature, reminding us what we 
lose when we jettison nature, that is, when we go “post-natural.” What we lose when we 
go “post-natural” is a certain care and respect for practical boundaries that make 
friendships possible. This care, for Aquinas, is central to the human capacity to belong 
and work for friendship with the more-than-human ecological processes we cohabit and 
which make our creaturely lives possible and meaningful. Ultimately this friendship, like 
any friendship, goes beyond merely acknowledging interconnectedness—as important 
and difficult as that in itself may be—and requires a certain care for and respect for 
boundaries. It is this task of retaining and continuing to care for boundaries in a world 
that has rightly begun to move away from modernity’s Nature-Culture binaries which 




Coda: Timothy Treadwell and the Brown Bears 
I conclude with a brief illustration from contemporary environmental politics. On 
October 2003, in Katmai National Park on the Alaska Peninsula Timothy Treadwell, 
Amie Huguenard, and a brown bear were all killed within hours of one another. After 
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thirteen summers of living with the bears—“of seeking a primordial encounter”—
Treadwell and Huguenard were attacked and eaten by a bear. The bear was later shot and 
killed by park rangers.101 Controversy ensued. Critics of Treadwell faulted him for the 
bear’s death. Defenders of Treadwell claimed he was “out there” protecting the bears 
from poachers, although there was no evidence of bear-poaching within Katmai. In a 
documentary made from footage filmed by Treadwell and later directed by Werner 
Herzog, an indigenous Alutiiq comments: “Timothy crossed a boundary we’ve [Alutiiq] 
lived with for 7,000 years. An unspoken, unknown boundary, but when we cross it we 
pay the price.” This indigenous remark resonates with Aquinas’s counsel regarding care 
and respect for boundaries. Treadwell, Huguenard, and the bear paid “the price” with 
their lives, others paid with the imposition of restrictions on camping in Katmai, others 
paid with the loss of loved ones, and yet others paid with crushed dreams  of human-bear 
harmony.  
 Aquinas, like the Alutiiq, theorizes a place for conceptual distinctions and care for 
boundaries which I believe is crucial for contemporary environmental politics. Aquinas 
would have no problem censuring Treadwell’s attempt to live amongst the bears as 
unnatural (contra naturam). This is not because Treadwell’s actions transgressed some 
immutable species-boundary or because Treadwell’s actions violated the park’s rule 
about maintaining a distance of fifty yards between humans and bears. Rather it is 
because Treadwell’s actions jeopardized friendship. Friendship, as Aquinas points out, 
depends on boundaries. There is something to be gained by human animals and other-
than-human-animals alike in maintaining both connectedness and boundaries. This is 
                                                 




precisely what Treadwell’s actions in regard to the bears failed to appreciate. 
Serendipitously though, Treadwell may also offer us a model for appropriate human-
other-than-human-animal friendship in his filmed interactions with the red foxes. 
 Along with his interactions with the bears, Treadwell captured extensive footage 
of his interaction with several red foxes. Both bear and fox are “wild” animals, yet their 
filmed relationships with Treadwell are marked by contrast. Footage includes a fox 
chasing Treadwell only to catch him and then roll onto its back “begging” for belly-rub; a 
pup “stealing” Treadwell’s hat with Treadwell cursing, hot in pursuit; a mother bringing 
her pups by Treadwell for a “pet” when Treadwell is trying to film a bear; and an adult 
lounging on Treadwell’s tent as if it were a hammock. Species boundaries, human-wild 
boundaries are all certainly being transgressed here as readily as in Treadwell’s 
interactions with the bears. Yet I cannot conclude as certainly that Aquinas would 
unproblematically censure this relationship as unnatural or destructive of friendship. This 
inability, this faltering is as illuminating for my interpretation of Aquinas’s account of 
natural law as it is problematic. 
 Brown bears and red foxes are different, and drawing these distinctions is crucial. 
That which is appropriate for the maintenance of friendship between humans and bears is 
different from that which is appropriate for the maintenance of friendship between 
humans and foxes. Treadwell could be doing great harm to both fox and himself by 
acclimating the foxes to humans. Then again, as some scientists and anthropologists have 
recently noted in the case of human-wolf domestication, it is not clear which way the 
causal arrow points or who domesticates whom.102 Perhaps the foxes were taming 
                                                 
102 Brian Hare, “We Didn’t Domesticate Dogs. They Domesticated Us., ” National Geographic (March 
2013); Ed Yong, “The Origin of Dogs,” The Atlantic 2 June 2016. 
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Treadwell to their presence. Perhaps over time these relationships could bring human 
beings to a new stage of development just as wolves may have once done. Whatever this 
stage would be, one thing is certain; it would now possess elements of the vulpine 
alongside the lupine. And perhaps it would not be a bad thing to breed some sly wit and 
anti-hierarchy vulpine sensibility into our hierarchized, and at times seemingly all-too 
lupine world. What I can conclude with more certainty is that in Aquinas’s time this 
conceptual distinction-drawing was vital. How these practical boundaries got drawn and 
redrawn were at the forefront of his account of natural law. It is this vision of natural law, 




























The Character of the Contract: Scenes of Contract and 





This last “story” chapter is concerned about what it means to contract and promise in 
relation to natural law thinking. It adds a piece to the puzzle of the non-universal natural 
law tradition I have been attempting to uncover. This puzzle piece concerns the binding 
or obligatory character of law and it has been missing from the first two chapters. I turn 
to the writing of the lawyer, historian of political thought, and storyteller Leopold von 
Sacher-Masoch—remembered overwhelmingly for his sex and bondage novellas—to 
investigate this binding character of law. I show how Sacher-Masoch recuperates a 
concept of contracting that is directed not towards securing a more stable or predictable 
future, but being mindful of the present and embodiment.103 This concept of contracting 
is useful because it gives us more resources and a richer vocabulary for speaking about 
law in terms of “bonds” that are not only directed to conventional legal positivist 
functionalist arguments about law.  
 Sacher-Masoch is less well known as a natural law thinker than Sophocles and 
Aquinas, yet Ernst Bloch ranks him, along with his teacher J.J. Bachofen, among the 
                                                 
103 See Elizabeth Povinelli, Economies of Abandonment for a similar distinction that rejects task-
orientation in its analysis of aboriginal Australian communities. 
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most important modern natural law thinkers (1987, 97-109). However, what concerns me 
primarily in this chapter is not proving Sacher-Masoch was a natural law thinker, but 
recuperating his concept of contract. My argument in this chapter is that Sacher-
Masoch’s novella Venus in Furs (1871), tells a story about what we miss when we think 
of the contract exclusively in terms of securing the future or establishing what Arendt 
called “islands of predictability” in the uncertain sea of human action and time’s 
unfolding (Arendt 1958). For Sacher-Masoch, I argue, contracting is not about wresting 
spots of certainty out of uncertainty, but a commitment to the present moment. 
 This Masochian vision of the contract is an important final story chapter in my 
story of an alternative tradition of natural law. It provides this story with something it has 
been lacking or only vaguely gesturing toward—an account of what gives law its binding 
force. If the natural law I have sketched in the previous chapters via Sophocles and 
Aquinas is non-universal and proceeds neither from the unchangeable structures of the 
cosmos, the imperatives of reason, nor the eternal commands of God, then what gives this 
law its binding quality? If law is the bonds and connections between people and things 
what does law actually do or look like? Sacher-Masoch’s own interest in bondage and 
contracting is illuminating here. 
There is a lot to say to introduce Sacher-Masoch to a political and legal theory 
audience. Sacher-Masoch was trained as a lawyer and political theorist, only later in life 
opting for the role of storyteller after retiring very young from his university post.104 His 
                                                 
104 English biographies of Sacher-Masoch are very few and far between. For most of these details I am 
relying on James Cleugh, The First Masochist (1967). Michael O’Pecko’s “Afterword” to his translations of 
the first volume of the Legacy of Cain and A Light for Others also include important biographical 
information on Sacher-Masoch. I have benefited greatly from personal communications with Michael 
O’Pecko regarding the life and writing of Sacher-Masoch. 
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most published tale, Venus in Furs, abounds in legal and political themes. Yet today, he 
is almost entirely overlooked by theorists. When Sacher-Masoch is remembered he is 
overwhelmingly remembered for “the sexual perversion” his contemporary, the Austro-
German psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing, used his name to denote: Masochism. I 
devote Section One to a brief biography of Sacher-Masoch.  
Section Two briefly recounts the dominant legal positivist narrative of the 
contract using Hobbes’s account in Leviathan and Sacher-Masoch’s own account of it in 
Venus in Furs. Section Three shows how Sacher-Masoch recuperates an alternative 
concept of the contract in the same book. Contracting remains a way of navigating an 
uncertain world, and this is precisely what makes the contract such an important concept 
for the non-universal account of natural law I am attempting to uncover. Rather than 
secure a terra forma in a sea of uncertainty, the Masochian contract works to commit us 
to the moment in all its uncertainty.  
For Sacher-Masoch, I show, contracting is not about securing a predictable future, 
but about drawing together (literally con-tracting) in the present, and loving where one is 
at. Another way to put it could be, loving “the trouble” with which Donna Haraway 
suggests we stay (2016). Sacher-Masoch describes the process of contracting in vivid 
terms of flesh contracting under a mistress’s whip, and nipples contracting in the cold. In 
Section Four, I briefly consider the radicalness of Sacher-Masoch’s account of 






I Introducing Leopold von Sacher-Masoch and Venus in Furs 
Today, Sacher-Masoch’s Venus in Furs is rarely read—especially by political theorists—
despite having been popular in Sacher-Masoch’s own day. And Sacher-Masoch is never 
listed among political theorists. It is not that no one has heard of Sacher-Masoch; on the 
contrary, Sacher-Masoch is overlooked as a theorist because everyone has heard of 
masochism and has all sorts of colorful ideas and stories associated with the term.105  
 While it is true that Sacher-Masoch’s writing and personal life testify to diverse 
desires and a certain predilection for authoritative female figures, Sacher-Masoch was a 
lawyer and political theorist before he started writing stories. Sacher-Masoch’s first 
publications were academic manuscripts on the history of political thought and he was 
professor of history at the University of Graz. Born in 1836 in Lemberg, Galicia 
(modern-day Lvov, Ukraine) on the frontier of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to a semi-
noble family, Sacher-Masoch had both a poetic bent and a deep passion for political 
philosophy from an early age. He excelled in school and as a reward his parents allowed 
him to stage theatrical performances at the family house. He pursued a law degree at the 
Universities of Prague and Graz, and by 1856 was already lecturing in German history. 
When we think of masochism and dream of leather and whips, this professional academic 
is not the Sacher-Masoch we remember. Or is it?  
The tension between Sacher-Masoch the dry academic and Sacher-Masoch the 
lurid fiction writer is reflected in Venus in Furs. Specifically, it is reflected in the tension 
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between the contract understood as the means to secure the future or possess something 
and the contract understood as an embodied experience. 
Venus in Furs tells the story of an affair between a young and aimless Galician 
nobleman, Severin von Kusiemski, and an even younger widow, Wanda von Dunajew. 
Severin describes himself as “a dilettante in life” and Wanda repeatedly calls him a 
“dreamer.” Wanda is stern, even despotic.106 Their affair begins at an idyllic Carpathian 
health resort. Severin is obsessed by Wanda whom he almost immediately begins to call 
“Venus” after both the goddess of love and a marble statue of the goddess in the resort’s 
garden. When he arrived at the resort, Severin fell in love with the statue; he finds 
something both thrilling and chilling in transferring his affections from a stone statue to a 
flesh and blood human being. Wanda, the human being, can “take pity” on Severin in a 
way he never experienced with the marble statue. Yet the fact that she is flesh and blood 
also makes Severin’s relationship with her less certain which terrifies Severin.  
Severin’s solution to the uncertainty he feels in his relationship with Wanda is 
marriage. Wanda ridicules him saying she could never love a man for more than a month. 
She derides the marriage contract as nothing but an attempt by man to “bury woman like 
a treasure” (19). Severin confesses he is tormented by the thought of losing Wanda and 
shifts the terms of his proposition: “If you can’t be mine, all mine and forever, then I 
want to be your slave, serve you, tolerate anything from you” (27). Wanda agrees to this 
arrangement and a contract is drawn up and signed. Now in Florence, Severin (now 
known as Gregor) rides in third class and Wanda (referred to as Mistress) rides in first. 
Other features of their lives together include episodes of bondage and whipping. Wanda 
                                                 
106 This trope of a relationship between a dreamy man with his head in the clouds and a practical woman 
is recurrent in Sacher-Masoch’s writings. For example, see Harsa Raba, The Love of Plato. 
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also frequently orders Severin to procure contact information for her on prospective 
lovers. 
A thread that runs through the novella is the longing expressed explicitly by 
Severin for permanence in a world of growth and decay. A provocative illustration of this 
thread comes around the middle of the novella: Wanda is bathing and Severin is serving 
her. While he attends his mistress he can, “watch her dipping up and down in the 
crystalline liquid, watch the small waves agitated by her and amorously playing around 
her” (90). At this point, Severin himself dips into reflection. “Our nihilist aesthetician is 
right,” Severin claims, obliquely gesturing toward Nietzsche, “A real apple is more 
beautiful than a painted one, and a live woman is more beautiful than a Venus of stone” 
(90). Given that up to this point the entire novella has been driven by Severin’s striving 
after “a Venus of stone,” something stable and unchanging that can never be taken from 
him, Severin’s reflection takes on greater significance. Before the water has even dried 
on Wanda’s skin however, Severin and Wanda have already agreed to hire an artist to 
idealize and preserve her. Severin insists, “the artist’s hand should wrest you from 
destruction. You must not perish like the rest of us forever and always, without leaving 
behind some trace of your existence. Your pictures must live long after you have 
crumbled into dust, your beauty must triumph over death” (91).  
Early on Sacher-Masoch piquantly illustrates an alternative mode of dealing with 
the tension between the beauty of “a real apple” and a painted one. When he first arrives 
at the resort, Severin recalls, “Actually I had very little interest in the beautiful woman up 
there, since I was in love with another—indeed, very unhappily in love, far more 
unhappily than Sir Toggenburg or the chevalier in Manon Lescaut, for my beloved was 
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made of stone” (12).107 Yet what makes Severin unhappy in love is also the very thing 
that he prizes most in this relationship: The fact that his love is stone gives her a 
permanence no flesh and blood might provide. Not only will she remain the same forever, 
but also he can possess her like one possesses treasure, and do with her what he wishes. 
He frequently goes to the garden where she stands to adore before her (13). But of course 
she can never caress him, and this makes Severin unhappy. Then, one night in the 
moonlight, he sees “white as stone” the statue come alive. “The beautiful marble woman 
had taken pity on me and had come alive and followed me,” Severin recounts with 
terrified rapture (13). But instead of being overjoyed, instead of running to the woman 
and embracing her, his body literally contracts in fear: “I was seized with a nameless 
fear, my heart was ready to burst, and instead of—Well, I was a dilettante after all” (13).  
Throughout the story we see Severin grapple with both the desire to arrest the 
flow of time and the allure of flesh made vibrant only in organic cycles of time. What is 
more, we see contracts for both temporalities. The marriage contract fixes a moment, the 
moment of possession of the other, and promises this relationship will endure without 
change. Other contracts however, like those realized with pain or pleasure in the body, 
the fibers of the body responding to organic stimuli, make no promises but offer instead 
exquisite, fleeting sensations, a lifetime contracted to a moment.    
 
II Contract as Securing the Future: Hobbes and Sacher-Masoch 
As we can see from Wanda’s response to Severin’s marriage proposal in Venus in Furs, 
the contract is one way people attempt to create certainty and stability when they 
                                                 
107 This is not the only time Severin recounts falling in love with a stone object. Later in his Confessions he 
tells of a childhood love affair he had with a marble statue in his father’s library. 
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otherwise experience a lack of these things. The contract is here figured as a supplement 
or corrective to the way things are given. This is an old narrative about the contract in 
legal and political theory. According to this narrative, the contract is envisioned to secure 
the future, to make conditions more predictable in an otherwise uncertain world. The 
contract is produced to supplement or fix something wrong in the present—the fact that 
the present is open-ended. 
Thomas Hobbes presents a famous account of contracting in his text Leviathan 
that matches up with this vision of contract as an attempt to securing the future.108 
According to Hobbes, contract is “the mutual transferring of right” (XIV). This “mutual 
transferring of right” is introduced into the social world with nothing else but “the 
security of a man’s person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life as not to be 
weary of it” as its end (XIV). Yet to understand why this introduction of security is 
necessary, we need to step back for a moment and consider the character of the given in 
Hobbes.  
  Famously, according to Hobbes, life prior to the social contract is “nasty, 
brutish, and short” (XIII). Hobbes was the first to define this pre-contract life as the “state 
of nature” and so equate the pre-contractual with the natural in the terms of given.109 For 
Hobbes, the natural is a base. This view of the natural was in sharp distinction to the 
                                                 
108 Hannah Arendt and Jacques Derrida tell two contemporary versions of this account of contracting. As 
Bonnie Honig (1991) has pointed out, their accounts are crucially different in regard to how they theorize 
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are key to navigating the realm of action or politics. Because human action is always unpredictable and 
open-ended, human beings make to create “islands of predictability” (THC). Without these “islands of 
predictability,” we would be adrift not only on our own unbound capacity for action, but also in a world of 
the merely given. Action allows us to transcend the merely given .  
 
109 This is telling and has had profound consequences on how future generations conceive the given and 




Aristotelian teleological view of nature for example that held nature to be an end in itself. 
Hobbes called on the contract as a means to allow us to escape our base conditions in the 
state of nature. In other words, the contract came to supplement nature and the given 
where they failed. Hobbes, of course, argued that the state of nature failed in providing 
human beings with adequate “security.” Yet others have argued differently about where 
and how nature fails us. Nonetheless all agree that somewhere nature fundamentally fails 
us or is fundamentally incomplete and the contract comes as the remedy. In all these 
cases, the contract comes to fix something that is wrong.  
The world itself is deficient, or a condition of lack pervades like atmospheric 
conditions as Hobbes put it (XIII). Hobbes’s use of an atmospheric metaphor to describe 
the state of nature is helpful in illuminating how the contract works for Hobbes and how 
it compares with Sacher-Masoch’s understanding. Hobbes writes  
“during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, 
they are in that condition which is called Warre…warre, consisteth not in 
Battel onely, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to 
contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time, is 
to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For 
as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an 
inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth 
not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto” (88-89)  
 
Hobbes’s state of nature has often been understood as a theoretical device for deducing 
man’s originary or “naturall” characteristics: his selfishness, fear, lupine proclivities, etc. 
Yet here Hobbes’s description of “warre” as a “condition” foremost defined by its 
awelessness or lack of wonder and his refusal to equate “warre” with “actuall fighting,” 
and, finally, his comparison of this aweless condition with heavy hanging atmospheric 
conditions, all seem to suggest the state of nature is a type of mood or temperament 
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similar to the listless “despairing” mood that hangs over the beginning of Venus in Furs 
(9-11). The similarities do not stop there. Both Hobbes and Sacher-Masoch also 
understand the primary problem to be an awelessness or despairing sense of 
disenchantment. And both suggest that this mood or atmosphere is simultaneously fed 
and supported by our inability to connect with others. This problem, of course, Hobbes 
fixes with the contract. Sacher-Masoch does as well, but he envisions a radically different 
kind of the contract, one that does not aim to secure the future or make it more 
predictable but disclose our present relationality and bondedness.    
   
III Contracting and Bonding in Venus in Furs 
To contract means literally to draw together or bind (OED: Serres 1995, 103). This sense 
of the word is central to Sacher-Masoch’s alternative conception of contracting. To see 
how Sacher-Masoch fleshes out this conception, I look at three scenes of contract in 
Venus in Furs. 
A. Slave Contract 
About half way through the novella, Wanda and Severin draw up and sign a 
contract (73). This contract makes Severin the “unconditional slave” of Wanda. And 
while the contract seems to work by securing a future in which Severin is dominated by 
Wanda, Sacher-Masoch describes its effects differently. Thew slave-relationship (based 
on the slave contract) is presented as Severin’s alternative to the marriage-relationship.  
 In this scene, Sacher-Masoch compares the slave contract and the marriage 
contract in ways that prefigure the work of Carole Pateman and other feminist critiques of 
the marriage contract (1988). Both the slave contract and the marriage contract feature 
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different ways of navigating uncertainty. As noted above, Severin first proposes a 
marriage contract to Wanda to alleviate his fear of losing Wanda. Wanda turns down his 
proposal and mocks him, “It is merely the egoism of the man, who want to bury a woman 
like a treasure. All attempts at using vows, contracts, and holy ceremonies have failed to 
bring permanence into the most changeable aspect of changeable human 
existence…Nature knows of no permanence in the male-female relationship” (19). As 
Wanda understands full well, Severin ’s desire is to secure the future as an eternal present 
moment.  
 After Wanda rejects his marriage proposal, Severin reformulates his proposal and, 
in doing so, reworks the contract in an interesting way. Severin now proposes: “If you 
can’t be mine, all mine and forever, then I want to be your slave, serve you, tolerate 
anything from you” (28). He continues: “if I can’t enjoy the full and total happiness of 
love, then I want to drain its torments, its tortures to the dregs; then I want the woman I 
love to mistreat me, betray me, and the more cruelly the better. That too is a pleasure” 
(29).  
The contract Wanda and Severin sign does not prohibit Wanda from choosing to 
love and give herself to anyone she pleases. She can dismiss or retain or even kill Severin 
at her whim.110 Certainty about the future is given up. Revised by Severin, the contract 
becomes a tool for expunging the desire to have security, certainty, or predictability. 
Rather than secure the future, the contract reworked by Severin allows him to live only in 
the moment.  
                                                 
110 Along with the contract, Severin signs an undated pseudo suicide note in case Wanda desires at some 




The other thing to note about this written contract is the emphasis Sacher-Masoch 
puts on its drafting. The contract is drafted and re-drafted various times. It is almost 
signed and then delayed. Sacher-Masoch shows us how the writing or drafting of a 
contract is a material process. It requires pen strokes, that come to replace or stand for the 
whip strokes that otherwise bond Severin to Wanda. 
B. Contracting Flesh 
The second instance—and really they are multiple—of a contract scene in the 
novella that illuminates the alternative contract Sacher-Masoch provides in Venus in Furs 
occurs whenever Wanda abuses Severin. At first blush, it may seem ridiculous to 
describe these scenes of bondage as contract scenes, yet this is precisely the language 
Sacher-Masoch uses to describe them. However, he uses this language to describe how 
the body is literally bound or drawn together, bringing other bodies and body parts in 
unexpected relation to one another.111 
For example, one of their first fierce embraces causes Severin to faint (45). 
Fainting is the effect of the contracting and “seiz[ing]” of the capillaries around the heart, 
a phenomenon that may occur in moments of intense fear (13) or of other powerful 
feelings, such as cold and “tingling” (22) caused by arousal or by being pinioned to a 
bedpost (113). These contracts leave marks such as those left by pen when it strikes paper 
(73), or by a plow when it is pulled by a man being whipped by three women (83-4).  
This last scene is one of the most evocative of the entire novella. In this scene 
Severin is harnessed to plow and made to till a field of maize while Wanda watches (83-
                                                 
111 Deleuze and Guattari develop this theme in Sacher-Masoch in “Bodies without Organs” in A Thousand 
Pleateaus. There they note, but do not develop, how this drawing together is a literal contracting. 
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4). The imagery reminds us that bound up in what it means to contract and contracting 
are not only human beings, but also other-than-human animals, as well as tools and other 
inanimate objects. The whole scene, from the three African women whipping the 
European male as he, tied in a harness to a farm implement, makes furrows in the earth, 
unsettles the dominant narrative of the contract. This is a stunning scene and it merits 
Sacher-Masoch’s further inclusion in a wide range of critical literature exploring contract 
theory.  
C.  A Contract’s Organic Cycles 
A different whipping scene provides another insight into the contract Sacher-
Masoch offers us to think. After this whipping scene, Severin and Wanda part. 
Consequently, many readers of Sacher-Masoch, like Deleuze, claim that their contract is 
broken, and this marks the end of the Masochist fantasy (1988). However, if a contract is 
not oriented toward the future but is rather focused on bringing human beings (as well as 
nonhuman animals, fields, plants, plows, history, statues, etcetera) into relations with one 
another in a sensational moment, what it means for the contract to “fail” must also be 
reconsidered. In fact, in the final whipping scene that many read as the dissolution of the 
contract Severin claims not that his fantasies are destroyed but that they are “surpassed” 
(115).  
The problem with this final whipping scene according to most readers is that in it 
Severin is not whipped by Wanda but by Wanda’s new Greek lover. The problem is not 
that Wanda does not live up to her end of the bargain—there are no stipulations in the 
contract preventing Wanda from engaging in multiple sexual relationships—but that the 
contract has failed to secure Severin a future with Wanda. Wanda leaves with the Greek. 
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What is more, after being whipped senseless and raw by him, Severin does not pursue 
Wanda (117).  
Yet this reading seems insufficient on many levels. Most notably, the relationship 
between Severin and the Greek is overloaded with homoerotic elements. Severin 
expressly admits to “lusting” after Wanda’s new love interest (95). Describing the Greek, 
Severin exclaims: 
He was a handsome man, by God. No more: he was a man such as I had 
never seen in the flesh. He stands in the Belvedere, hewn in marble, with the 
same slender and yet iron muscles, the same face, the same rippling 
curls…and that strange line around his mouth, the leonine lips that revealed a 
bit of the teeth and momentarily gave the face a touch of cruelty—Apollo 
flaying Marysyas…Now I understood male Eros and admired Socrates for 
remaining virtuous with Alcibiades. (96) 
 
Even in this introduction to the Greek at the moment when Wanda is first falling for him, 
it is clear that Severin is too. And just as whipping fantasies sustained his relationship 
with Wanda, by comparing the Greek to “Apollo flaying Marysyas” Severin seems to be 
setting the stage for his own submission to Wanda’s lover. Indeed, during the actual 
whipping scene, Severin begs the Greek to wear fur just as he had once begged Wanda 
(115). And again, Severin claims this whipping “surpasses” his fantasies.  
Thus, it seems to me what we have here is the passing away of one assemblage or 
grouping (Severin-whip-Wanda) and the coming into being of another (Severin-whip-
Greek-laughing Wanda). This new assemblage ends up dissolving too, but that is not 
important. Sacher-Masoch’s contract is more than fulfilled. For the contract is not 





Conclusion: An Account of Contracting for Natural Law Theory 
Throughout Venus in Furs we see Severin grapple with both the desire to arrest the flow 
of time and the allure of flesh made vibrant only in organic cycles of time. What is more, 
we see contracts for both temporalities. The marriage contract fixes a moment, the 
moment of possession of the other, and promises this relationship will endure without 
change. Other contracts however, like those realized with pain or pleasure in the body, 
the fibers of the body responding to organic stimuli, make no promises but offer instead 
exquisite, fleeting sensations, a lifetime contracted to a moment.    
 Sacher-Masoch recuperates this latter vision of contracting and its connection to 
the present and embodiment. This is important for the stories I have been telling about a 
non-universal natural law tradition because it provides an account of law’s binding force 
that does not require law to take either universal form or the form of the decisions of a 


















Animals on Trial: Reconsidering the Natural Law 
Tradition for Troubling Times  
 
 
“Through exclusively social contracts, we have abandoned the bond that connects us to the 
world, the one that binds the time passing and flowing [temps] to the weather outside [temps], 
the bond that relates the social sciences to the sciences of the universe, history to geography, 
law to nature, politics to physics, the bond that allows our language to communicate with 
mute, passive, obscure things.” 
 Michel Serres, The Natural Contract, 48 
 
“In urgent times, many of us are tempted to address trouble in terms of making an imagined 
future safe, of stopping something from happening that looms in the future, of clearing away 
the present and the past in order to make futures for coming generations. Staying with the 
trouble does not require such a relationship to times called the future. In fact, staying with 
the trouble requires learning to be truly present, not as a vanishing pivot between awful or 
edenic pasts and apocalyptic or salvific futures, but mortal critters entwined in myriad 
unfinished configurations of places, times, matters, meanings” 




Of Vintners and Weevils 
In the late sixteenth century, the weevils of the commune of Saint Julien in southern 
France were taken to court.112 Weevils are a type of beetle. They are usually small, 
measuring less than six millimeters, and are generally considered a “pest species” 
because of their ability to reproduce quickly and wreak havoc on human crops when 
conditions are in their favor (“Weevil,” Encyclopedia Britannica). The weevils of Saint 
Julien had done just that, decimating the commune’s highly prized grape crop. Sober 
                                                 
112 See Edward Evans, The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals, pp. 38-49 for a full 
account. Evans documents nearly 200 examples of nonhuman animals and “inanimate things” being tried 
in courts of law spanning much of Western history and lingering into the twentieth century.  
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human vintners decided to take legal action. Taking legal action against other-than-
human animals and objects was usual practice in Europe and even the Americas prior to 
the twentieth century.113 Indeed, the weevils of Saint Julien were repeat offenders. About 
thirty years earlier in the spring of 1546, similar destructive activity landed the weevils 
(or at least their forbearers) in court. At that time, the weevils’ two appointed human 
lawyers were able avoid trial. This time however, the weevils’ newly appointed lawyer, 
Pierre Rembaud, would not be so effective.  
Rembaud first argued that the case should be dismissed, claiming that the weevils 
had a prior right to the vineyards in so far as God created weevils before human beings, 
according to the biblical narrative of creation.114 The judge rejected Rembaud’s motion 
for dismissal. While weevils may have been created prior to human beings, the judge 
reasoned, it is not clear that vineyards existed in this interim between the creation of 
“creeping things” and “man.” The trial thus proceeded with both sides presenting lengthy 
and sophisticated arguments that Evans presents in some detail (1906, 39-47).  
During these legal machinations, the weevils kept up their ravaging of the 
vineyards. Understandably anxious for a speedy resolution of the matter, the human 
vintners organized a public meeting to debate allocating a plot of land on the outskirts of 
town for the express use of the weevils. This meeting concluded with the selection of a 
plot named “La Grand Feisse” which the plaintiff’s attorney described “with the 
exactness of a topographical survey” to the court (Evans 1906, 46-47). Rembaud was not 
happy though. On behalf of his insect clients, he countered, insisting that the proposed 
                                                 
113 Edward Evans has documented nearly 200 such examples ranging from weevils and termites to sows, 
boat rudders, donkeys, and trains. 
 
114 See Genesis chapter 1. 
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plot was “barren” and therefore an unsuitable alternative to the lush present home of his 
clients. Acknowledging Rembaud’s motion, the judge decided to appoint a group of 
experts to assess the viability of “La Grand Feisse” for the weevils’ habitation and 
ordered that a written report be submitted to the court. We do not know the findings of 
this report or how the case ends, unfortunately. The next page of the records was 
“destroyed by either rodents or insects” or some other “creeping thing” (Grigen 104; 
Genesis). Girgen ironically speculates that the responsible party may have conspired with 
the defendants against the literacy of the plaintiff’s descendants (Girgen 2003, 104). 
Today, few scholars address the prevalence of “animal trials” in the pre-20th 
century West. When they do, the most typical response is to reject the phenomenon as 
“childish” play or as a superstitious remnant of an earlier “animistic time” that positions 
the other-than-human animal as some curious subject of proto-liberal rights (Evans 1906; 
Kelsen 1967, 31-2; Sykes 2011). A few critical scholars point out the elements of cruelty 
and human-animal domination that the phenomenon of animal trials display to 
acknowledge the wider social function legal trials played then and continue to play now 
(Berman 1994). Others, such as Victoria Ridler, worry about the “justice” of punishment 
without mens rea or clear criminal intent as such states of mind may not easily, if ever, be 
established in nonhuman animals (2014). Others, among them Peter Leeson, suggest that 
animal trials were nothing but a thinly veiled attempt by ecclesiastical and secular courts 
to assert more authority over the governance of everyday social life (2013). What better 
way to do this than by expanding the court’s jurisdiction? When a weevil infestation 
becomes a legal matter, humans facing the infestation must not only work to remove the 
weevils but must also appear in court.  
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In a similar vein, Esther Cohen reads the phenomenon of animal trials as an 
attempt to extend or widen the net of human legal authority. For Cohen, this extension 
includes not only the human-social world but the nonhuman world as well. “If man was 
to rule nature,” Cohen writes, “he must do so according to the same principles that 
governed his relationships with his fellow human beings” (1986, 36). For Cohen, the 
animal trials can thus be seen as part of Western man’s progressive attempt to dominate 
the world, both human and nonhuman. According to Cohen, the seriousness and 
procedural detail of animal trials requires us to view them as something more than 
childish superstition à la Hans Kelsen or a subconscious cruelty à la Ridler, but as a 
rational desire to bring the nonhuman world under human control. 
The stories I have told about the natural law tradition in the previous chapters can 
help us understand this phenomenon of animal trials in a productive and illuminating 
way. In these previous chapters I attempted to recover an obscured understanding of law 
and its relationship to nature, materiality, and embodiment that has a long history. In this 
final chapter, I explore some of the fruits or “pay-offs” of this recuperation and 
storytelling.115 The first pay-off I consider is how these stories can help us better account 
for the phenomenon of animal trials. Understanding these animal trials is not just an 
academic-historical concern, nor is it simply a provocative way to highlight the relevance 
of the stories I have told; it is important for contemporary environmental politics. In 
Sections Two and Three I explore how the stories I have told contribute to two vibrant 
ongoing fields of research. 
                                                 
115 Walter Benjamin notes that in contrast to the novel, all stories are practically-oriented. Stories provide 




I Animal Trials as the Institutional Work of “Celebrating our Pact with the 
Earth” 
How are we to understand the phenomenon of animal trials? It seems to me that Cohen is 
correct that there is more to the phenomenon of animal trials than superstition, but 
ultimately wrong in her analysis of what this more is. Clearly, animal trials were horribly 
ineffective attempts at governing the nonhuman world when animal defendants failed to 
show up for their court dates, rarely complied with court orders, and were notorious 
repeat offenders (remember the weevils). Nevertheless, animal trials were taken seriously 
and a great amount of care was expended in their maintenance. The stories I have told 
about natural law in this dissertation begin to suggest why. Like Antigone’s care for 
Polynices’s corpse and Severin’s emphasis on the embodied present, the trials display an 
attentive, observant awareness of material particularity and embodied life that was part 
and parcel of wider vision about law, the cosmos, and human beings place within the 
world. The institutional work that went into these animal trials needs to be read as an 
example of the ligaments or “connective tissue” Aquinas talks about which holds together 
the sublunary realm. 
 Evans’s detailed accounts of the animal trials support this reading with evidence. 
Evans shows how much care and work went into the animal trials even when it was quite 
obvious to the human participants that other-than-human animal participants would not 
show up to trial or follow court orders. For example, when animal defendants were 
“evicted” from certain fields or habitats, it was common that they be granted “safe 
passage away from the vicinity, free of possible harm from dogs, cats, or other enemies” 
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(Evan 1906, 18).116 This was the case in a mole trial in Stelvio, Italy in 1519. In that case, 
in a move that was not unusual, the judge even went further to grant any pregnant mole or 
mole with young or mole for whom the move would be stressful “an additional respite of 
fourteen days” to undertake the relocation (Evans 1906, 111). It was also often the case 
that a suitable alternative habitat be provided when animal defendants were evicted. In 
the weevil case discussed above, a specific plot of land called “La Grand Feisse” was 
designated for the weevils’ express use and even described “with the exactness of a 
topographical survey” by the plaintiff’s attorney.117 Likewise, in 1713, great care was 
taken in the legal proceedings determining the relocation of a brood of termites standing 
trial for eating away at a Franciscan monastery in Brazil (Evans 1906, 213).  
When animals were punished, their punishment was meted out with a similar 
level of sobriety (Evans 1906). So, for example, when a sow and her six piglets stood 
trial in 1457 in Savigny, France for trampling and killing a small human child, no less 
than eight human eyewitnesses were called in order to establish “beyond reasonable 
doubt that the sow had killed the child” (McWilliams 2013; Evan 1906, 154). The piglets, 
however, were exonerated. Although they were found at the crime scene splattered with 
the human victim’s blood, the eyewitnesses established that unlike the mother sow, the 
piglets were “never seen directly attacking the child” (McWilliams 2013; Evans 1906, 
140). In a bestiality case from 1750 in which both a male human and female donkey were 
charged, careful written testimony of the townspeople submitting that “in word and deed 
                                                 
116 Gunther Teubner also gives evidence for this claim in his essay exploring rights of nonhumans, “Rights 
of Non-Humans?: Electronic Agents and Animals as New Actors in Politics and Law” (2006). 
 
117 Yet this was not enough to persuade the court that the plot was a suitable alternative. The judge 




and in all her habits of life [this particular donkey was] a most honest creature” procured 
her exoneration. The man, however, was hanged from the gallows.  
The thoughtfulness, serious, and care with which these animal trials were 
undertaken might be explained in terms of the stories of natural law I have told as these 
communities’ patient institutional work at maintaining their “bond” with the other-than-
human world. This understanding of institutional work, community, law as bond, and 
other-than-human world informs natural law philosophy, as I have attempted to recover 
and tell in this dissertation.  
In his book on the philosophy and history of law, French philosopher Michel 
Serres identifies natural law as the “celebrat[ion] of our pact with the world” (1995: 47). 
Serres suggests that this pact took institutional form in premodern natural law 
jurisprudence. Modernity, Serres argues, has neglected (neg-legere: to deny the bond or 
ligament) the politico-legal institutional work that went into maintaining this pact or 
bond. Serres does not give details on what this work looked like. But it seems to me this 
work would have taken many forms, from the common and serious defense and 
prosecution of nonhuman animals and nonorganic things in both ecclesiastical and 
secular courts of law, to detailed jurisprudential inquiries and tracts on the activities and 
functionings of bodies, and the sovereign’s ritual and legal acknowledgment of his (or 




That this other-than-human world was attributed legal status, was not the result of 
some primitive irrationalism or spontaneous animism118--an anachronistic reflection of 
modern legal positivism’s assumption that only the subject has a voice in the courtroom 
and that consequently the premoderns must have imputed subjective proto-liberal rights 
to the nonhuman – but an acknowledgment that the bonds and relations that hold human 
communities together extend into and are even made possible by the more-than-human 
world. It is a modern conceit, say Serres, to posit premodernity as a time of effortless, 
harmonious belonging. Human communities worked to maintain the natural law which 
gave them and their institutions a place within an unruly, unmasterable, and at times 
unpredictable nature. Neglect of this natural law has, Serres thinks, allowed for the 
modern silencing or objectification of nature that has led to the instrumentalization and 
domination of bodies, nonhuman and human. 
Serres exhorts us to renew this bond with a new “natural contract” and remember 
our symbiotic placement within the world in order to address global climate change. My 
interest in the natural law tradition is not to resuscitate these politico-legal institutions of 
the premodern occident nor to prescribe a new contract. Rather, I want to suggest that if 
we recall the active role the other-than-human world once played in law, we can better 
appreciate the role the other-than-human plays in our law today.  
Animal trials can help us begin to think about the role bodies and materialities 
continue to and might play in our law, again, not as proto-human liberal subjects which 
once had legal rights (in a primitive animistic age) and which might be extended rights 
                                                 
118 See Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and custom in savage society (1926) for a similar criticism of 
Durkheimian “spontaneous solidarity.” Malinowski shows all the institutional work that goes into 
maintaining non-Western “customary” legal systems. 
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once again (in an age of enlightened ecological responsibility), but as bodies and things 
with shared vulnerabilities, connections, and bonds that crisscross, support, and sustain 
the human estate. The interesting point for environmental politics today, is that 
recognizing these shared vulnerabilities and connections should be a goal alongside the 
extension of rights that others have argued for (Latour 2016). This would return us to the 
discussion Aquinas opened with his careful interrogation of boundaries and their 
maintenance that I discussed in Chapter Two. 
All in all, one important function of natural law was to give human beings and 
human political communities a place within nature, rather than against or outside nature. 
This orientation remained a staple of Western politico-legal thought until quite recently 
and that this is a crucial story we miss when we ignore the seriousness attributed to 
animal trials or subsume it into a legal positivist narrative of domination. I turn now to 
explore how the stories I tell about natural law can contribute to the ongoing investigation 
of law’s relationship to materiality in legal studies.  
 
II Legal Materialist Enquiries into Law   
Legal scholarship has not been ignorant of the fact that matter matters and that law 
always work in and upon an embodied, material frame. Many in Law and Society have 
been critically thinking about law’s relationship to the objects and bodies of everyday life 
as well as law’s own unique matter (Kang 2017). Nevertheless, Law and Society scholars 
tend to assume there is a thing called “law,” and that it is the job of the legal scholar, 
using empirical and sociological research methods informed by theoretical reflection, to 
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explain what this thing is and its relationship to matter (Pottage 2012; Kang 2017).119 
This emerging legal materialist scholarship is as diverse as it is fascinating, so I attempt a 
brief survey of it here in order to make more evident how my stories about natural law 
can contribute.   
 This scholarship can be roughly broken into four groups: 1) those who investigate 
the link between law and physical violence exploring how law is always inscribed on and 
produced by physical bodies; 2) those who focus on the way law is mediated through 
material objects; 3) those who draw attention to overlooked aesthetic aspects of law that 
in their own way contain a rich, sensuous materiality, such as law’s images and sounds; 
and, 4) those who investigate the way law constructs material worlds and knowledges 
through regulatory regimes. Ultimately, I see the stories I have told about natural law 
doing what even the best of legal materialist enquiries fail to do. While the best of this 
scholarship uses the imbrications, collisions, and eruptions of law and matter to disclose 
the beginnings of an alternative account of law that is not part of the legal positivist 
narrative, none of this scholarship follows through to develop their account into a rich 
positive story about law. 
 
A. Law’s Inscription on Bodies: Law and Physical Violence  
                                                 
119 For a similar criticism of socio-legal materialist analyses of law see Alain Pottage “The Materiality of 




 Robert Cover’s work on the constitutive link between word and deed at the heart 
of law is a theoretical starting point for many materialist investigations of law.120 In his 
1986 “Violence and the Word,” Cover argued that “legal interpretation is either played 
out on the field of pain and death or it is something less (or more) than law” (211). 
Writing against certain Law and Literature scholarship of the 1980s that emphasized the 
meaning-making capacity of law and the interpretative or literary characteristics of 
judging to the detriment of what Cover saw as the very real physicality law—the way law 
is always violently worked out on bodies—Cover sought to show that law is never just 
about language and interpretation, but about the material tie between word and deed. Any 
“’interpretations’ or ‘conversations’ that are the preconditions for violent incarceration 
are themselves the implements of violence,” Cover wrote, and as such cannot be thought 
apart from the materiality of the bodies that law is inscribed on (211).  
Yet Cover’s point is more subtle than it initially sounds. Cover was not simply 
claiming that there is connection between law and physical violence in criminal 
sentencing. Cover was trying to get at a more profound link between law and physicality, 
a constitutive relationship that weds law to physical violence as a condition of law’s 
possibility. For Cover, law involves “the projection of an imagined future upon reality” 
(206). In his earlier essay “Nomos and Narrative,” Cover called law the bridge between 
vision and reality (9). It is in the move between vision or future and reality that Cover 
locates law as he says, “between the idea and reality of common meaning falls the 
shadow of the violence of law itself” (206, 1601). In short, for Cover, our visions of the 
                                                 
120 See Law, Violence, and the Possibility of Justice ed. Austin Sarat and the concluding chapter of David 
Delaney Law and Nature for a few examples of socio-legal scholarship that turn to Cover in order to begin 
thinking about law’s matter. 
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future need require the work of violence to become real and it is here that Cover locates 
law. Cover thus urges us to remember that law’s very possibility depends on violence—
the materiality of command, inscriptions on bodies. For Cover, to think law without 
violence is not to think law but is rather to think literature.121 Law works through, alters, 
emerges from, and is violently inscribed on physical existence. 
Following Cover, but also drawing from late 20th continental philosophy, Pheng 
Cheah, David Fraser, and Judith Grbich’s edited volume Thinking Through the Body of 
the Law (1996) highlights the formative role the body plays in law. The stated goal of  
Thinking Through the Body of Law is to overturn the last remnants of the rationalist 
primacy of mind over body that haunts Critical Legal Studies (CLS). Too much CLS 
scholarship, Cheah, Fraser, and Grbich argue in their introduction, continues to see the 
corporeal body as a simple substance, an object which is external to the law rather than 
an active participant in law (xv). The essays collected in the volume attempt to overcome 
these vestiges of a rationalist-redemptive project ensconced in CLS. 
In their contribution, Pheng Cheah and Elizabeth Grosz cite Cover in their attempt 
to read between Foucault and Derrida an account of bodily or corporeal justice (25). For 
Cheah and Grosz, law is “ontological violence” and as such is prior to any particular 
material embodiment. Law is a “constitutive force which shapes the material processes of 
embodiment…an originary and inhuman violence operative in embodiment and which is 
subsequently appropriated to human action and explained in terms of social causes” (10).  
                                                 
121 This is not to claim that literary activity lacks an element of violence. This recognition was one of 
Arendt’s most cogent criticisms of Heidegger: the poet in her work effects violence. While Cover frames 
his account as if to suggest a non-violent aspect of literature, it only strengthens his argument to 
acknowledge with Arendt the violence attendant to literary production. Doing so one can acknowledge 
law as both “a profession of words” and simultaneously a physical activity. 
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Cheah and Grosz situate their theoretical account as a critique of legal positivism. 
According to them, legal positivism reduces law to a “positional power of the mind” (3). 
Cheah and Grosz argue that this view of law is uncritically wed to the rationalist primacy 
of mind over body. Cover was critical of this “rationalist primacy” as well, but did not go 
far enough; it seeped, back in in his account of law as an inscription on material bodies. 
For Cheah and Grosz, the “corporeal body” is problematically conceived when it is 
thought of as “a simple substance,” an object external to law, that is then written on by 
the subject of law (xv). Their goal is to theorize ways to appreciate and acknowledge 
corporeal bodies’ active participation in law. Thus, they attempt to theorize law from the 
ontological perspective. With Cover, they recognize the link between law and physical or 
bodily violence, but going beyond him, they develop an account of law itself as 
“ontological violence,” or the messy pre-individual constitutive forces of reality that birth 
embodied forms.  
In my opinion, Cheah and Grosz are heirs to the natural law tradition this 
dissertation has sketched. Unlike legal scholars who assume law is a certain evident 
thing—an observable “social instance” as Pottage puts it (2012)—Cheah and Grosz 
understand law as ontological violence, “an originary and an inhuman violence operative 
in embodiment and which is subsequently appropriated to human action and explained in 
terms of social causes” (10). Therefore, for Cheah and Grosz, law cannot be reduced to a 
social explanation or power of the human mind. On the contrary, it is the force that 
produces society, mind, embodiment in the first place. 
While I think the ontological account of law Cheah and Grosz develop as a means 
of escaping the last vestiges of legal positivism actually has an odd way of reaffirming 
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the solidity of legal positivism’s assumption that law possesses a certain self-evident 
existence, Cheah and Grosz make a crucial intervention when they begin to attend to 
corporeal bodies not just as “simple substance,” but as participants of law.122 The natural 
law stories I discussed in this dissertation goes further, considering how corporeal 
bodies—be they human bodies, other-than-human animal bodies, texts, stones, incipient 
coming-to-be or undoing bodies like clouds, swarms, molten rock flows, and decaying 
corpses, institutions, and bodies of water—actively participate in law. 
 
B. Law’s Construction of Material Worlds: Regulation and Mediation 
The second group of Law and Society scholars emphasizes the way law and legal 
practices partake in the construction of our material worlds. Here Susan Silbey’s work on 
law and science is exemplary. Using ethnographic methods, Silbey “examines academic 
research labs as examples of intractable governance sites” to investigate the ways that 
regulatory law structure the production of scientific knowledge (“Constructing” 158). 
Silbey points outs that regulatory laws stipulating the number of feet a Bunsen burner 
must be placed from a doorway, for example, not only affect the physical layout of the 
laboratory, but also have material effects upon the production of scientific knowledge. 
For example, such laws limit how many Bunsen burners can be present in a room of a 
certain size with a certain number of doors and therefore how many experiments 
requiring the use of Bunsen burners can run simultaneously. Not only does this limit the 
type of experiments that can be done in a lab, but it also structures how experiments are 
                                                 
122 By appealing to the ontological and originary, Cheah and Grosz, just like the legal positivists they 
critique, give law a definite form: one is just social, the other ontological and originary. 
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performed in labs when, for example, they require more than the legally permitted 
number of Bunsen burners, and consequently the production of scientific knowledge. 
More recently and in the same vein as Silbey’s work there have been 
collaborations between socio-legal studies (SLS) and Science and Technology Studies 
(STS). One example of such a collaboration is the March 2012 issue of The Journal of 
Law and Society, “Material Worlds: Intersections of Law, Science, Technology, and 
Society.” Spurred in large part by the English translation of Bruno Latour’s The Making 
of Law and Foucauldian inspired attempts to give account of regulatory regimes, this 
issue continues the legal realist critique of law by “promot[ing] understanding of the 
ways in which legal processes and instruments interact with and produce material 
worlds” (2). Collaborations between STS and SLS explore both the way that law 
regulates emerging technologies and how “law itself increasingly depends upon 
contributions from scientific advances” (16). The various articles in this journal issue 
offer trenchant Actor-Network Theory (ANT) inspired investigations of a range of 
regulatory regimes from the regulation of nicotine (Rooke), nanotechnology (Stokes), and 
biobanks (Rial-Sebbag, Cambon-Thomsen), to forensic evidence (Toom). One of ANT’s 
key positions is the refusal to hierarchize the social-material world, thus also refusing to 
give primacy to human actors alone in social interpretation of phenomena like law. These 
collaborations thus front the way that law not merely orders human existence, but has 
physical effects in the construction of the material world. The placement of a curb, a 
zoning law that stipulates a liquor store be at least a certain number of feet from a church 
or school, an environmental law that forbids the construction of human dwellings in 
certain protected areas, all effect and shape what the material world is and can become. 
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Sharing this scholarship’s interest in the application of ANT to law and how law 
mediates its presence, is Kyle McGee’s extension of Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network 
Theory to the study of the normative force of law. McGee’s interest is more theoretical 
than the STS and SLS approaches discussed above. McGee is not interested in 
investigating particular laws but in using ANT and social theory to help give an account 
of how law is experienced as binding. McGee argues that if we are to understand the 
normative force of law, we need “to take seriously the media of law’s expression” (1). 
“Law,” McGee tells us following Latour’s analysis of the French Constitutional Council 
in The Making of Law, “makes technicity [the material world, e.g. the turnstile] durable 
as technicity makes law durable. And as such, both are deeply involved in the 
construction of societies” (15). Put in less Latourian lingo, it is law’s objects—the 
turnstile, the handcuffs, the police barrier—that mediate law, that give it a physical 
existence. But equally it is law as a “regime of enunciation” that gives the turnstile its 
particular legal affectivity. Repeal or modify the legal text and the turnstile will be 
removed and relegated to the obscurity of some Department of Transportation storehouse 
or worse. Outside of a regime of signification, law lacks durability, physical force, or 
material existence.123 McGee concludes, it is “not an echo of the force of law that is 
expressed in technical objects [such as the turnstile], but the force of law itself” (17).  
Cornelia Vismann’s work on the textual mediality of law also helpfully 
illuminates the way law works or is mediated in a material world. Drawing on the work 
of German media theorist Friedrich Kittler, Vismann follows Kittler in his attempt at 
                                                 
123 Following Latour, McGee thinks law as a regime of enunciation. I suggest the New Materialisms push 
us to consider law itself as a material practice. McGee seems to want to get here, but is unsure how to do 
it with Latour. See McGee’s recent monograph, Bruno Latour: The Normativity of Networks (2014). 
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“driving the human out of the humanities” by focusing on the “technological-media” that 
undergird and make possible activities we typically assume to have originated in and be 
maintained by the human mind. Law is the activity Vismann focuses on, and the a priori 
medial schemata she suggests undergirds law is the “list.” “Lists,” Vismann writes, “do 
not communicate, they control transfer operations, lists are an administrative form of 
literacy that stands in no relation to speech” (7). According to Vismann, an item on a list 
“is determined by its placement on the list [whether it is put in the left or right column for 
example] rather than by any outside reference” (8). Moreover, lists—and when they 
accumulate into records and files—have a certain raw “materiality” that outweighs 
“content.”  
Vismann seeks to show how conventional accounts of law which locate the origin 
of law in the oral customs of so called “pre-legal societies” (Hart 1961) are misplaced 
and conceal law’s origin not in the human mind, but in this materiality. As the files 
stacked up and the tablets became codices, a certain “presence” became palpable that 
attracts human rulers likes moths to a lamp (xi). Expanding on Derrida’s reflections in 
Grammatology on Levi-Strauss’s attempt to teach the Nambikwara of the central 
Amazon how to write, Vismann argues that law, like writing, is not fundamentally about 
the communication of meaning or speech, but about something else. Vismann claims that 
in the case of law, this something else is the “creat[ing of] presence, to blend and 
impress” (xi).124  
                                                 
124 Perhaps piquantly, Donald Trump is a good illustration here. Vismann did not live to see his presidency, 
but his attraction to files and siphoning of their material presence seems to speak much for her account. 
President Trump often invokes the raw materiality of files, usually stacked on a table next to his podium. 
At times, he will flip through the files, thumbing and giving vibrancy to their rich materiality, to their 
density and fullness of ink, but he never reads from them. For all intents and purposes, the files are 
content-less. What the files say does not matter. The files are there for their materiality alone and are 
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In problematizing our Western prioritization of content over media and “teasing 
out the mediality of texts…ground[ing] the law in files and records,” Vismann draws our 
attention not only to the way that law mediates, constructs, and regulates our material 
world, as Latour and some Law and Society scholars do. She also suggests how law may 
emerge without being the product of human intention even if it is simultaneously an 
artifact of human societies. Like Sacher-Masoch’s bonds that I discussed in Chapter 
Three, law is both a product of human action and excessive to that action in its outcomes 
and possibilities.  
Lists, records, and files exist because of human societies. But Vismann shows law 
is not the simple list, record, or file. It is rather the material presence that is exuded by 
these objects when they are gathered. While humans may have intended to keep lists at 
some point they also realized that their accumulation garnered a certain presence and 
power that could then be redirected.  The way we handle and use files has a life of its 
own that gives them a force or power that is not wholly reducible to human activity. 
Vismann tries to show this force does not exist in the mind. Rather, “it is all in the files 
themselves…[in] the profane administrative techniques [of writing lists, keeping files, 
and displaying binders we might add today] rather than spirt” (122). So while Cheah and 
Grosz use corporeal bodies and their activities to disrupt legal positivism’s assumption 
that law possesses a certain self-evident existence, Vismann turns to lists, records, and 
files—to the medial schemata of law—to offer an alternative origin story for law 
                                                 
then, usually, they are hastily and literally tossed aside by the President. Social media is full of memes 
mocking the President’s ability to read and framing him as a bumbling fool upon a stage. But Vismann’s 
account seems to suggest something different, something that stretches back to early human history, and 
tells the story of an astute ruler, vividly aware of the material power and presence files have and co-




disconnected from both legal positivism’s emphasis on oral society and customs and 
Cheah and Grosz’s ontological violence. I suggest that Vismann thus needs to be viewed 
as another participant in the natural law tradition I have been sketching. 
 
C. Law and Aesthetics 
 A third group of Law and Society scholars draws our attention to matters of 
positive law often overlooked because of their tenuous connection to what we normally 
think of when we talk of law. This group of scholars foregrounds aspects of law, such as 
its visual and auditory presence, that open up other ways to talk and think about law’s 
matter in ways similar to my own attempts to do so. These inquiries tend to be explicit 
that their object of interest is positive law however. This group brings to the fore certain 
material aspects of law often overlooked and often seen as ancillary to the real content of 
law.125  
Peter Goodrich’s recent work on legal emblems and the visual in law is important 
here. Noting that “justice has always had a theatrical presence,” Goodrich bemoans the 
“dearth of scholarship on visual advocacy and on critical interpretations of the visibilities 
of power” (2). “It is necessary,” Goodrich concludes, “to take a stand in support of the 
important of the visual” (144). Goodrich turns to investigate early modern legal emblems 
such as depictions of Justitia – many of which grace twenty-first century courtrooms and 
still make their affective presence felt – showing how “images enact and make present 
the norms that found the law” (145). For Goodrich, we touch only the tip of the iceberg 
of law when we think about it as a discursive system or normative order. Law is 
                                                 
125 It is thus possible to place Cornelia Vismann’s exploration of the medial schemata of positive law in this 
section too.  
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composed of strands of sensory and bodily experience that run on frequencies that do not 
always register at the discursive or normative level. The way a statue of Lady Justice and 
the robed judges may affect us when we enter a courtroom are all fundamentally part of 
law for Goodrich, just as much as if not more so than the rules that compose the content 
of law. Similarly, Jamie Parker turns our attention to the soundscape of justice in his 
exploration of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (2012). Parker chides us to 
be attentive to the way that sound participates in law.  
 
D. Law and Geography 
The fourth and final group of Law and Society scholars I want to consider turns 
its attention not primarily to the way legal regulations and positive laws structure our 
built worlds, but to the way material spaces influence and problematize law’s operation 
and our theorization of law. Much of this scholarship has been done at the intersection of 
geography and legal studies and focuses on the spatiality of law. Lisa Pruitt’s work on 
lawscapes and rurality and her application of the concept “urban-normativity” to court 
rulings has shown, for example, the way that legal decisions are often “blind” to the 
particularities of material space and therefore to the legal consequences of their rulings. 
In her recent work with Martha Vanegas, Pruitt claims the urban-normativity of the law 
takes “urban life as the benchmark for what is normal,” and thus loads terms like “undue 
burden” with a peculiar urban slant ignorant of the vagaries of material space (3).  
Urban-normativity has untold and insidious effects on inhabitants of rural areas. 
Drawing on the recent slew of state attempts to regulate abortion – attempts that have 
severely reduced the number of abortion clinics in rural areas while requiring multiple 
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visits and thus multiple trips of great distance – Pruitt and Vanegas argue that when 
courts uphold these regulations they expose a judicial “ignorance of rural spatiality and 
the very real obstacles that distance represents to many [rural] women” (5). Judges living 
in urban settings are “spatially privileged,” Pruitt and Vanegas argue, “blind” to the 
“undue burden” that regulations place on rural women. In Pruitt and Vanegas’s account 
of lawscapes, law is unjust in so far as it ignores the reality of material spatiality.    
Others in Law and Geography, like Peter Sloterdijk, David Delaney and Andreas 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, evoke Carl Schmitt’s Nomos of the Earth not only to 
reveal insidious aspects of a law intent on ignoring the vagaries of material spatiality a la 
Pruitt and Vanegas, but also to offer their own alternative accounts of law as the concrete 
fusion of the legal and spatial. In their own way, these accounts continue Schmitt’s 
critique of liberalism’s abstract, universalization of law, critiquing Schmitt along the way. 
In Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt sets out the legal version of his critique of liberalism. 
What Schmitt is looking for as an alternative to liberalism’s universal, abstract, 
impersonal rule of law is a primordial, foundational, even chthonic account of law as the 
immediate form in which a people’s political and social order becomes spatially 
evident—something literally as basic as the drawing of a line in the dirt (Schmitt 70). 
Such a line introduces a division between those who are inside (us) and those who are 
outside (them). According to Schmitt, this line—a physical drawing in the dirt—is not 
only the origin of law, but also the animus of all succeeding laws. While the fascist, 
nationalist, and wall-building elements are all evident in Schmitt’s account, some like 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos have been crucial in retrieving or at least thinking through 
some of the other elements of Schmitt’s account.  
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Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos goes the farthest in offering an account of law that 
sees law indeterminably “interlaced” with the materiality of space in what he calls the 
“lawscape.”126 One of his recent essays begins with a provocative description of the 
lawscape:  
You walk into a room that smells of roses. The walls are painted a 
stimulating combination of red and yellow. The first notes of Beethoven’s 
Fur Elise are piped in the air. You touch the smooth surface of the table, you 
sit on a comfortable chair, you switch on your iPad and get ready to browse 
the internet. You feel well, at ease, energetic. You perceive the surrounding 
atmosphere as pleasant, familiar, protective. You take a sip from your Coke 
and settle in. You have entered the lawscape. Or rather, you never quite left 
it. (35) 
 
For Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, law and matter, law and city are inextricably 
“interfolded.” Whether the legally patented hue of red and yellow that stimulates feelings 
of warmth and safety, the safety regulations that prescribe the manufacturing of the 
“comfortable chair,” the health regulations that regulate the production of your drink and 
– in some jurisdictions – how much Coke you may buy, or the environmental laws that 
govern the harvest of the roses and the disposal of your iPad battery, “every surface, 
smell, colour, taste is regulated by some form of law” (35). “Perhaps less metaphorically 
than it might sound,” Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos continues, “the law is spread on 
pavements, covers the walls of buildings, opens and closes windows, lets you dress in a 
certain way (and not another), eat in a certain way, smell, touch or listen to certain things, 
touch other people in a certain way (and not another), sleep in a certain space, move in a 
certain way, stay still in a certain way” (35). 
                                                 
126 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s account of the lawscape is different from Pruitt’s. The point I am trying 
to draw out here is that Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s lawscape shares more with Schmitt’s nomos of 
the earth and Delaney’s interest in offering a different account of law rather than simply critiquing it. 
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 Central to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s account is what he calls “the 
epistemological and ontological tautology of law and the city” (2013, 36). 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has a broad conceptions of both “law” and “city.” By 
“law,” he writes, “I understand both standard law and regulation, as well as the 
generalised diffused normativity that characterises life—what Spinoza (2007) has called 
‘rules for living’” (36). By “city,” he says, “I understand the thick spatiality of bodies 
(humans, non-humans, linguistic, spatial, disciplinary), buildings, objects, animals, 
vegetables, minerals, money, communication, silence, open spaces, air, water, and so on” 
(36). For Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos “law” and “city” cannot be understood apart. “A 
city without law is a holy city of justice, perpetually floating in a post-conflict space 
where everything is light and forgiveness. Likewise, a law without a city is a law without 
materiality, an abstract, universal, immutable law that trammels the globe. Both the above 
are fantastic beasts that operate at best as horizon and at worst as cheap rhetoric” (36). 
Schmitt’s critique of liberalism has, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos thinks, already alerted 
us to the dangers and myth of law without city; part of his goal is to point out that much 
of what is called “the ethical turn” in deconstruction, including work on messianic justice 
and justice always-to-come, is just as fantastic and dangerous in its assumption of city 
without law.  
But this criticism is not where Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s main insight lies 
for me. It lies for me in his thinking of law and city together in a way that is irreducible to 
either law’s normativity or the city’s spatiality alone (41). In Chapter Two I argued that 
Aquinas does something similar, although he does not refer to city but rather to “natura.” 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos suggests the word “atmosphere.” For Philippopoulos-
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Mihalopoulos, atmosphere captures the relational force of the lawscape that holds law 
and city in tautology.  
Affects are generated in that shared urban skin, caressing, scenting, beating, 
biting spaces and bodies and holding them together in what I would call an 
atmosphere. I want to think of atmosphere as a force of attraction. As such, it 
is embodied by each body yet exceeding the body because it cannot be 
isolated. An atmosphere spreads instead through and in between a 
multiplicity of bodies like a sticky substance. Atmosphere is the excess of 
affect that keeps bodies together. And, further, what emerges when bodies (in 
the Spinozian/Deleuzian sense) are held together by, through and against 
each other. An atmosphere is affect transmitted, as well as affect directed. It 
is air, breath, exhalation, ozone, earth. It is room, city, book, music, soup, 
face, memory, storm, death. (41) 
 
In his account of the lawscape and atmosphere as the “sticky substance” between bodies, 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos gets to the point of superabundance Aquinas also tried to 
describe. It is from this excess that boundaries are generated. In other words, the hidden 
natural law I have attempted to disclose in this dissertation expresses itself not in 
ontological violence but rather, as Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and Aquinas suggest, in 
a superabundance that both distinguishes and draws together.  
 
III Thinking the New Materialisms Jurisprudentially 
I turn last to consider how the stories I have told about natural law might contribute to 
current work in the New Materialisms. Here I have in mind the work of Jane Bennett 
(2010), Timothy Morton (2010), and Brian Massumi (2015) in environmental political 
theory, but also the more strictly philosophical work of Graham Harman (2009) and 
Quentin Meillassoux (2006) which has broadly gone under the heading of Speculative 
Realism. New Materialist scholarship has helpfully reanimated discussions of nature and 
matter in contemporary social science and humanistic enquiries, which is central to my 
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own reconsideration of the natural law tradition. Yet the New Materialisms rarely if ever 
address law or jurisprudence.127 This oversight does not appear to be intentional, but 
rather a matter of focus. However, I suggest that when approached through the lens of 
jurisprudence rather than philosophy, many of the debates internal to the New 
Materialisms become more intelligible and tractable. Jurisprudence has a long tradition of 
focusing on bodies, agencies, and on how matters come to matter (Mussawir 2010). 
In a recent interview, Dana Luciano said: “The most compelling contribution of 
the new materialisms is not conceptual or analytic, strictly speaking, but sensory. The 
attempt to attend to the force of liveliness of matter will entail not just a reawakening or 
redirection of critical attention, but a reorganizing of the senses” (Luciano interview 
Trans). A bit later she follows up with this remark: “In re/awakening criticism to 
alternate sensory dimensions, it [the new materialisms] holds the potential to expand and 
enliven—though crucially, not to replace— ‘old’ (historical) materialisms.” In other 
words, the New Materialisms do not simply help us see an old phenomena from a new 
angle. Rather, as Luciano points out, the New Materialisms undertake a highly politicized 
task, “a reorganizing of the senses.” According to Luciano this task is political because it 
requires our collective action to undertake.128  
Luciano praises the New Materialisms for their courage in undertaking this task, a 
task that is—perhaps unbeknownst to many New Materialist scholars—crucial to law as I 
                                                 
127 For a similar attempt to bring new materialist insights into contact with another realm of inquiry see 
Kathy Ferguson, “Anarchists Printers and Presses: Material Circuits of Politics” in Political Theory, 
forthcoming. Also see Cary Wolfe, Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame 
(2012). While Wolfe does not explicitly engage the new materialisms, he draws posthumanist animal 
studies into conversation with biopolitics scholarship in ways similar to what I do here. 
 
128 Luciano makes a point similar to Ranciere’s distinction between the police and the political. See 
Ranciere,”Ten Theses on Politics.” 
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have attempted to show in this dissertation. For the boundaries between nature and 
culture, between human and nonhuman are a matter of law. At a very fundamental level 
then, the New Materialist project of “reorganizing the senses” and rethinking the 
boundaries between nature and culture, human and nonhuman is a deeply law project. In 
this final section I want to explore three strands more or less uniting the New 
Materialisms in order to demonstrate how the stories I have told about natural law in this 
dissertation can contribute to this ongoing diverse field of inquiry.     
Not all the scholars I consider under the banner “New Materialisms” in this 
section would take kindly to being identified this way. Some might prefer the banner of 
Speculative Realism, or Object-Oriented Ontology, or Eco-materialism, or Feminist 
Materialism, or Agential Realism. And the dissension goes deeper than nomenclature, to 
fundamental disagreements about how to theorize matter, things, and objects. Does 
agency “withdraw” into the interior of an object (Harman 2009) or does agency emerge 
in the pooled “intractivity” of “assemblages” (Bennett 2010; Barad 2006; Latour 2009)? 
Is the goal to see currents of subjectivity and proto-subjectivity coursing through all 
elements of the universe or to de-subjectify the human subject, curiously observing the 
ways our bodies—even our wills and minds—behave more with the recalcitrance of 
objects than traditional intentional subjects? What is the difference between an “object” 
and a “thing” and why might it matter? I use “New Materialisms” in the plural to capture 
some of this tension, while fully noting it does not go far enough.129  
                                                 
129 Part of my argument though is that from the perspective of jurisprudence rather than philosophy, 
many of these tensions appear in a different light and so it does not make sense to divide the theoretical 
field the way the practitioners do. On the distinction between philosophy and jurisprudence see Francois 
Ewald’s influential work spanning the past several decades to reestablish jurisprudence as a philosophy of 
law that developed alongside Western philosophy and its subfield of legal philosophy, not internal to it (in 
particular see Norms, Discipline, and the Law (1990). Also see Gilles Deleuze 1993: 153, 169-182. Deleuze 
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One strand uniting the “New Materialisms” is their insistence to get us, in the 
words of one practitioner, to the “great outdoors, the absolute outside of pre-critical 
thinkers” that has supposedly been lost to Western thought since Kant (Meillassoux 2006, 
7). Or, in the words of one of their critics, the goal of the New Materialisms is “to respect 
the indifference of objects in themselves,” a task that requires “work[ing] hard not to 
project the human into the heart of things” (Cole 2013, 106). A central objective that 
unites all those I variously group under the heading New Materialisms then, is the 
problematization of thinking materiality as fundamentally split between an experiencing 
subject endowed with agency and intentionality and a mute objective reality on the other 
hand which we can only say exists for the subject.  
As thinkers like Bruno Latour and Quentin Meillassoux demonstrate, this “great 
Bifurcation” of active subject and passive object introduces a split in reality that is hard 
to maintain in practice. This bifurcation also activates critical philosophies which deny 
the subject’s ability to ever access the objective in-itself or a reality that exists not for-us, 
i.e. filtered through or experiences (Meillassoux 5). One way to see the New 
Materialisms then is as a collection of attempts to overcome or escape this bifurcation. 
The New Materialisms look to and for “traces of independence or aliveness, constituting 
the outside of our own experience,” as Jane Bennett has put it (xvi). The New 
Materialisms explore the myriad ways the material world itself is active and lively, and 
                                                 
makes several similar comments on the relationship between legal philosophy and jurisprudence. In 
contrast to philosophy or religion, jurisprudence has always concerned itself with the practicalities of the 
here and now and our lives together in a world that exceeds us. Also see A. Lefebvre, The Image of Law 
(2008) and E. Mussawir, Jursidiction in Deleuze (2011) for more of an elaboration of the distinction 




therefore not fully reducible to its correlative relationship with human agency and 
intentionality.  
On these New Materialists’ account, matter is not the inert background of human 
activities or passive building blocks as it is on the Cartesian bifurcated model. Matter is 
rather co-constitutive of human subjective projects and existence. Matter is an “enactive 
dance,” as Timothy Morton puts it. In the words of Diane Coole and Samantha Frost,  
matter contains “emergent, generative powers” of its own. The New Materialists thus 
problematize the mind-body and culture-nature dichotomies, helping us focus on the 
oddity of attributing intentionality, inventiveness, agency, and meaning only to the 
activities of the human (or divine) mind. In so far as it can help us see that law is never 
only mediated by and inscribed on matter but actively participated in by matter, this 
problematization of the mind-body and culture-nature dichotomies is extremely helpful. 
Whether it is the white noise machine the shrouds at-bench discussions from the 
ears of the jury, the stream environmental law seeks to protect, the turnstile that orders 
the flow of bodies in a subway station, or the DNA sample provided as evidence in a 
criminal trial, the New Materialists can help us see that the things of law are never simply 
inert objects used, regulated, and manipulated by law, but active participants in law. 
When the white noise machine malfunctions and the defense calls for a mistrial, when the 
stream erodes a bank and a landowner calls for a new law to take into account the 
material particularities of the stream’s ecology, when the turnstile jams and bodies collide 
as they rush for a train, and the DNA sample reveals an untold story about the Middle 
Passage, things – organic, man-made, and hybrid – show an independence and liveliness 
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that exceeds human projects. In the practice of law, human beings court such things 
rather than regulate them.   
It is one thing to problematize or expose a dichotomy as problematic or even 
false. It is another to actively theorize what the world looks like after the 
problematization of that dichotomy has been disclosed. The New Materialists take one of 
two distinct theoretical approaches to matter’s independence.  
The modus operandi of the first approach has been to shift the focus away from 
what a thing is to what it does, or what Jane Bennett calls “thing power.” That is to say, 
one New Materialist approach is to focus on the way things both human and more-than-
human “make differences, produce effects, alter the course of events” (Bennett viii). A 
philosophy of immanence or horizontal ontology informs this approach. It has been 
heavily influenced by Latour’s work on Actor Network Theory, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work on assemblages and rhizomes, and a Spinozist sensibility of conatus. I take an 
example from Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (2010) to 
flesh out how this approach attempts to access the “great outdoors.”  
In Vibrant Matter, Bennett gives the example of a massive electrical blackout that 
occurred in North America during the summer of 2003. Over the period of several days in 
August 2003, fifty million people over approximately fifteen thousand square miles in the 
eastern portion of the United States and Canada were left without electricity. Over one 
hundred power plants were shut down including a score of nuclear reactors. Basements 
flooded, stores were looted, people were left in the dark and sweltering summer heat. At 
first blush, an electrical blackout seems like a wholly human failure. Humans makes 
electricity, humans build and maintain the lines to deliver electricity, humans use 
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electricity, humans structure their lives around the electrical grid. Yet, rather than focus 
on identifying a human agent to blame, such as the directors of the Ohio power company 
FirstEnergy, the company whose Lake Eerie power plant’s failure many argued 
precipitated the extensive blackout, Bennett focuses on the larger complex within which 
these persons acted.  
The electrical grid, Bennett writes, is “a volatile mix of coal, sweat, 
electromagnetic fields, computer programs, electron streams, profit motives, heat, 
lifestyles, nuclear fuel, plastic, fantasies of mastery, static, legislation, water, economic 
theory, wire, and wood – to name just some of the actants” (25). “Actants” is a term of art 
Bennett borrows from Latour’s Actor Network Theory to mean something like an actor, 
but not with a strong sense of agency or possessed agency. The actant, unlike the actor, 
does not possess their agency but rather enacts it. I will return to this point below. 
Bennett continues, “There is always some friction among the parts, but for several days in 
August 2003 in the United States and Canada the dissonance was so great that 
cooperation become impossible” (25). In drawing our attention to the way in which 
human intentionality is only one actor among others, Bennett dislodges agency from its 
traditional resting place in human subject or human collectivity to an interactant web. 
True, heads of companies like FirstEnergy and the decisions they made were certainly 
complicit in the blackout, as were members of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission and other human governmental agents. But also active in the blackout was 
the way electricity behaves sometimes unpredictably, tree-wire encounters, and brush 
fires that downed lines and stressed other lines, as well as computer programs that 
automatically threw plants offline when overstressed. “Electricity sometimes goes where 
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we send it,” Bennett concludes, “and sometimes it chooses its path on the spot, in 
response to the other bodies it encounters and the surprising opportunities for actions and 
interactions that they afford” (28). Bennett thus points to a world where the human being 
and human society is just one actor among many others.  
Coming from a different angle and drawing on Martin Heidegger, but pointing to 
a similar account of things and objects as containing traces of independence that prevent 
them from being cast as the inert background of human activity, Graham Harman argues 
that all things contain an element of withdrawal or self-withholding. This element, this 
reservoir of potential, means that all things can never be fully ordered, manipulated, or 
regulated by human beings. Objects have a life of their own, independent of our 
particular projects. Unlike the first New Materialist approach however, this second 
approach – often self-described as Object-Oriented Ontology or Speculative Realism – 
does not focus on relationality and interconnectedness. It focuses instead on how all 
objects, including the most mundane, withdraw from one another. Thus, instead of 
privileging relationality and the univocity or connectedness of being, this approach 
explicitly denies the possibility of relationality.   
Using a Heideggerian-inspired phenomenology that others have equated with 
medieval mystical thinking, this second approach presumes that in moments of 
breakdown, when a hammer shifts from being the ready-at-hand tool of the carpenter to 
the broken present-at-hand object, the hammer offers us an elusive glimpse of its radical 
independence, the reservoir of potentiality it harbors outside our use of it. It is in the 
moment of breakdown that we recognize a hammer is never only a tool for a human 
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project –  a “correlate” of human existence to use the Quentin Meillassoux’s word. A 
hammer also exists in a netherworld of its own possibilities.  
Both New Materialist approaches find ways to access what Kant’s critical 
philosophy said was off-limits to us—the outside. But when we read the New 
Materialisms alongside the stories about natural law I have told in this dissertation a 
helpful distinction comes to light in terms of what Aquinas called the “analogical 
structure of being” (analogia entis) (and more recently what Jacob von Uexküll has 
called “the musical laws of nature”). Reading the New Materialisms jurisprudentially 
alongside Thomistic natural law theory opens up avenues to reconsider the debate 
between how to access the “great outdoors” internal to the New Materialisms as another 
iteration of the Scholastic debate between the univocity and equivocity of being.  
 
B. Agency as Enactment 
Another possible strand uniting the New Materialisms might be the claim that 
agency is enacted rather than possessed by subjects. This is related to the claim that 
knowledge is embodied. Knowledge is not possessed by subjects; knowledge is 
something in the world that subjects partake of, enact, or live through. Michel Villey 
suggests the same may be said of jurisprudence as jurisprudence emerges from particular 
“cases” mixed up in the world rather than neatly pre-given in subject-object schema 
(Villey).130 Similarly, the New Materialist David Abrams asks, although more poetically, 
                                                 
130 According to Costas Douzinas, for Michel Villey “The judge [first] acts like a botanist or an 
anthropologist: he observes the connections and relations amongst his fellow citizens, the way in which 
they arrange their affairs, in particular the way in which they distribute benefits and burdens” (2000, 40). 
These “connections and relations” have real value according to Villey explicating Aristotle, drawing their 
sustenance not just from human convention but dikaion. Dikaion, Villey argues, was an important concept 
in jurisprudence that was not concerned with morality, utility, or truth, but with the sharing of external 
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“What if mind is not ours, but is Earth’s?...What if like the hunkered owl, and the spruce 
bending above it, and beetle staggering from needle to needle on that branch, we all 
partake of the wide intelligence of this world” (123).  
Andrew Pickering and Karen Barad are more systematic in their critique of the 
traditional representationalist epistemology which positions the subject (scientist) as 
possessor of knowledge rather than actor in the world. Pickering argues for what he calls 
a “mangle of practice” evoking the old-fashioned laundry “mangle” that dried clothes by 
smooshing and wringing them between two rollers. Practice and knowledge emerge for 
Pickering as wrung out together (1995). The human scientist does not stand apart from 
the world as an external observer, but acts within the world and as an integral piece of the 
world. Barad goes even further arguing that all knowledge is always only “part of the 
universe making itself intelligible to another part” or what she calls the “intractivity” of 
the universe instead of its “interactivity” (2006, 143).131 Focusing on matters of practices, 
doings, and actions, Barad argues for the priority of “phenomena” (121). “Phenomena,” 
Barad writes, “are ontologically primitive relations—relations without preexisting relata” 
(133). In making this move, Barad, similar to Pickering, rejects a Kantian tradition that 
subordinates phenomena to a more real realm of noumena. “Relata,” or the discrete 
things that together compose a relation, “do not preexist relations; rather, relata-within-
phenomena emerge through specific intra-actions” (134). “Intra-action,” or action within, 
                                                 
goods and the ordering of the world (Villey 1969). Consequently, “the just decision is always provisional 
and experimental, transient and dynamic in the same way that human nature is always on the move, 
between the actual and the potential and continuously adjusts to changes, new circumstances and 
contingencies. Finding the dikaion is the aim of the classical jurist but that is never fully and finally 
achieved” (2000, 40). 
 
131 The title of her most influential book Meeting the Universe Halfway also makes the same point. 
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rather than inter-action, or action between, better gets at the characteristics of agency and 
knowledge production, Barad suggests. “Agency is not,” Barad concludes, “an attribute,” 
or something that might belong to something, “but the ongoing reconfigurings of the 
world” (135). 
Bennett makes a similar observation is her account of the 2003 North American 
electrical blackout I detailed above. Quoting Latour, Bennett describes the blackout as a 
“slight surprise of action” (27). Bennett’s point is that there is always something slightly 
surprising, unpredictable, and cumulative about action. Over half a century ago, the 
political theorist Hannah Arendt made similar claims about action and its surprising, 
unpredictable character, although for Arendt action is an exclusively human affair. The 
action itself, in addition to the actors, adds something that is not predicated to the effect. 
We always find ourselves in the middle of action. Action happens, it is something done, 
an enactment rather than something possessed or done by a subject upon or to an object.  
Hence, the ever-present possibility of surprise. Of course, this is why Arendt thought 
promising, forgiving, and the law-like “islands of stability” they produced were so crucial 
to the human experience of action. It is also why she says only the “backwards glance” of 
the storyteller can give meaning to the “sheer occurrences” humans encounter and 
participate in as action. The stories this dissertation has told about natural law suggests 
the continued importance of the “backward glance” of the storyteller and its law-like 






C. And Earthly Ethics  
A third and final strand uniting the New Materialisms has been described as the 
New Materialisms’ call to “listen to the call of things” (Cole 2013, 107). Both 
practitioners and critics alike have taken to describing this as the New Materialisms’ 
“ethical” moment. In Reassembling the Social, Latour describes his method at length as 
one of giving objects voice, of “making them talk.” 
To be accounted for, objects have to enter into accounts. If no trace if 
produced, they offer no information to the observer and will have no visible 
effect on other agents. They remain silent and are no longer actors: they 
remain, literally, unaccountable. Although the situation is the same for groups 
and agencies—no trial, no account, no information—it is clearly more 
difficult for objects, since carrying their effects while becoming silent is what 
they are so good at as Samuel Butler noted. Once built, the wall of bricks 
does not utter a word—even though the group of workmen goes on talking 
and graffiti may proliferate on its surface…This is why specific tricks have to 
be invented to make them talk, that is, to offer descriptions of themselves, to 
produce scripts of what they are making others—humans and nonhumans—
do. (2005, 79)  
 
More recently, Latour has described his method as establishing “a parliament of things” 
(2009). Just as humans need representatives to have a voice in parliamentary systems of 
governance, nonhuman objects need to be provided representatives to give them a voice. 
Similarly, Jane Bennett “tr[ies] to give voice to a vitality intrinsic to materiality” in 
Vibrant Matter (2010, 3). 
 Here the cross-overs between the New Materialisms and the use of legal language 
become apparent. Yet when the New Materialists seem to draw on legal theory, they 
never recognize it as a resource. Rather, they emphasize the ethical claim that we must 
listen to the call of things by assuming that there is call and we are either just talking too 
loudly to hear it or do not yet have the techniques to hear it (Kang 2017). In other words, 
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the problem is on our end. It is an ethical problem, one we need to fix with ourselves 
rather than a problem with the links and ties that connect us to the world which the stories 
I have told in this dissertation suggest are better addressed as a jurisprudential problem. 
Such a problem may be more richly addressed when it is recognized as a jurisprudential 
one.  
 This brings me full circle in this chapter to the animal trials I began with and the 
institutional work they did of connecting and bonding a human community to a place 
within the wider more-than-human world. I understand the New Materialisms to be 
pursuing a similar task for us late moderns today although from an individual ethical 
standpoint. The salvo the animal trials raise for us today then is with what institutional 
work and care will we greet and face the bonds of vulnerability and embodiment that 
hold us in unfinished makings with a still-becoming material world (Latour 2016)? This 
dissertation has attempted, among other things, to recover some stories from the past to 


































Figure 1, Johns Hopkins University, 22 September 2014. Copyright owned by author. 
 
 
The queer but not uncommon incident which I am about to relate in truncated form 
occurred in the early fall of 2014 on Johns Hopkins University’s Homewood campus in 
northern Baltimore City. I was fortunate enough to be privy and present (only a few 
documentary photographs exist, see figure 1). It is my feeling that this account of “the 
natural law’s holding court” may now be published without impunity due to the time that 
has elapsed, the increasing frequency and ubiquity of such occurrences in our warming 
world, and the negligence I might otherwise suffer and sustain. 
 
Years earlier, the aforementioned university had decreed and promulgated a network of 
crisscrossing redbrick paths throughout the campus. These paths, cut at sharp angles, 
were felt by many members of the community to be an artificial and arbitrary imposition 
of university’s legislative power. One section of pathway, near Levering Hall and just off 
the Wyman Quad, elicited especial protest from the faculty, staff, squirrels, students, 
dogs, trees, visitors, and flowing water, all collectively pursuing gentle government. So 
arbitrary and unnatural (contra naturam) was the bent of the path felt to be, that none but 
the most acquiescent to posited authority followed it; the majority ambling instead across 
the grass and under the shade of a small pin oak, walking the lay of the land. In repeated 
shows of might and order, the university erected barriers and other obstacles attempting 
to discipline the anarchic bodies—at least this was the university’s presumed view—




The cold draconian measures had little effect however, and in overdue course the 
university relented to warm sighted Themis, daughter of Gaia, justice below. Now 
working with rather than against the natural law, heeding the ‘tie that sympathetically 
binds the parts of the world,’ the university repealed the old (and rarely trodden) 
pathway, seeding it with grass, and promulgated with redbrick the pathway the natural 
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